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 Human health risks and environmental risks are different and are perceived 
differently; health risks primarily threaten human health, whereas environmental risks 
threaten both human and environmental health. Nonetheless people tend to view 
environmental risks as impersonal, primarily threatening nonhuman elements or distant 
others, making it difficult for risk communicators to motivate target audiences to take 
risk-mitigating actions.  
 This dissertation argues that because environmental risks threaten both health and 
the environment, messages about this category of risk can be framed in either a health or 
an environmental context as a means of altering risk perceptions. It is further asserted 
that, all things being equal, message features that are more or less relevant to either the 
health or the environmental frame will achieve different results depending on which 
message frame is used. As a means of investigating this claim, two types of similarity 
(demographic similarity and scene similarity) were manipulated in a 2 (risk frame: health, 
  
environmental) × 2 (demographic similarity: high, low) × 2 (scene similarity: high, low) 
between-subjects experiment (N = 568), in which participants were exposed to a message 
about drought framed as either a health or an environmental risk.  
 The results show that scene similarity interacts with the two message frames 
(health and environmental) for narrative persuasion and behavior-related variables. 
Specifically, high (versus low) scene similarity resulted in better persuasive outcomes for 
the health frame than for the environmental frame, whereas low (versus high) scene 
similarity resulted in better persuasive outcomes for the environmental frame than for the 
health frame. Additionally, the study found that framing an environmental risk as a health 
risk increased behavioral intention and behavioral expectation. Furthermore, high (versus 
low) personal relevance improved risk perception, narrative persuasion, behavioral 
intention and expectation, and response efficacy.  
 The study has implications for health and environmental risk communication, 
particularly for impersonal risks that people perceive to be of low personal relevance, and 
opens up new avenues for research and practice in areas such as climate change 
communication and entertainment-education. Limitations, implications, and 
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Chapter 1: Human Health vs. Environmental Risk Perception 
 
When people fail to be alarmed about a risk or hazard, they do not take 
precaution. We should find ways to evoke visceral reactions towards the 
risk; perhaps by simulations of its concrete future consequences for 
people’s home or other regions they visit or value.        
     Elke U. Weber (2006, p.103)  
 
 The above quotation from Elke U. Weber highlights a critical challenge faced by 
environmental risk communicators: how to motivate people to mitigate a risk that they do 
not perceive as a problem. Weber (2006) suggested finding ways to show people the 
enormity of the threat, perhaps through scenes that depict devastation in places that they 
value. Although this may be a reasonable strategy for increasing perceptions of risk, if 
people are not convinced that the risk directly (and perhaps immediately) affects their 
personal health and wellbeing, they may still remain indifferent to the risk (see Kahlor, 
Dunwoody, Griffin, & Neuwirth, 2006; Maibach, Roser-Renouf, & Leiserowitz, 2008). 
Convincing people that an environmental risk directly affects their personal health has 
been suggested as a strategy for combatting environmental risk apathy and engendering 
risk mitigating and adaptation actions (see for example, Frumkin Hess, Luber, Maililay, 
& McGeehin, 2008; Semenza, Ploubidis, & George, 2011). 
Helweg-Larsen (1999) found that personal experience with a hazard can increase 
perception of risk, but that does not help the vulnerable who have not yet had the benefit 
of hindsight. Weber (2010) suggested that vicarious experience can be used to alter 
perceptions of risk, and although he suggested this be done through statistical description, 
a meta-analysis by Reyna, Nelson, Han, and Dieckmann (2009) showed that people 
generally lack numeracy skills that would help them make wise decisions about personal 




narrative message about an environmental risk as a means of altering risk perception. 
Risk perception is central to risk communication because of its crucial role as a mediator 
between attitude and behavior change (Roser-Renouf & Nisbet, 2008; Sjöberg, 2000a, 
2000b, 2004).  
In the field of risk communication, several theories predicting risk-related attitude 
and behavior have been used to guide the development of persuasive risk messages. 
Notably, theories of this type, such as the Health Belief Model (HBM; Janz & Becker, 
1984; Rosenstock, 1966), and the Extended Parallel Process Model (EPPM; Witte, 1994) 
were derived for health risks (e.g., HIV, heart disease, cancer, diabetes).  Due to the 
fundamental differences between human health and environmental risks (e.g., climate 
change, drought, deforestation, coral reef degradation, wildfires), it may not be 
appropriate to apply human health-specific theories to environmental risk messaging.  
First, these two types of risks are different in their causes, consequences, and primary 
target; human health risks directly threaten the self, whereas environmental risks threaten 
the self as well as something or someone other than the self, for example, plants and 
animals, and their habitats.  Second, because people perceive these two risk classes 
differently (e.g., Schutz & Weidmann, 1998) meaning that the predictors (i.e., health 
beliefs) in the models will be unique, their attitudes, intentions, and behavior regarding 
health and environmental risks also differ such that they generally prioritize health risk 
mitigation over environmental risk mitigation (Kahlor et al., 2006; Weber, 2006).   
 The central claim of this dissertation is that because environmental risks threaten 
both human and environmental health, messages about this category of risk can be 




relative to environmental health), and further, that specific message elements result in 
different outcomes depending on the frame being used. These claims are based on the 
idea that some message elements are more relevant to a health frame and others to an 
environmental frame, and that when there is match in relevance between the message 
element and the frame, message outcomes are improved as opposed to when there is 
irrelevance and non-matching between the message elements and the risk frame. This 
claim will be investigated by studying the effects of relevant and irrelevant similarity in 
narrative risk message.   
The dissertation treats similarity into two ways; one way concerns similarity of 
demographics (e.g., race, age, occupation) between the audience and narrative characters, 
referred to as demographic similarity; the other concerns similarity of features shared 
between the locale of the audience and the locale of the narrative characters (e.g., 
geographic location, weather, infrastructure), referred to as scene similarity. Because 
human health risks are considered to primarily affect people, demographic similarity may 
be more relevant to a health message frame than to an environmental message frame. 
However, because environmental risks are perceived as primarily affecting the 
environment, scene similarity may be more relevant to an environmental message frame 
than to a health message frame.  It is therefore hypothesized that demographic similarity 
is more important than scene similarity as a predictor of risk perception, narrative 
persuasion, and behavioral intention when the risk is framed a human health threat, 
whereas scene similarity is more important than demographic similarity as a predictor of 
the same variables when the risk is framed as an environmental threat. 




similarity: high, low) × 2 (scene similarity: high low) online experiment was conducted 
(N = 568), after implementing two pilot studies (N = 171, and N = 426). The studies draw 
on narrative persuasion theory as well as theories in the broader areas of persuasion and 
social influence, health and risk communication, risk perception and assessment, 
decision-making, risk and information processing. The results have implications for risk 
communication in both health and environmental contexts but especially in the latter 
because of the duality of the target of the threat for environmental risk (i.e., they threaten 
both human as well as environmental health).  
 The next chapter situates the dissertation research in the broader context of risk 
communication and discusses literature regarding characteristics and perceptions of risk 
in general, and then more importantly, focuses on research about human health and 
environmental risks.  The chapter also elucidates the connections between risk 
perception, similarity, persuasion, and attitude and behavior change, and briefly discusses 
some of the variables that may modify these connections. Details of the research studies 
conducted are found in Chapters 3 and 4; Chapter 5 lays out limitations of the research, 




Chapter 2: Human Health and Environmental Risk Perception 
and the use of Similarity-Based Messages to Stimulate Change 
This chapter is divided into three sections. The first situates human health and 
environmental risks in the broader context of risk communication and then goes on to 
define, characterize, and operationalize each of these two types of risk. The purpose of 
that first section is to explain the theoretical basis for the operationalization of human 
health and environmental risk frames used in this dissertation and the distinction between 
these two frames. Being able to distinguish between the health frame and the 
environmental frame is fundamental to the arguments about the proposed differential 
roles of demographic similarity and scene similarity in each frame. 
The second section elaborates on risk perception, its role in attitude and behavior 
change, how it differs between human health and environmental contexts, and how 
narratives may influence risk perception. The third section discusses the role of message 
framing and similarity in risk perception and narrative persuasion processes, and how the 
influence of demographic similarity and scene similarity may differ between a health-
framed risk narrative and an environmental-framed one.  
Characterizing the Risk in Risk Communication 
Defining Risk Communication 
The various definitions of risk communication in the literature speak to the 
multifaceted nature of the process of communicating risk. Plough and Krimsky (1987) 
defined risk communication as “any public or private communication that informs 




and, McComas (2006) defined it as “an iterative exchange of information among 
individuals, groups, and institutions related to the assessment, characterization, and 
management of risk” (p. 76). Covello, von Winterfeldt, and Slovic’s (1987) definition 
specified the type of risks in question; they stated that risk communication is "any 
purposeful exchange of scientific information between interested parties regarding health 
or environmental risks” (p. 222). Covello’s (1998) definition adds information about 
message content and context; he stated that risk communication is an open, transparent, 
systematic, structured and evidence-based method of effective communication that 
“involves the exchange of information among interested parties about the nature, 
magnitude, significance, or control of a risk” and which occurs in high-concern situations 
where people perceive a threat to their safety, health, or environment (p. 161).   
 Although some may object to definitions limiting risk communication to health 
and environmental contexts, much of the literature in the field is indeed related to these 
two contexts, particularly in the case of public health risk communication (see reviews 
about the development of risk communication in McComas, 2006; Plough & Krimsky, 
1987).  What is generally missing from the literature, however, is a comparison of how 
risk communication may differ between health and environmental contexts. For a clear 
understanding of possible differential message effects between these two contexts, clear 
operational definitions of health and environmental risks need to be established, a feat 
that can be quite complex. The following section first establishes how the term risk is 
used in this dissertation and then goes on to discuss the definition, categorization, and 




Defining, Characterizing, and Categorizing Risk 
Risk as a general term. Risk is commonly defined as the probability of an event 
with adverse consequences, and the magnitude of its effects (Kaplan & Garrick, 1981; 
Rayner & Cantor, 1987; Whyte & Burton, 1980).  The term hazard is often confused with 
risk, but experts point out that the event with adverse consequences is called the hazard, 
whereas the likelihood of a hazard causing harm is called risk (Kaplan & Garrick, 1981). 
Nonetheless, the terms hazard and risk continue to be used interchangeably in the 
literature, but seemingly less out of confusion and more out of convenience (see, e.g., 
Kasperson, Kasperson, & Dow, 2001; Whyte & Burton, 1980). In this dissertation the 
term risk carries the same meaning as hazard, that is, the adverse event itself (e.g., 
drought, climate change). This dissertation is concerned with people’s perception, that is, 
their subjective (perceived) risk rather than objective risk, which is the actual scientific 
probability that the adverse event will occur (Boholm, 1998; Kaplan & Garrick, 1981; 
Weber 2006).   
 Risks have been defined, categorized, and characterized in several ways, based on 
various aspects, including the severity of the risk for human casualties versus no human 
casualties (Fischhoff, Slovic, Lichtenstein, Read, & Combs, 1978), source of the risk, for 
example, natural versus manmade (e.g., Axelrod, McDaniel, & Slovic, 1999; McDaniels, 
Axelrod, & Slovic, 1996, 1997), the medium through which the risk is transferred, such 
as humans versus environment (e.g., Smith, 2013; Whyte & Burton, 1980), the scale of 
the impact, such as local versus global (e.g., Schmidt & Gifford, 1989), and the target of 
the risk outcomes, that is, self versus something or someone other than self  (e.g., Dietz, 




environmental risk, however, are more likely to be based on more than one of these 
aspects, whereas definitions of health risk (very few of which are explicit) appear to be 
based solely on the target of the risk, that is, human health and wellbeing.  
 Defining and operationalizing human health and environmental risk. Menon, 
Raghubir, and Agrawal (2008, p. 2) defined health risk as “the perception of the 
subjective likelihood of the occurrence of a negative event related to health for a person 
or group of people over a specified time period.” For the purpose of this dissertation, the 
operational definition of a human health risk is: a risk that is readily seen as directly and 
primarily affecting humans, with no obvious adverse effects on nonhuman elements of 
ecosystems. Risks that fall into this category include cancer, heart attacks, and HIV/AIDS 
(see Kahlor et al., 2006).  
 Definitions of environmental risk are based on combinations of several aspects of 
the risk including its severity, source, medium of transmission, scale, and target. For 
example, Kasperson, Kasperson, and Dow (2001, p. 4), defined an environmental risk as 
one that levels “threats to human beings and what they value resulting from human-
induced environmental change, either systemic or cumulative, on the global scale.” In 
this dissertation, the operational definition of an environmental risk is: a natural or 
human-induced hazard, transmitted through the natural or built environment, with 
negative consequences for human and nonhuman components of ecosystems, on a local 
or global scale. Nonhuman components of ecosystems include plants, animals, and their 
habitats. For the purpose of this dissertation ecological and environmental risks are 
synonymous. The dual nature of an environmental risk affecting both self and something 




health or a threat to the environment, and as a framework for studying message features 
that are perceived differently for these two types of threat.   
When formulating messages designed to change people’s attitude and behavior 
through increased risk perception, a clear understanding of how people perceive the risks 
in the first place will help to determine how message elements can be used to alter risk 
perceptions. Clearly, health and environmental risks have distinctive.  Next, I will 
elaborate on how these distinctions might manifest themselves in different risk 
perceptions.   
Risk Perception 
Defining Risk Perception 
Within the realm of risk communication, it is considered axiomatic that 
persuasion (attitude and/or intention change) cannot occur if one does not perceive the 
risk. Risk perception refers to people’s subjective judgments about the probability of an 
adverse event and their concern about the consequences (Sjöberg, 2004; Slovic, 1987).  
Risk perception is based on a host of psychological, social, cultural, and contextual 
factors, as well as attributions to the risk itself (Bronfman & Cifuentes, 2003; Plough & 
Krimsky, 1987; Sjöberg, 2004; Slovic, 1987). These judgments involve “beliefs, 
attitudes, judgments and feelings, as well as the wider cultural and social dispositions 
they adopt towards hazards and their benefits” (Pidgeon, Hood, Jones, Turner, & Gibson, 
1992, p. 89). Risk perception is therefore a subjective concept in that two risks with the 
same objective probability (i.e., probabilistic risk assessments) can be perceived 




Linking Risk Perception with Attitude and Behavior 
Risk perception determines people’s tolerance and acceptability of risk as well as 
their reactions to risk (Sjöberg, 2004; Starr, 1969).  Fischer et al. (1991) found that 
people’s willingness to pay for reductions in future risks was higher for risks perceived to 
pose direct personal threat (e.g., human health risks) than for those perceived to directly 
affect something other than self (e.g., the environment). Some studies have shown that 
people are generally unwilling to take steps that would interfere with their personal 
comfort in order to mitigate perceived impersonal risk (e.g., environmental risk) but often 
opt to engage in smaller behaviors even when those behaviors (e.g., recycling) may have 
little or no effect on the problem (Lorenzoni & Pidgeon, 2006; Wakefield, Elliot, Cole, & 
Eyles, 2001). This raises the issue of willingness to make personal sacrifices, a concept 
that has been found to be critical in behavioral intentions to engage in climate change 
mitigation (Loewenstein, Weber, Hsee, & Welch, 2001; O’Connor et al., 2006; Roser-
Renouf & Nisbet, 2008).  
Loewenstein et al. (2001) suggested that the reason people are not willing to make 
personal sacrifices to mitigate climate change is because people do not experience the 
level of emotion needed to drive such behavior. Climate change and related risks rank 
below personal risks and everyday stresses (Bostrom, Granger Morgan, Fischhoff, & 
Read, 1994; Lorenzoni & Pidgeon, 2006; Norton & Leaman, 2004) with regard to their 
priorities. In addition, people generally consider themselves responsible for personal risks 
like human health risks but consider environmental risks as posing no direct personal 
threat, lacking in personal relevance and responsibility (Gattig & Hendrickx, 2007; 




Gooby & Zinn, 2006; Weber, 2006).  Because of these characteristics people perceive 
that they have little control over environmental risks and generally do not feel efficacious 
about their individual actions to mitigate this category of risk (Lorenzoni & Pidgeon, 
2006).   
McDaniels et al. (1995) measured perceptions of a number of environmental risks 
including deforestation, loss of wetlands, acid rain, marine pollution, ozone depletion, 
and soil erosion, finding that in terms of these risks, the participants perceived the 
consequences to be greater for nonhuman species than for themselves. In addition, 
participants perceived that environmental risks held greater benefits for society as a 
whole than for themselves.  Harland et al. (1999) posited that this is perhaps because the 
benefits of behaviors related to environmental risks are less obvious than for personal 
risks. According to Roser-Renouf and Nisbet (2008, p. 48), “impersonal risk perceptions 
are powerful drivers of policy preferences and behavioral intentions.” Sjöberg (2000) 
found that the seriousness of the consequences of a risk (an important component of risk 
perception) and interest in the risk predicts the demand for mitigation. People tend to 
place impersonal risks in the category of moral or ethical issues and often disassociate 
themselves from such risks (Zwick & Renn, 2002). In addition, Poortinga and Pidgeon 
(2003) found that in some cases the dread factor for such risks is low. Strategic messages 
can be used to increase people’s risk perceptions with a view to changing their attitude 
and behavior.  
Narratives provide a way to frame a risk in a health or an environmental context, 
while varying the features of people and places portrayed. The following section 




change in risk perceptions, attitude and behavior.  
Changing Risk Perception through Narratives 
 Narratives provide the opportunity for people to vicariously and emotionally 
experience the impacts of a risk by presenting the disastrous consequences in a concrete 
and relevant manner (De Wit, Das, & Vet, 2008; Dunlop, Wakefield, & Kashima, 2010; 
Marx et al., 2007; Moyer- Gusé, 2008; Weber, 2006). This vicarious experience in turn 
leads to increased realism and enhanced identification (Green & Brinn, 2003; Cohen, 
2001) with the story line or the characters themselves, as well as with the places depicted 
in the story. Weber (2006, p. 103) suggested that mental simulations of risk-related 
consequences for places and possessions that people value can create visceral reactions 
needed to motivate attitude and behavior change regarding environmental risks like 
climate change.  
 Kreuter et al. (2007, p. 222) defined a narrative as “a representation of connected 
events and characters that has an identifiable structure, is bounded in space and time, and 
contains implicit or explicit messages about the topic being addressed.” Compared to 
statistical messages, narratives can sometimes be more persuasive because they have 
been found to be associated with less defensive message processing (De Wit, Das, & Vet, 
2008) and the persuasive intent may be considered to be less transparent than in other 
types of messages (Kreuter et al., 2007).  
 De Wit, Das, and Vet (2008) compared the persuasiveness of narrative versus 
statistical messages about Hepatitis B virus in increasing the risk perception of men who 
have sex with men. They found that participants who were exposed to the narrative 




against the virus than those who were exposed to a statistical message.  De Wit et al. 
concluded that the narratives increased the sense of personal risk because they caused 
less reactance and counterarguing.  
 Narrative persuasion processes: Identification, transportation, and self-
referencing. In addition to reducing counterarguing, narratives are said to influence 
attitude and behavior through a number of processes including identification, 
transportation, and self-referencing (Cohen, 2001; Dunlop, Wakefield, & Kashima, 2010; 
Green & Brock, 2000, Moyer-Gusé, 2008). Cohen (2001) described identification as a 
process in which audience members take on the perspective of a character to the extent 
that they lose their sense of self-awareness and develop intensified cognitive and 
emotional connections with the character, leading the audience to empathize with the 
character, adopt the character’s identity and goals, and simulate feelings appropriate for 
the character in a given situation. Transportation, which is becoming engrossed 
(absorbed) in a story, is theorized to be different from identification although both 
concepts involve losing oneself in a story (Moyer-Gusé, 2008). The difference is that in 
the case of identification the message receiver takes on the perspective of the 
character(s), whereas transportation does not require this perspective-taking (see Cohen, 
2011; Moyer-Gusé, 2008; Moyer-Gusé et al., 2011). Self-referencing has been defined as 
relating information to aspects of oneself (Burnkrant & Unnava, 1995). Dunlop et al. 
(2010) noted that self-referencing goes beyond personal relevance in that it provides a 
means through which previously stored information (e.g., memories) can be linked with 
information to which one is currently attending.  




narratives can influence narrative persuasion processes, as well as risk perception, and 
behavior-related variables. Specifically, it is proposed that varying the risk-frame (health 
versus environmental) of the message and the level of similarity between message 
recipients and the people (and places) in the narrative can lead to a change in the level of 
the outcome variables. 
 Framing the narrative to improve outcomes. Nisbet (2009, p. 15) defined 
message frames as “interpretive storylines that set a specific train of thought in motion, 
communicating why an issue might be a problem, who or what might be responsible for 
it, and what should be done about it.” Nisbet also stated that framing allows for specific 
information to be given greater weight over other information, and allows for linkages 
between two concepts. Framing an environmental risk as a health concern is a way to 
relate the risk to a familiar problem (personal health) thereby increasing the personal 
relevance of that risk (see Nisbet, 2009). Additionally, such framing can also serve to 
combat the distal associations often attributed to environmental risk; after all, one’s 
personal health is as proximal as a risk can get.  
 Because people are likely to perceive greater threat when a risk is related to 
human health rather than environmental health (see Kahlor et al., 2006), it is expected 
that a health-framed message will lead to a greater feeling of vulnerability (susceptibility) 
than an environmental-framed one. Moreover, a risk that primarily affects people should 
be considered more severe than one that primarily affects the environment. Furthermore, 
people are expected to feel a greater need to take mitigating action when a risk directly 
affects humans as opposed to the environment, that is, they should have a higher level of 




environmental frame. Additionally, they should perceive more response efficacy for a 
health risk (as opposed to an environmental risk) because of a greater sense of control 
(Lorenzoni & Pidgeon, 2006).  
 Framing should also influence narrative persuasion processes. Because a health 
risk affects people as opposed to the environment, identification (taking on the 
perspective of characters in the story) should be greater for the health frame than for the 
environmental frame.  And, although transportation (losing oneself in a story) does not 
necessitate feeling connected to narrative characters (see Moyer-Gusé, Chung, & Jaun, 
2011), at least one study (Dunlop et al., 2010) suggested that transportation involves 
connecting events in the story to one’s life experiences; as such transportation should also 
be greater for the health frame as opposed to the environmental frame. Furthermore, a 
risk depicted in a health frame should facilitate greater self-referencing (making 
connections between the story and oneself).  
 H1: Effect of message framing on outcomes. Greater levels of susceptibility, 
 severity, behavioral intention, behavioral expectation, response efficacy, 
identification,  transportation and self-referencing will be seen in the case of a health-
framed message as opposed to an environmental-framed one. Basil and Brown (1997, p. 
393) suggested that “It is the combination of the message itself with people’s perceptions 
of similarity of the depicted character that determines the effectiveness” (p. 393).  
Therefore in addition to investigating the role of message framing on outcome variables, 
it is important to also study how similarity (between narrative characters and the message 
receiver) may influence risk perception, narrative persuasion and behavior related 




similarity. The characterization of similarity in the literature often lacks precision 
however; the following section defines and characterizes similarity as it has been used in 
the literature and operationalizes its use in this dissertation. The section then goes on to 
discuss the process through which similarity influences risk perception and persuasion, 
with a special focus on similarity’s influence through narrative persuasion processes.  
Similarity 
Defining, Characterizing and Operationalizing Similarity 
 The use of similarity as a persuasion strategy has been recognized for centuries. 
Aristotle’s (1941) Rhetoric discussed the importance of source credibility, also known as 
ethos, and suggested that persuasive outcomes can be increased by using speakers with 
high status and high similarity to the audience as a means of increasing ethos. The type of 
similarity to which Aristotle referred is known as source similarity, or more specifically 
source-receiver similarity, and it has been the pervasive context in which similarity has 
been studied, even in the field of risk communication. This section operationalizes the 
two types of similarity being investigated, demographic and scene similarity, and 
discusses their relevance (suitability) to health and environmental risks. This section also 
explains how these two types of similarity may influence attitude and behavior change by 
altering risk perception and narrative persuasion processes.  
Demographic similarity. According to Lowry (1973), demographic similarity 
refers to the degree of correspondence between the physical attributes of the sender and 
receiver.  This definition can also be applied in the context of narrative communication as 
it regards similarity between story characters and audience members.  Lowry referred to 




as gender, race, age, height, and nationality.  Demographic similarity is related to 
character similarity, which is defined by Moyer-Gusé (2008, p. 410) as “the degree to 
which an individual perceives that he or she is similar to a character.” Cohen (2001) 
pointed out that this perceived similarity increases realism and is not limited to 
demographic similarity but can extend to similarity of feelings and situations. However, 
the type of character similarity with which this dissertation is concerned is confined to 
demographic similarity between the characters in a narrative and the audience. 
Cohen (2001) noted that audience members can respond to a character in a 
narrative in several ways, including perceiving themselves as similar to that character, a 
response that has been shown to precede identification (Kreuter et al., 2007; Moyer-Gusé, 
2008). Character similarity is widely discussed in the entertainment-education literature 
and is one of five dimensions of involvement audience members can have with characters 
in a narrative.  The five dimensions are: similarity, liking, identification, wishful 
identification, and parasocial interaction (Cohen, 2001; Moyer-Gusé, 2008).1 Character 
similarity is said to be the driving mechanism responsible for stronger character 
involvement (McKinley, 2010).  
 Scene similarity. The types of similarity found in the literature appear to capture 
the similarity of people well, but have little to do with the similarity of places, that is, the 
scene in which a story takes place.  Scene similarity can, however, be considered in the 
broader realm of situational and contextual similarity that have been mentioned by some 
researchers (e.g., Cohen, 2001; Howel, Moffatt, Bush, Dunn, & Prince; Lorenzoni et al., 
2006). According to Lowry (1973), situational similarity refers to the degree of 




(1975), “situation” can be broadly defined as a “behavioral setting” bounded by space 
and time.  A related concept more applicable to this dissertation is “environment,” which 
can be considered as a “permanent situation” and includes the geographic location of a 
space (Belk, 1975).  If similarity is to be used in messages about environmental risks, 
often perceived as a threat to something or someone other than self (see Kahlor et al., 
2006; Leiserowitz, 2005, 2007), the similarity of the “something other than self” (e.g., the 
environment) must also be captured in the message. For a discussion about the 
importance of using a people and places framework when attempting to change risk 
related attitude and behavior see Maibach, Roser-Renouf, and Leiserowitz (2008).  
 For the purpose of this dissertation, scene refers to the physical environment in 
which a story is set, and includes the geographical location, the weather and climate, and 
natural and human-made elements of the physical environment (e.g., vegetation, 
infrastructure).  By extension, scene similarity is defined as the similarity between the 
physical environment depicted in a message and the physical environment of places 
valued by the audience, for example their residential locale, and it includes aspects of 
both the built and the natural environment.  
Using Similarity to Improve Outcomes 
 Similarity, risk perception, and behavior. Similarity (particularly source-
receiver similarity) has been widely used as a means of gaining compliance and changing 
attitude and behavior regarding health risks (Basil & Brown, 1994, 2004; Kalichman, & 
Hunter, 1992). Several studies have found that similarity increases risk perception. For 
example, Brown, Messman-Moore, Miller and Stasser (2005) determined that the greater 




greater their perceived risk of becoming victims of such assaults. Grace, Hershenfield, 
Robertson, and Stewart (2004) revealed that people who knew a similar other with severe 
acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) perceived themselves to be at greater risk.  
 Silvia (2005) found that high levels of source-receiver similarity led to increased 
compliance regardless of the level of threat in the message.  Additionally, after the 
announcement by sport celebrity Earvin “Magic” Johnson about his HIV status, 
significant changes in behavior were reported by high-risk individuals who identified 
with Johnson because of similarity (Kalichman, & Hunter, 1992; Wåhlberg & Sjöberg, 
2000).  
The positive relationship between similarity and risk perception is not always 
seen however, particularly in the optimistic bias literature. Optimistic bias is the tendency 
to perceive one’s risk as lower than that of others (Weinstein, 1980). Optimistic bias 
therefore is comparative risk perception, that is, the difference between people’s 
perception of risk to themselves and their perception of risk to others. Research shows 
that optimistic bias increases as dissimilarity between self and a referent other increases 
(Menon, Block, & Ramanathan, 2002; Perloff & Fetzer, 1986; Rimal & Morrison, 2006; 
Weinstein, 1980). Weinstein (1980) noted that this optimistic bias is a function of 
stereotype salience, that is, people have a stereotype regarding whom an event is likely to 
affect, and the more different from the stereotype they perceive themselves to be, the 
greater their optimistic bias.  It is evident in the literature that people do not generally 
perceive themselves or similar referent others to be vulnerable to risks (Raghubir & 




Research on comparative risk judgments indicates that people judge their risks to be on 
the same level as the risks of similar others (Davis, Hoch, & Ragsdale, 1986; Menon, 
Raghubir, & Schwarz, 1995; Whitley & Hern, 1991). Rimal and Morrison (2006) found 
that individuals perceived themselves to be more susceptible to a risk that similar others 
were susceptible to, as opposed to a risk to which dissimilar others were vulnerable.  In 
other words, optimistic bias was virtually eliminated when demographic characteristics 
(e.g., gender, age, ethnicity) between study participants and referents were matched. 
However, this absence of optimistic bias is cause for concern because people tend to 
perceive the magnitude and consequences of the risk to be low for themselves as well as 
similar referent other. In other words they perceive both themselves and similar referents 
to be invulnerable to the risk (Menon, Block, & Ramanathan, 2002; Perloff & Fetzer, 
1986; Raghubir & Menon, 1998; Rimal & Morrison, 2006; Weinstein, 1980).  
Optimistic bias has been observed with environmental risks, in that people 
perceive these risks as a threat to dissimilar, rather than similar others, and to dissimilar 
rather than similar places in their residential frame of reference (Leiserowitz, 2005, 2006, 
2007; Lorenzoni et al., 2006, 2007). With the recognition that people do not readily 
perceive risks to themselves or places they value (Lorenzoni et al., 2006; Weber, 2006; 
Weinstein, 1980), a possible way of increasing their risk perception is by increasing their 
perception of risks to similar others and similar places of reference. Because people judge 
their risk on the same level as the risks to similar others (Rimal & Morrison, 2006), this 
should increase their perception of increased risk to themselves and to the places where 




 Risk-Relevant Similarity. Because studies investigating the effects of similarity 
on risk perception and persuasion have dealt overwhelmingly with personal risk, there is 
need for research regarding the role of similarity in the perception of risks that are 
considered to be impersonal, for example, environmental risks. Not only is it worthwhile 
to determine whether the influence of similarity differs according to the type of similarity 
in the message (hypothesis 2) but it would also be beneficial  to determine whether the 
influence of a specific type of similarity varies depending on the way the message is 
framed. An interesting question, for example, is whether a specific type of similarity is 
more relevant (suitable) for a particular message frame.  
 Simons et al. (1970) suggested that relevant similarity has a greater effect on 
persuasion when compared with the effect of irrelevant similarity on persuasion. This 
relevance does not refer to personal relevance, but instead to the appropriateness of using 
a particular type of similarity in messages about particular types of risk.  For example, 
this dissertation contends that because environmental risks affect both people and places, 
when people cognitively make connections between themselves and the message content 
(self referencing), they are making these connections both in terms of the people in the 
message, and contextual factors such as place.  Consequently it may be more appropriate 
to use in environmental risk messages, depictions of both similar people (demographic 
similarity) and similar places (scene similarity) as a frame of reference for message 
receivers. 
  Based on the idea of using message-relevant similarity (vs. irrelevant similarity) 
it is expected that for narratives highlighting a personal risk (e.g., a human health risk), 




scenic or other contextual elements because a personal risk primarily affects the self. In 
other words, demographic elements paired with a risk affecting personal health make a 
relevant match.  
 Consequently, demographic similarity should have a greater influence on risk 
perception, attitude and behavior when a risk is framed as a health risk as opposed to 
when it is framed as an environmental risk. Alternately, for narratives highlighting 
perceived impersonal risks such as environmental risks (e.g., climate change, coral 
bleaching, deforestation, land and sea pollution), similarity of scenic elements (scene 
similarity) is expected to be more relevant (appropriate) than similarity of demographic 
elements because even though these risks affect people, they often do so indirectly, but 
they affect the environment directly.  
 Bickerstaff and Walker (2001) stated that when it comes to global environmental 
risks, perception is intimately tied to aspects of local context. In their study on risk 
perceptions regarding air pollution, concern about the threat was influenced by the local 
setting and lived experience. However, some researchers have found that people may not 
perceive similarities between their geographical locations and the stereotypical 
geographical locations shown by the media as being affected by environmental risks such 
as climate change (Leiserowitz, 2005, 2007; Lorenzoni et al., 2006). Lorenzoni et al.’s 
(2006) paper posited that localized representations of climate change effects may increase 
salience and engender mitigating behavior. This may also be the case for climate change 
related risks such as droughts, heatwaves, storms, and floods. 
 Similarity’s influence through narrative persuasion processes. The influence of 




referencing, identification, and transportation. Perceived similarity has been found to 
indirectly affect attitude and behavior change through identification (see Bandura, 1986; 
Basil & Brown, 1996, 1997; Cohen, 2001; McKinley, 2010; Moyer- Gusé, 2008).  
Identification can be triggered by message features or a realization of the similarity that 
exists between the audience and the character (Cohen, 2001).   
 Moyer- Gusé’s (2008) entertainment overcoming resistance model (EORM) 
proposes that identification leads to attitude and behavior change by reducing 
counterarguing and selective avoidance, by increasing perceived vulnerability, and by 
changing outcome expectancies, which refer to perceived consequences of a given 
behavior (Cohen, 2001, Kreuter et al., 2007; Moyer- Gusé, 2008). Subsequent tests of the 
EORM have found overall support for the EORM (e.g., McKinley, 2010; Moyer- Gusé, 
Chung, & Jain, 2011; Moyer- Gusé & Nabi, 2010).  However, whether there is a 
relationship between identification and perceived vulnerability is inconclusive at best:  
Neither Moyer- Gusé et al. (2011), Moyer- Gusé and Nabi (2010) nor McKinley (2010) 
found a statistically significant relationship between the constructs (although Moyer- 
Gusé and Nabi’s data showed a relationship between identification and vulnerability 
nearing statistical significance, but, only after a two week delay).  The lack of statistical 
significance for the influence of identification on perceived vulnerability could be due to 
the lack of personal relevance, which, as previously mentioned is critical in risk 
perceptions (Markova & Power, 1992).  
 Dunlop et al. (2010) found that for participants who read a narrative on skin 
cancer risk, transportation increased behavioral intention through self-referencing, which 




1995). Dunlop et al. stated that this finding suggested that transportation also involves 
relating events in a narrative to one’s own experiences. It is therefore reasonable to 
predict that the more similarity found between a narrative and oneself, the greater the 
level of transportation. Moreover, such a link between similarity and transportation is 
also easy to envision when one considers the conceptual overlap between transportation 
and identification, particularly as similarity is considered a prerequisite for the latter.  
Self-referencing has been found to behavioral intention through felt risk, that is, affect 
related to judgments of personal risk (Dunlop et al., 2010). Because self-referencing 
involves relating elements in a story to oneself and one’s experiences, it is also expected 
to increase with similarity. 
H2: Effect of similarity on outcomes. There will be greater levels of susceptibility, 
severity, behavioral intention, behavioral expectation, identification, 
transportation, and self-referencing when demographic similarity and scene 
similarity are high rather than low.  
H3a: Risk frame × demographic similarity interaction on outcomes. A risk-frame 
× demographic similarity interaction will occur for susceptibility, severity, 
behavioral intention, behavioral expectation, identification, transportation, and 
self-referencing, such that when demographic similarity is increased from low to 
high, there will be an increase in the level of the dependent variable, but the 
increase will be greater when the risk is framed as a health risk than when it is 
framed as an environmental risk. The highest scores on these dependent variables 
are expected for the health frame when demographic similarity is high, and the 




H3b: Risk frame × scene similarity interaction on outcomes. A risk frame × scene 
similarity interaction will occur for susceptibility, severity, behavioral intention, 
behavioral expectation, identification, transportation, and self-referencing, such 
that when scene similarity is increased from low to high, there will be an increase 
in the level of the said outcome variables, but the increase should be greater when 
the risk is framed as an environmental risk than when it is framed as a health risk. 
The highest level of each outcome variable is expected to occur when the frame is 
environmental and scene similarity is high, and the lowest for the health frame 
when scene similarity is low.  
H4: Risk frame × demographic similarity × scene similarity interaction on 
outcomes. A three-way interaction is predicted for susceptibility, severity, 
behavioral intention, behavioral expectation, identification, transportation, and 
self-referencing, such that  demographic similarity should have a greater effect on 
dependent variables when the risk was framed a health threat (rather than an 
environmental threat), and scene similarity should have a greater effect on the 
same variables when the risk was framed as an environmental threat. 
Additionally, for both message frames, the highest level of each dependent 
variable is expected to occur when both types of similarity are high rather than 
low, but the highest increase should be seen for the health frame when both 
demographic and scene similarity are high, followed by the environmental frame 
with both types of similarity are high. The lowest level of each  dependent 




similarity—low scene similarity condition, followed by the health frame—low 
demographic similarity—low scene similarity condition. 
RQ1: Demographic similarity × scene similarity on outcomes.  Is there a 
significant demographic similarity × scene similarity interaction for any of the 
outcome variables, without the effect of framing? 
RQ2: Effect of independent variables on perceived demographic and scene 
similarity. How do risk frame and manipulated similarity influence perceived 
demographic and scene similarity in terms of individual effects and interactions? 
Particularly, does an increase in one type of similarity lead to an increase in the 
perception of the other type of similarity, with and without the effect of risk 
frame? For example, do people think that they share more demographic 
characteristics with story characters if their locale is similar to that of the 
characters, and do these perceptions depend on the risk frame?  
The Role of Personal Relevance in Risk Perception and Narrative Persuasion 
 Personal relevance has been found to be a predictor of risk perception and 
persuasion. Several researchers have highlighted the need for increasing the personal 
relevance and salience of impersonal risk as a way of engendering mitigating action (e.g., 
Kahlor et al., 2006; Leiserowitz, 2005, 2006, 2007; Lorenzoni et al., 2006, 2007; Weber, 
2006).  Maximizing the similarity in messages about perceived impersonal risk may be 
one way of increasing the personal relevance and salience of this type of risk.  
In the Elaboration Likelihood Model (ELM, Petty & Cacioppo, 1986), personal 
relevance is operationalized as issue involvement. Issue involvement is defined as, “the 




& Cacioppo, 1979, p. 1915). As stated in Petty and Cacioppo (1990), personal 
importance encompasses various aspects of relevance, including goals and values. 
According to the Elaboration Likelihood Model (ELM), there are two routes to 
persuasion: the central route leads to persuasion through careful elaboration and 
evaluation of the arguments in a message, whereas persuasion through the peripheral 
route is achieved by using heuristic cues unrelated to the arguments in the message.  The 
message processing route depends on motivation and ability, with high motivation and 
ability leading to central route processing, and low motivation and ability leading to 
peripheral processing.   
Personal relevance (issue involvement) represents a form of motivation, therefore 
the greater the personal relevance, the greater the motivation, and the more likely that the 
central route to persuasion would be taken, therefore the greater elaboration of arguments 
in the message. Likewise, lower levels of personal relevance leads to lower levels of 
motivation making it more likely that the peripheral processing route will be taken, and 
hence less attention to message arguments, and more attention to heuristic message cues 
(Petty & Cacioppo, 1981). It therefore stands to reason that the degree to which 
participants are influenced by depictions of similarity (the representativeness heuristic, 
see Tversky & Kahneman, 1974) in a risk message would depend on the personal 
relevance of the issue in the message. Participants for whom the issue has high personal 
relevance should be less influenced by the similarity (representativeness) heuristic than 
participants for whom the issue is of low personal relevance. This is because according to 
the ELM, participants for whom the issue is of low personal relevance are likely to focus 




influence of personal relevance is expected, its effect would be controlled for using 
analysis of covariance. Details of the influence of personal relevance are reported in a 




Chapter 3: Method 
 
Three studies were conducted for this dissertation: two pilot studies and one main 
study. This section describes the participants, procedures, and instruments of all three 
studies, as well as the results of the two pilot studies. Results of the main study are 
reported in Chapter 4. 
Pilot Study 1 
Purpose of Pilot Study 1 
The purpose of the first pilot study was to choose two risks that would be the 
focus of the main study messages. The main study required that judgments about a health 
risk (i.e., one primarily threatening self [personal]) be compared with judgments about an 
environmental risk (i.e., one threatening something other than self [impersonal]) as a test 
of the hypothesis that people process messages about health risks differently from the 
way in which they process environmental risks.  Pilot 1 consisted of an original list of 
eight risks from which two were chosen for the main study. The original list of eight were 
climate change, drought, flood, global warming, heat wave, high pollen count, tornado, 
and West Nile Virus, which in turn were chosen from a host of risks thought to be 
intensifying because of climate change and global warming (see Greenough, McGeehin, 
Bernard, Trtanj, Riad, & Engelberg, 2001; Patz, Engelberg, & Last, 2000); which are also 
considered risks and therefore included in the Pilot 1 study. Climate change and global 
warming were used as a broad framework for the Pilot Study 1 risks because they affect 
an array of risks that may be judged differently, and which have the potential to adversely 




 It was hoped that the differential risk judgments garnered from Pilot Study 1 (see 
Appendix E) would collectively provide some insight into why people may perceive one 
risk as personal and another as impersonal, in other words, they would help to elucidate 
the underlying dimensions on which people judge health and environmental risks. More 
specifically then, the main objective of Pilot Study 1 was to find one risk that fell on the 
personal end of the perceptual continuum (basically a health risk) and one that fell on the 
impersonal end of the continuum, that is, a risk affecting something other than self, and in 
this case an environmental risk. Keep in mind that one of the main arguments of this 
dissertation is that the use of demographic similarity and scene similarity yield different 
effects between perceptions of health and environmental risks because of their 
differences.  However although the dissertation theorized that these differences result 
from perceptions of threat to self (personal) versus threat to other (impersonal), 
conclusive statistical evidence in the literature to support this view has not been obvious.  
RQ1 ‒ Pilot 1: Is there an interpretable simple structure that indicates the 
 underlying dimensions upon which risks are perceived in terms of susceptibility 
 and severity, and other characteristics such as scale of effects, immediacy, 
 abstractness, primary target of the threat, personal relevance, need for personal 
 action, and collective efficacy? 
 RQ2 ‒ Pilot 1: Is there a significant difference between people’s perceptions of 
 risks based on the characteristics in RQ1 (i.e., susceptibility, severity, scale of 
 effects, immediacy, abstractness, primary target of the threat, personal relevance, 




Additionally, it was determined that each risk chosen for the main study should fit 
the description of one that people thought was severe, but at the same time one to which 
they were not susceptible. It was felt that it would be easier to see the persuasive effects 
of similarity in the main study messages if there were room for persuasion rather than if 
people people’s attitudes toward the risks were already favorable (i.e., if they felt the risk 
was severe and that they were also susceptible).  
 RQ3: Which health risk and which environmental risk do people perceive to be 
 most severe, but at the same time to which they perceive themselves to be the 
 least susceptible? 
Participants for Pilot Study 1 
 A survey was given to 171 undergraduates between 18 and 29 years old taking the 
basic communication course at a large public university in the Southern region of the 
United States. There were 40 males and 130 females; one person did not indicate his or 
her gender. The students represented the full gamut of majors at the university because 
the course falls in the general education category. 
Procedures for Pilot Study 1 
 The Pilot Study 1 survey (see Appendix E) asked participants to state the extent to 
which they agreed or disagreed with statements about the eight aforementioned risks 
(climate change, drought, flood, global warming, heat wave, high pollen count, tornado, 
and West Nile Virus), on a scale of zero to 100, where zero signified complete 
disagreement and 100 signified complete agreement. The questions about perceived 




McKeon, Cameron, & Berkowitz, 1995); other questions were based on risk-related 
characteristics such as immediacy and extent of negative consequences from Slovic’s 
(1987) dread and unknown risk dimensions, and still others on notions of abstractness, 
target of the impact, and scale of negative effects that have been used in the literature to 
describe environmental risks. Together, responses to the questions were intended to 
provide a general overview of risk perceptions in the study population, about the selected 
climate change related risks. 
Measured Variables for Pilot Study 1 
Susceptibility. Susceptibility was measured using the susceptibility subscale of 
the Risk Behavior Diagnostic Scale (RBD; Witte, McKeon, Cameron, & Berkowitz, 
1995), and one additional item added by the researcher. The RBD items were: (1) it is 
likely that I will be affected by ___, (2) I am at risk for being affected by ___, and (3) It 
is possible that I will be affected by___. The additional item was: (4) The extent to which 
I will be affected by ___ is great. Each question was answered for all eight risks on a 
scale of 0 to 100 where 0 = strongly disagree, and 100 = strongly agree. Internal 
consistency of the scale was measured for each risk as well as for all risks collectively 
using Cronbach’s Alpha. Reliabilities are reported in Table 1. 
Severity. Severity was measured using the severity subscale of the Risk Behavior 
Diagnostic Scale (Witte, McKeon, Cameron, & Berkowitz, 1995) and consisted of three 
items: (1) I believe that  ___ is severe, (2) I believe that  ___ has serious negative 
consequences (the term “negative consequences” was added to improve specificity, and 
(3) I believe that  ___ is extremely harmful. Each question was answered for all eight 




Internal consistency of the scale was measured for each risk as well as for all of the risks 
collectively using Cronbach’s Alpha; individual risk reliabilities were between .763 and 
.871. Reliabilities are reported in Table 1. 
Table 1 
Reliabilities for Pilot Study 1 Severity and Susceptibility Scales 
Risk Severity 
Cronbach’s Alpha 
 (4 items) 
Susceptibility 
Cronbach’s Alpha 
 (4 items) 
Climate change  .865 .899 
Drought .766 .842 
Flood .763 .823 
Global warming .866 .913 
Heat wave .822 .861 
High pollen count .871 .900 
Tornado .773 .858 
West Nile Virus .851 .852 
 
General risk questions. The additional measures in the Pilot Study 1 survey were 
single items largely based on Slovic’s (1987) dread and unknown dimensions of risk 
perception, and Leiserowitz’s (2005, 2007) survey of American risk perceptions of 
climate change and global warming. The items measured perceptions of the extent (level) 
of the potential effects of the risks (The effects of  ___ occur on a large scale), the 
perceived extent of personal impact (The extent to which I will be affected by  ___  is 
great), perceived immediacy (I believe that the consequences of  ___  are immediate), 
perceived need for personal action (There are steps that I should personally take to 
combat the effects of ___), perceived abstractness ( ___ exists in a very abstract way in 
my mind), degree of otherness as it relates to possible impact on other people ( ___  




impact on the environment relative to impact on humans ( ___ affects the natural 
environment more than it affects people), personal relevance (I consider  ___  to be 
personally relevant), perceived efficacy of collective action (I think that humans can 
work together to prevent ___ ). Each question was answered for all eight risks on a scale 
of 0 to 100 where 0 = strongly disagree, and 100 = strongly agree.   
Results of Pilot Study 1 
Before any data analyses were performed, the Pilot Study 1 data were screened 
for missing and implausible values, and for outliers. Of the 174 participants who clicked 
on the study link, three did not consent and exited the study, leaving 171. Of these 
remaining cases, there were two implausible values (over the 100 maximum on the zero 
to 100 scale) for two of the variables, and these were removed and replaced with the 
group mean. Although mean substitution is often discouraged, Tabachnick and Fidell 
(2013) suggested that it can be used when there is a very small proportion of missing 
values, in this case only 1.2% of all values. 
 Prior to performing data analyses to answer the three research questions, basic 
general linear model assumptions of normality, linearity, and homogeneity of variance 
were checked. Normality was checked using skewness and kurtosis (see Appendix A) as 
well as through graphical methods. Values of skewness and kurtosis that approach zero 
indicate approximately normal distributions. Skewness refers to the distribution 
symmetry. There are different rules of thumb concerning skewness; this dissertation 
subscribes to Bulmer’s (1965) rule of thumb by considering a highly skewed distribution 
as one that has a skewness statistic smaller than -1 or bigger than 1, a moderately skewed 




symmetric distributions falling between -.5 and .5.  Kurtosis refers to the peakedness of 
the distribution curve, and is related to the variance (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2013). Citing 
Waternaux (1976), Tabachnick and Fidell (2013) stated that underestimates in variance 
due to nonnormal kurtosis tend to disappear with larger samples (100 or more for positive 
kurtosis and 200 or more for negative kurtosis).  
Of the 120 variables analyzed in Pilot 1, the vast majority (85%) were either 
moderately skewed or approximately normal, and 15.8 % had a skewness statistic 
between 1.13 and 2.11; about three of the variables (2.5%) had a skewness statistic just 
barely over 1.00 (between 1.08 and 1.10). According to Tabachnick and Fidell (2013), 
skewness and kurtosis can degrade analysis of the data and therefore highly skewed 
variables should be transformed unless there is a compelling reason not to. Additionally, 
Fink (2009) stated that transformation aids in the discovery of the correct functional form 
between variables. The highly skewed variables (with skewness statistic over 1.00) were 
transformed using log10 transformations (with an added constant of 101 for variables 
with high negative skewness) but in about half of those cases although the skewness 
statistic improved (i.e., fell below 1.00), the kurtosis statistic increased substantially. For 
example, in the case of PS_Tornado (which asked about whether personal steps could be 
taken to mitigate the effects of the risk of a tornado), the skewness statistic decreased 
from 1.134 to .061 but the kurtosis statistic increased from .019 to -1.727. The decision to 
use a log10 transformation was based on Tacbachnik and Fidell (2013). Other 
transformations (for example square root) did not improve the skewness or kurtosis 
statistic.  




pairs when there are many variables (Pilot Study 1 had over 120) and therefore based on 
their suggestion, linearity was assessed by looking at bivariate scatterplots of the highly 
skewed variables (i.e., skewness statistic over 1.00); the scatterplots did not indicate any 
major variations from linearity. Homoscedasticity (called homogeneity of variance for 
grouped data) refers to equality of variances across dependent variables and is related to 
normality; variables that are approximately normal are likely to be homoscedastic 
(Tacbachnick & Fidell, 2013). Homogeneity of variance is often assessed during (as 
opposed to before) certain data analyses, for example the sphericity assumption, a version 
of homogeneity of variance specific to repeated measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) 
is reported subsequently when the results of Pilot Study 1 are discussed. 
 Factor analysis was used to answer the first research question (RQ1 for Pilot 1), 
which sought to investigate the underlying dimensions of risk perception. The extraction 
method was principal axis factoring (PAF) as opposed to principal components analysis 
(PCA) because of the interest in looking only at the shared variance among the variables, 
as opposed to including unique and error variance, both of which are also extracted in a 
PCA (see Tabachnick & Fidell, 2013). Additionally, oblique rotation was chosen because 
the factors being sought were not expected to be orthogonal. Apart from the general 
linear assumptions, factor analysis has the added requirements that the data be free from 
outliers, multicollinearity and singularity (redundancy associated with highly correlated 
variables), and that the correlation matrix of the scale items be factorable. Outliers had 
been removed in the screening process, and according to Tabachnick and Fidell (2013, p. 
89) multicollinearity and singularity is less of a problem in repeated measures ANOVA 




the analysis of Pilot Study 1 data.  
 According to Tabachnick and Fidell (2013, p. 619), the factorability of the 
correlation matrix (of scale items) can be assessed in various ways including checking to 
see whether the matrix has “several sizeable correlations.” Appendix B shows the 
correlation matrices for the susceptibility and severity respectively, which indicate a large 
number of correlations above the recommended .30 (see Tabachnick & Fidell, 2013, p. 
619). A statistically significant Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity and a Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin 
Measure of Sampling Adequacy (KMO) above .6 also indicate that the correlation matrix 
is factorable (Pallant, 2010), although the Bartlett’s test is said to be heavily dependent on 
sample size such that significance is achieved with large samples even when the 
correlations in the matrix are small (see Tabachnick & Fidell, 2013, p. 619).  For the Pilot 
Study 1 dataset, all correlation matrices had a KMO of over .7, and the Bartlett’s test in 
each case had a significance of p < .001, indicating factorability of the data. 
 The first research question (RQ1) sought to investigate the underlying dimensions 
upon which people judge risks in terms of susceptibility, severity, and a number of other 
characteristics including primary target of the threat and personal relevance. The factor 
analysis of the susceptibility and severity scales, and of the other items in the Pilot Study 
1 questionnaire showed that people’s risk perceptions were consistently based on two 
dimensions (eigenvalues over 1.00), one on which climate change and global warming 
had relatively high loadings, with the other six risks having relatively high loadings on 
the other dimension (see Appendix C for factor loadings). These dimensions were, 
however, not easily interpreted, and neither were the dimensions that emerged when all 




 The other two research questions were answered by conducting repeated 
measured ANOVA. For repeated measures ANOVA, instead of assuming homogeneity 
of variance between groups, the assumption becomes homogeneity of variance between 
pairs of groups; this characteristic is referred to as sphericity and the assumption is that 
the population difference scores variance for any two groups are the same as that for any 
other two groups (Pallant, 2010). The assumption of sphericity can be tested using the 
Mauchly’s test; however, this assumption is often violated, making the F test inaccurate 
(Field, 2012). The Mauchly’s test is a chi-square test and a chi-square statistic with a 
significance of p ≤ .05 indicates that the sphericity assumption has been violated. In such 
cases however (i.e., when sphericity is violated), the degrees of freedom can be corrected 
such that the F test is accurate. This correction results in a more conservative p value. 
The SPSS output gives two possible corrections, Greenhouse-Geisser and Huynh-Feldt. 
Field suggested that the Greenhouse-Geisser correction should be used when epsilon (є) 
(the sphericity estimate) is less than 0.75, and that the Huynh-Feldt correction should be 
used when є is more than 0.75.   
 The second research question (RQ2) sought to determine whether there was there 
a significant difference between people’s perceptions of risks based on various 
characteristics of interest including susceptibility, severity, scale of effects, immediacy, 
abstractness, primary target of the threat, personal relevance, need for personal action, 
and collective efficacy. And the third research question asked which health risk and 
which environmental risk are perceived to be most severe, but at the same time to which 




Severity. On average, participants deemed global warming (M = 73.81, SD = 
19.15) to be the most severe risk closely followed by tornado (M =73.33, SD =20.89), 
then flood (M = 70.19, SD = 19.15), and then drought (M = 69.64, SD = 19.80). High 
pollen count (M = 43.49, SD = 23.79) was judged to be the least severe of the risks, 
followed by heat wave (M = 61.33, SD = 21.23), and then climate change (M = 65.25, SD 
= 24.40), which was deemed less severe than West Nile Virus (M =67.32, SD =24.04), 










































































































































Large scale (LS)  The effects of ___ 


































Likelihood of being 
affected (LA) 
It is likely that I will be 





























































Risk of being 
affected (RA) 
 
I am at risk for being 









































Possibility of being 
affected (PA) 
It is possible that I will 


































Extent to which 
affected (EA) 
The extent to which I 





































I believe that the 



































Personal steps (PS) There are steps that I 
should personally take 





































___ exists I a very 
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___ affects the natural 
environment more than 
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I think that humans can 






































The repeated measured ANOVA indicated that there was a significant difference 
in the perceptions of severity among the different risks. The assumption of sphericity was 
violated as indicated by the Mauchly’s test, χ2 (27, N = 171) = 318.21, p < .001 so the 
Greenhouse-Geisser correction was used and this indicated that there was a significant 
difference in perceptions of severity among the different risks, F(4.36, 736.178) = 55.69, 
p < .001, partial η2 = .25 (refer to Table  3).  Using Cohen (1988) as a reference, the 
effect size would be considered large. Pairwise comparisons showed significant 
differences between various pairs of risks, but most notably between high pollen count 
and all the other risks, between heat wave and all other risks except climate change and 
West Nile Virus, where p < .001 in all of those cases. Areas of no significance are also 
important to note; for example, the perceived severity of climate change was only 
significantly different from the perceived severity of global warming (p < .001) and 
tornado (p < .05), and there was no significant difference between the perceived severity 
of tornado, drought, flood, and global warming as all of these risks had comparably high 
severity ratings (see to Table 3). 
 Susceptibility. Overall, the means for susceptibility were quite lower than those 
for severity, except in the case of global warming and climate change.  Participants 
perceived themselves to be most susceptible to global warming (M = 71.07, SD = 26.78) 
and then to climate change (M = 66.70, SD = 27.47), followed by heat wave (M = 54.11, 
SD = 24.91) and high pollen count (M = 50.38, SD = 28.88).  Perceived susceptibility for 
all other risks were below the midpoint on the scale of zero to 100, with people 
perceiving themselves to be the least susceptible to West Nile Virus (M = 30.14, SD = 




that there was a significant difference in perceived susceptibility among the different 
risks. Although the assumption of sphericity was violated (Mauchly’s test, χ2 (27, N = 
171) = 290.93, p < .001, the Greenhouse-Geisser correction was used and indicated that 
there was a significant difference in perceived susceptibilty among the different risks, 
F(4.70, 539.92) = 85.89, p <.001, partial η2 = .34 (refer to Table 3). As shown in Table 3, 
pairwise comparisons reveal significant differences between all pairs (in most cases p < 
.001 and in a few cases p < .05), except between flood and high pollen count (HPC), 
flood and drought, and flood and tornado, drought and tornado, and high pollen count and 
heat wave, relationships between which there was no significant difference. 
 Immediacy. As shown in Table 2, participants believed tornado to be most 
immediate in its consequences (M = 78.99, SD = 30.24), followed by flood (M = 73.49, 
SD = 30.40), then heat wave (M = 63.18, SD = 31.54), and then West Nile Virus (M = 
59.29, SD = 32.80). Climate change (M =38.70, SD = 31.99) and global warming (M = 
39.01, SD = 31.74) were perceived to be the least immediate. There was a significant 
difference in perceived immediacy of the consequences among the different risks F(4.19, 
711.38) = 55.62, p < .001, partial η2 = .25. The assumption of sphericity was violated 
(Mauchly’s test, χ2 (27, N = 171) = 340.25, p < .001) so the Greenhouse-Geisser 
correction was used. Pairwise comparisons show significant differences for perceived 
immediacy between pairs, most at the p < .001 level, but there were no significant 
differences in perceived immediacy of consequences between climate change and global 
warming, between drought and West Nile Virus (WNV), WNV and heat wave, and 




 Personal steps. When asked their level of agreement with the statement “There 
are steps that I should personally take to combat the effects of ___,” participants agreed 
with this statement most for global warming (M = 66.54, SD = 34.92) and climate change 
(M = 53.05, SD = 37.71), and although West Nile Virus (M = 30.99, SD = 33.67) and 
drought (M = 28.09, SD = 30.57) had the next highest means, the scores on these two 
risks were significantly smaller (at the p <.001 level), indicating that people generally felt 
that there was not much they could do to combat the effects of drought and West Nile 
Virus. Again, the repeated measures ANOVA showed that there was a statistically 
significant difference in the extent to which people perceived that they should take 
personal action to mitigate the different risks, F (3.87, 654.53) = 68.81, p < .001, partial 
η2 = .29. Again, the Greenhouse-Geisser correction was used to compensate for the 
violation in the sphericity assumption by making the necessary adjustment to the degrees 
of freedom. 
 Abstractness. When asked about the level of abstractness associated with each 
risk (“___ exists in a very abstract way in my mind”), all scores were below the midpoint 
of the zero to 100 scale, with global warming (M = 47.27, SD = 36.99) being considered 
as the most abstract, followed by, climate change (M = 42.90, SD = 36.05), and then 
West Nile Virus (M = 40.95, SD = 36.34), then drought (M = 34.11, SD = 34.86), with 
tornado (M = 29.06, SD = 31.21) being considered the least abstract. The Greenhouse-
Geisser correction was used to compensate for the violation in the sphericity assumption 
in the repeated measures ANOVA. The results indicated a statistically significant 
difference in the level of abstractness between the risks, F (4.57, 777.41) = 13.25, p < 




abstractness for various risk pairs. For example, there was no significant difference in 
abstractness between climate change and three risks (global warming, high pollen count, 
and tornado), nor between drought and West Nile Virus.  
 People in other countries. When asked the extent to which the risks affect people 
in other countries (“___ primarily affects people in other countries”), four risks had mean 
scores above the midpoint, with West Nile Virus (M = 72.45, SD = 30.97), and drought 
(M = 64.87, SD = 31.46), being perceived as the risks that most affected people in other 
countries, followed by heat wave (M = 56.12, SD = 32.73), and flood (M = 55.71, SD = 
33.47). The repeated measures ANOVA revealed a statistically significant difference in 
the level of abstractness between the risks, F(5.52, 932.26) = 76.24, p < .001, partial η2 = 
.31, with a large effect size. Again, the Greenhouse-Geisser correction was used to 
compensate for the violation in the sphericity assumption by making the necessary 
adjustment to the degrees of freedom. 
 Primary threat of risk (environment more than people). This item asked about 
the extent to which people perceived that the risk affected the environment more than 
people, as a means of acquiring perception on whom or what was thought to be the 
primary target of the risk. Participants were asked to state their agreement with the 
following, where the blank space is each of the eight risks:  “___ affects the environment 
more than people.” Their answers revealed that they generally disagreed with this 
statement for all risks except climate change (M = 59.75, SD = 32.01) and global 
warming (M = 56.74, SD = 33.66); and that even in these cases mean scores were still 




 The results indicated that people do not necessarily consider drought, flood, heat 
wave, and tornado to be primarily environmental risks. If these risks were considered to 
be primarily environmental risks, then when asked whether these risks affected the 
environment more than people, the means should have been at least above 50; instead the 
means for all of these five risks were between 40 and 45 (see Table 2).  The mean score 
for West Nile Virus (M = 19.76, SD = 26.81) was the lowest for this item, therefore it can 
be assumed that this risk is perceived as having the smallest effect on the environment. If 
the mean scores were reverse coded to give an idea of whether the risk affected people 
more than the environment, then West Nile Virus would be perceived as having the 
greatest impact on people (versus the environment). The repeated measured ANOVA 
revealed a statistically significant difference between the risks in terms of the extent to 
which they affect the environment more than people, F(4.90, 833.68) = 62.91, p < .001, 
partial η2 = .27; the Greenhouse-Geisser correction was used to compensate for the 
violation in the sphericity assumption by modifying the degrees of freedom. 
 Personal relevance. The repeated measured ANOVA revealed a statistically 
significant difference between the personal relevance of the different risks, F(4.89, 
827.12) = 45.28, p < .001, partial η2 = .21; and again the Greenhouse-Geisser correction 
for degrees of freedom was used to compensate for the violation in the sphericity 
assumption. Global warming (M = 62.15, SD = 36.09) was perceived as being the most 
personally relevant risk, followed by climate change (M = 55.75, SD = 37.26), then high 
pollen count (M = 41.06, SD = 36.33), and then heat wave (M = 40.08, SD = 33.74), with 





 Collective efficacy. When asked to indicate their agreement that humans could 
work together to prevent the various risks, participants generally felt that this was most 
possible for global warming (M = 78.06, SD = 27.78), followed by climate change (M = 
63.80, SD = 36.91).  They appeared to generally disagree that collective action could lead 
to risk prevention for the other six risks because the mean scores for those risks fell 
below the midpoint, with the lowest mean for tornado (M = 14.50, SD = 24.77).  The 
repeated measured ANOVA revealed a highly statistically significant difference 
(indicated by a large effect size) in the extent to which people perceived collective action 
could prevent the different risks, F(4.43, 752.33) = 144.19, p < .001, partial η2 = .46); 
again the Greenhouse-Geisser correction for degrees of freedom was used to compensate 
for the violation in the sphericity assumption. 
Table 3 
Repeated Measures ANOVA Statistics for Pilot Study 1 
Variable (Scale* or item) F df (within) df (error) Sig. Partial η2 
Susceptibility scale* 85.885 4.702 799.345 .000 .336 
Severity scale* 55.691 4.356 736.178 .000 .248 




50.316 4.937 839.265 .000 .228 
Extreme harm 57.705 4.836 817.300 .000 .255 
 
Large scale 66.188 4.640 779.477 .000 .283 
 
Likelihood affected 74.710 4.799 815.873 .000 .305 
Risk affected 74.884 5.090 865.283 .000 .306 
 




Variable (Scale* or item) F df (within) df (error) Sig. Partial η2 
Extent affected 40.115 4.552 773.907 .000 .191 
Consequences immediate 55.619 4.185 711.382 .000 .247 
Personal steps 68.806 3.873 654.533 .000 .289 
Abstract 13.253 4.573 777.414 .000 .072 
 
People in other countries 76.236 5.724 932.262 .000 .311 
Environment more than 
people 
62.909 4.904 833.678 .000 .270 
Personal relevance 45.275 4.894 827.118 .000 .211 
Collective efficacy 144.186 4.425 752.325 .000 .459 
Note: Because the assumption of sphericity was violated in all cases, the Greenhouse-Geisser correction 
was used in all cases except for the ‘people in other countries’ item, in which case the Huynh-Feldt 
correction was used because the value of epsilon exceeded .75 (see Field, 2012). 
 
Choice of Risks for Pilot Study 2 
The third research question asked which health risk and which environmental risk 
do people perceive to be most severe, but at the same time to which they perceive 
themselves to be the least susceptible.  As mentioned in the answer to RQ2 (which asked 
about the differences in the characteristics of interest among the various risks), based on 
the mean scores, participants generally perceived all eight risks to be relatively severe 
(see Table 2), but they felt that they were least susceptible to West Nile Virus (M = 30.14, 
SD = 24.37) and drought (M = 42.66, SD = 24.20), and therefore these two risks were 
chosen as the health and environmental topics for the study messages, respectively.  
Although the main study entailed a comparison of risk perceptions between a 




Pilot Study 1 (see Appendix C) showed that except for global warming and climate 
change, all of the other risks may be perceived as health risks, several considerations 
went into the decision to choose drought as the environmental risk (as opposed to global 
warming or climate change) and West Nile Virus as the health risk. First, because the 
dissertation messages sought to change people’s perceptions of risks deemed high in 
severity but low in personal susceptibility, drought and WNV seemed to be the best 
choices. Recall that people already felt most susceptible to global warming (M = 71.07, 
SD = 26.78) and climate change (M = 66.70, SD = 27.47), and in such cases, it was felt 
that the messages may do little to increase people’s perceptions of susceptibility when 
such perceptions were already high. Second, when asked which risks most affected the 
environment more than people, West Nile Virus (M = 19.76, SD = 26.81) had the lowest 
mean, and with the exception of global warming and climate change, drought (M = 44.36, 
SD = 30.13) had the highest mean.  Additionally, all of the risks seemed to be perceived 
as risks to people (as opposed to the environment), even in the case of climate change (M 
= 59.75, SD = 32.01) and global warming (M = 56.74, SD = 33.66) whose means were 
still relatively close to the midpoint of the scale. Third, on all characteristics except for 
the one dealing with collective action, drought loaded more highly on the presumed 
environmental dimension than did West Nile Virus (see Appendix C), making it a 
reasonable choice for a risk that affects both people and the environment as compared to 
West Nile Virus, which has consistently smaller loadings on the presumed environment 
dimension. The following section discusses Pilot Study 2, which tests the messages about 




Pilot Study 2 
Purpose of Pilot Study 2 
 After the development of messages based on West Nile Virus and drought (topics 
chosen from the results of Pilot Study 1), a second pilot study was conducted to 
determine the efficacy of the demographic and scene similarity manipulations in the 
messages, specifically whether different levels (low vs. high) of these types of similarity 
were perceived as such by the participants. This pilot study also investigated the 
perceived persuasiveness of the messages as well as the appropriateness of personal 
relevance, thinking style (rational and experiential), personal experience, perceived health 
condition, and optimistic bias as a possible covariates for the main study. 
Pilot Study 2 Participants 
 Study participants were undergraduates recruited from the basic oral 
communication course offered by the Department of Communication at the University of 
Maryland.  The course fulfills the university’s general education requirement for oral 
communication, and the Department of Communication provides about 75% of the 
university’s sections offered in the oral communication basic course. There were 426 
participants, 46.0% of whom were males and 52.6% females.  Fewer than 1% of the 
students identified their gender as something other than male or female (e.g., transgender) 
and 0.7% preferred not to indicate their gender. The racial/ethnic breakdown was 60.6%  
Caucasian, 15.0% Asian/Pacific Islander, 10.8% Black/African American, and 6.3% 
Hispanic/Latino, with 4.7% indicating that they preferred not to state their race/ethnicity 




majors, with 36.6% being freshmen, 25.8% sophomores, 15.5% juniors, and 21.4 % 
seniors.  
 Questions about political philosophy, home state or country, perceived social 
class, job status, health insurance, health condition, personal and parental income were 
included because it was thought that these variables may have an influence on the 
processing of demographic and scene similarity in the messages, which are two of the 
independent variables in this study. Of the 393 students who answered the question about 
their political philosophy, 48.8% identified themselves as Democrats, 20.7% as 
Republicans, 1.6% as Green Party, with 21.1% indicating that they prefer not to reveal 
their political philosophy and 7.7 percent omitting an answer. Fewer than 1% of the 
participants indicated that they consider a country other than the United States their 
home, with 86.6% listing their home to be in the northeastern part of the country, and 
61.9% stating that they considered Maryland their home.   
 Participants were about evenly split between those who had a part or fulltime job 
(50.0%) and those who did not (49.3%).  The highest personal income reported was $60, 
000, with 86.4% reporting income less than 20,000, 6.1% between $20,000 and $50,000, 
and only one person (0.2%) made more than $50,000; 7.3% did not report their personal 
income. Over three quarters of the participants (76.5%) classified themselves as middle 
class or upper-middle class 10.8% as upper class, and 3.3% as lower class. 
 Based on participants’ responses, the median income of parents was $130,000, 
with 4.7% of parents making less than $20,000; 9.9% making between $20,000 and 
$50,000; 14.6 % making more than $50,000 but less than $100,000; 37.1% making 




figures account for the 90% who answered the question about their parents’ income; 10% 
of the participants omitted an answer to this question. Regarding coverage of health care 
needs, 84.3% said that they were covered under their parents’ health insurance plan, 8.2% 
said that they have their own health insurance, 2.3% stated they had no health insurance, 
and 4.3% omitted an answer to the question.  
Procedures for Pilot Study 2 
Participants were recruited from the basic oral communication course at the 
University of Maryland, College Park, through the Department of Communication online 
SONA participant pool system. The abbreviation SONA stands for Service Oriented 
Network Architecture.  Participants signed up through this system and were then given 
the URL to the questionnaire, which was hosted on SurveyMonkey.  After reading 
through consent information, participants had the option of continuing with the survey or 
exiting. Participants were randomly assigned to one of eight conditions based on a 2 
(demographic similarity: low, high) × 2 (scene similarity: low, high) × 3 (type of risk: 
health, environmental presented as health, environmental) experiment.  Upon clicking the 
survey link, there was a news story that participants were asked to read before completing 
the questionnaire.  Students received extra credit for their participation. There was minor 
deception in that participants were told that they were evaluating health and 
environmental risk messages for use in documentaries. At the end of the survey, there 




Instrumentation for Pilot Study 2 
 Each questionnaire began with a news story that discussed the consequences 
associated with either West Nile Virus (WNV) or drought (see Appendix F). The news 
stories were based on the 2 (demographic similarity: low, high) × 2 (scene similarity: 
low, high) × 2 (risk type: health, environmental) design of the study, where WNV 
represented the health risk and drought represented the environmental risk. As required 
by the study design, there were eight news stories in all, four about WNV and four about 
drought. Each news story was six paragraphs long, with the first three paragraphs and the 
final paragraph being identical, depending on the risk, that is, the first three paragraphs 
and the final paragraph of the four WNV news stories were identical, and the first three 
paragraphs and the final paragraph of the drought messages were identical.  Paragraphs 
four and five of all messages contained the treatment. 
 The first three paragraphs in every message discussed reports from reputable 
agencies (National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration [NOAA] for drought and 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention [CDC] for West Nile Virus) about the 
severity of consequences related to the particular risk during the past summer (2012).  
For example, the WNV messages began “This past summer (2012) the U.S. saw its 
largest ever outbreak of West Nile Virus.  The Centers for Disease Control (CDC) 
reported over 5000 cases of the disease in 48 states, including 219 deaths – all in 2012 
alone,” and the drought messages began, “This past summer the National Oceanic and 
Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) reported that on a national level, the 2012 drought 
in the U.S. has been the worst in 50 years.  According to the NOAA’s drought experts, 




of September, 2012.” The rest of the standardized portion of the WNV messages went on 
to address specific health consequences of WNV, and the standardized portion of the 
drought messages went on to address both health and environmental effects of drought. 
All of the messages ended with the same risk specific recommendations for mitigating 
the risk (see Appendix F and G for all study messages).   
 The treatment portion of each message was in the form of a brief story that 
included combinations of high and low demographic and scene similarity elements 
related to the study design. Each treatment portion discussed how people were affected 
by consequences associated with the particular risk. For example, in the low 
demographic–low scene similarity West Nile Virus message, a short story was told of a 
Hispanic couple who live and work in a rural area, and whose health was affected by the 
virus.  And in the high demographic–high scene similarity drought message, a short story 
was told about the impact of drought on the town and the personal health of two 
undergraduate college students living in a college town in the eastern part of the United 
States. 
 The questionnaire following the story measured variables associated with 
narrative persuasion, namely self referencing, transportation, and identification, as well as 
personal relevance, perceived persuasiveness of the message, thinking style (rational vs. 
experiential), and perceived demographic and scene similarity using previously tested 
and derived scales (See Appendix E). Additionally, single items measuring optimistic 
bias, experience with the risk, perceived severity, perception of the primary target of the 
risk (people vs. environment) and message-induced discrete emotions were included. 




0 is none of the characteristic and 100 is the maximum possible amount of the 
characteristic. Inter-item scale reliabilities were measured using Cronbach’s alpha and 
confirmatory analyses on all scales were conducted using version 9 of the LISREL data 
analysis package version (Jöreskog & Sörbom, 2006). According to Hu and Bentler 
(1999), the following indices represent good model fit: a standardized root mean square 
residual (SRMR) of .08 or less, a comparative fit index (CFI) of .95 or more, and a root 
mean square error of approximation (RMSEA) of .06 or less. All of the scales can be 
found in Appendix D and the scale reliabilities for Pilot 2 are found in Table 4 and the 
inter-scale correlations in Table 5. 
Table 4 
Pilot Study 2 Reliabilities (N = 425) 




Demographic similarity 10 .902 
Scene similarity 10 .922 
Self referencing 4 .764 
Persuasiveness 4 .906 
Rational Experiential Inventory (REI, Rational subscale) 5 .765 
Rational Experiential Inventory (REI, Experiential 
subscale) 
5 .885 
Personal relevance 8 .942 
Transportation 19 .881 












Pilot 2 Inter-Scale Correlations with Standard Deviations (N = 425) 
 DS SS PERS REIr REIe PR TR ID SR OB 
DS 1.000          
SS .592 1.000         
PERS .076 .092 1.000        
REIr -.014 .042 .015 1.000       
REIe .059 .049 .072 .123 1.000      
PR .169 .210 .594 -.056 -.014 1.000     
TR .301 .298 .571 .043 .021 .665 1.000    
ID .191 .218 .587 .008 .047 .627 .775 1.000   
SR .332 .214 .476 .035 .091 .486 .466 .426 1.000  
OB -.163 -.170 -.087 .116 .103 -.257 -.163 -.103 -.123 1.000 
SD 21.58 23.78 22.64 18.85 18.64 22.30 15.30 19.31 22.84 30.73 
  
 Demographic similarity. The demographic similarity scale consisted of 10 items 
based on McCroskey, Richmond, and Daly’s (1975) homophily scale, measured on a 
scale of 0 to 100, where 0 = strongly disagree and 100 = strongly agree. Two items from 
the demographic similarity scale were, “The characters are from a social class very 
different from mine” (reverse coded), and “The characters are from an economic situation 
very much like mine.” The complete scale is found in Appendix D. The inter-item 
reliability was assessed using Cronbach’s alpha (α  = .902). Confirmatory factor analysis 
indicated a reasonable fit because the SRMR was less than .08 and the CFI was more 
than .95 (SRMR= .061, CFI= .97, however the RMSEA was less than desirable because it 




 Scene similarity. The scene similarity scale consisted of 10 items and was 
modeled from the demographic similarity scale, which was in turn based on McCroskey, 
Richmond, and Daly’s (1975) homophily scale. As with demographic similarity, scene 
similarity was measured on a scale of 0 to 100, where 0 = strongly disagree and 100 = 
strongly agree. Two items from the scene similarity scale were, “The characters are from 
a community very similar to mine,” and “The college in this story is very different from 
mine” (reverse coded). The complete scale is found in Appendix D. The inter-item 
reliability was assessed using Cronbach’s alpha (α  = .902). Confirmatory factor analysis 
showed a marginally good fit based on two of the fit indices (SRMR= .06, CFI= .94), 
however the RMSEA was less than desirable because it was more than .06 (RMSEA= 
.16). 
 Self referencing. The self-referencing scale was based on a four-item scale 
designed by Burnkrant and Unnava (1989). The first two items (“This story seemed to be 
written with me in mind,” and “This story seemed to relate to me personally”) were the 
same as those in the original scale, except that the word “message” in the original scale 
was replaced with the word “story” in this pilot. The other two items were modified to fit 
this study, that is, the item “This message made me think of my personal experiences 
with _____” was replaced with “This story made me think of my personal experiences (or 
lack of experiences) with West Nile Virus/drought. Likewise the item, “I thought about 
my own risk when I was reading this message” was be replaced by “I thought about my 
own risk of being affected by West Nile Virus when I was reading this story.” All items 
were measured on a scale of 0 to 100, where 0 = strongly disagree and 100 = strongly 




.764. Confirmatory factor analysis indicated a reasonable fit in terms of two of the fit 
indices (SRMR = .06, CFI = .94) but the root mean square error of approximation was 
too high (RMSEA = .20). 
 Persuasiveness. Perceived persuasiveness was measured on a four-item scale. 
Participants were asked to indicate on a scale of 0 to 100 the level of their agreement that 
the news story was compelling, persuasive, convincing, and swaying, where 0 = strongly 
disagree and 100 = strongly agree.  Two of the items in this scale were, “The news story I 
read was compelling” and “The news story I read was convincing.” See Appendix D for 
the other two items. The inter-item reliability of this scale was α = .906 measured. 
Confirmatory factor analysis revealed an excellent fit (RMSEA = 0.00, SRMR = .005, 
CFI = 1.00).  
 Individual information processing style. Information processing style (also 
known as thinking style) was measured using an abbreviated version of the modified 
Rational Experiential Inventory (REIm, Norris & Epstein, 2011; Pacini & Epstein, 1999) 
on a 0 to 100 point scale, where 0 = strongly disagree and 100 = strongly agree. The 
original scale has 42 items with three experiential subscales (intuitive, emotional, and 
imaginative). The shortened version used for this study had 10 items, with five items 
taken from the rational subscale measuring rational ability and five from the experiential 
subscale, measuring experiential engagement. Two items from the rational subscale were, 
“I try to avoid situations that require thinking in depth about something” (reverse coded) 
and “I prefer complex to simple problems.” Two items from experiential subscale were, 
“I trust my initial feelings about people” and “I can usually feel when a person is right or 




The inter-item reliabilities of the rational and experiential subscales were α = .765 and α 
= .885. A confirmatory factor analysis that fit both subscales into one model was a good 
fit (RMSEA = .06, SRMR = .06, CFI = .98). 
 Personal relevance. In this study, personal relevance was investigated as a 
possible covariate. Personal relevance was measured on an eight-item scale adapted from 
Zaichkowsky (1994) Personal Involvement Inventory (PII). Zaichkowsky operationalized 
involvement as perceived personal relevance. The original scale contained 20 bipolar 
adjective scales, each with seven options. For the purpose of this study eight of the 
bipolar pairs were used, and they were put into complete sentences. For example, the 
item pertaining to the unimportant‒important pair read, “Please indicate the level of 
importance this story has to you,” where 0 = not important at all, and 100 = of great 
importance. Likewise, the item pertaining to the trivial‒fundamental pair read, “Please 
indicate the level of triviality or fundamentality this story has to you,” where, 0 = very 
trivial, and 100 = very fundamental. Although in the original scale some of the bipolar 
pairs had to be reverse coded, in this study zero corresponded to the negative end of the 
scale and 100 to the positive end for all items (see Appendix D for the complete scale). 
The inter-item reliability for this scale (measured using Cronbach’s alpha) was .942. 
Confirmatory factor analysis showed a relatively good fit (SRMR = .03, CFI = .98), 
however the RMSEA was less than desirable because it was more than .06 (RMSEA = 
.10).   
 Transportation. The transportation scale was based on Green and Brock (2000), 
whose study used a 19-item version of the scale adapted by Dal Cin, Zanna, and Fong 




and “I found myself thinking of other ways this story could have ended.” The end points 
for this scale were 0 = strongly disagree and 100 = strongly agree. The complete scale is 
found in Appendix D. The inter-item reliability for this scale (measured using Cronbach’s 
alpha) was .881. Confirmatory factor analysis showed a less than desirable but not 
terrible fit (RMSEA = .07, SRMR = .12, CFI = .92). 
 Identification. The identification scale was based on Cohen (2001) and Sestir and 
Green (2010).  The wording of the scale was adapted for this study; for example, 
“viewing program X” in the original scale was replaced by “reading this story.”  
Examples of items in this scale include “I think I have a good understanding of the 
characters in this story” and “At key moments in this story, I felt I knew exactly what the 
characters were going through.” The end points of this scale are 0 = strongly disagree and 
100 = strongly agree. The complete scale is found in Appendix D. The inter-item 
reliability for this scale (measured using Cronbach’s alpha) was .891. The confirmatory 
factor analysis revealed a marginal fit in terms of the standardized root mean square 
residual (SRMR = .075) but based on the other two indices, the fit was less than desirable 
(RMSEA = .15, CFI = .92). 
 Single items. The Pilot Study 2 questionnaire also contained the following single 
items rated on a scale of 0 to 100, where 100 represents strongly agree and 0 represents 
strongly disagree: target of the risk (“_____ is more of a threat to the environment than to 
people”); personal experience (“I have been personally affected by_____”);  and severity 
(“I believe that _____ is severe”). Optimistic bias was measured by asking three 
questions, (1) “To what extent are you likely to be affected by _______”; (2) “To what 




extent is someone very different from you likely to be affected by _____.” The difference 
between (1) and (2), and between (1) and (3) indicates the level of optimistic bias 
between oneself and a similar other, and between oneself and a different other, 
respectively. Six discrete emotions (fear, frustration, sadness, worry, hope, and happiness 
were measured using a general statement that asked, “Please indicate the extent to which 
the story made you feel ____.” 
Results of Pilot Study 2 
 Before any analyses were carried out, the data were screened for missing values, 
outliers, implausible values, and for violations of the basic general linear model (GLM) 
assumptions of normality, linearity, and homogeneity of variance. During the cleaning 
process it was discovered that some participants inserted the incorrect story number, so 
this was corrected, and cases with absolutely no responses were deleted (there were 17 
such cases); three additional cases were deleted because participants abandoned the study 
after answering between 3% and 15% of the questionnaire. The deletions left 426 cases 
from the original 446 who originally consented to participate in the study. In terms of the 
GLM assumptions, normality was checked using skewness and kurtosis and all variables 
were approximately normal or moderately skewed.  Because all skewness values were 
under 1.00, no transformations were done. Approximately 15% of the variables has 
kurtosis values above 1.00, but in these cases the kurtosis statistics were only slightly 
above 1.00, with the highest value being 1.294 (see Appendix A). Linearity was checked 
using graphical means by regressing standardized residuals on predicted values and no 





 Pilot study 2 manipulation checks. The efficacy of the similarity manipulations 
was checked using univariate analysis of variance. Participants in the high demographic 
similarity condition (M = 52.31, SD = 20.60) perceived that they had a statistically 
significantly higher level of demographic similarity with the characters in the story than 
participants in the low demographic similarity condition (M = 31.80, SD = 17.60), F(1, 
421) = 121.19, p < .001, η2= .224.  The Levene’s Test of Equality of Error Variances was 
not significant F(1, 421) = 2.201, p = .139), suggesting equal variances. Likewise, 
participants in the high scene similarity condition (M = 58.58, SD = 21.99) perceived that 
they had a statistically significantly higher level of scene similarity with the scenes in the 
story than participants in the low scene similarity conditions (M = 31.95, SD = 17.08), 
F(1, 415) = 193.37, p < .001, η2= .318.  The Levene’s test was significant F(1, 415) = 
10.84, p < .05), suggesting unequal variances but a t test using the unequal variances 
results confirmed a statistically significant difference between the high and low scene 
similarity conditions, t(352.79) = 13.60, p < .001, d = 1.363. 
Persuasiveness. In general, the messages were shown to be somewhat persuasive 
(M = 60.25, SD = 22.64), but a 2 (demographic similarity: high, low) × 2 (scene 
similarity: high, low) ANOVA showed that there were no main effects, nor was there an 
interaction between the two types of similarity. Consequently, for the main study, the 
format of the message was changed from a news story to a flyer (see Appendix G). 
 Pilot study 2 covariates. An analysis of covariance was run to determine whether 
the relationship between the independent variables (risk frame, demographic similarity, 
scene similarity) and the dependent variables (persuasiveness, self referencing, 




thinking style (rational and experiential), personal experience, perceived health condition, 
and optimistic bias. Personal relevance was the only statistically significant covariate on 
all dependent variables.  Optimistic bias and personal experience were statistically 
significant as covariates in the case of the narrative persuasion variables only. Personal 
health was statistically significant as a covariate only when identification was the 
dependent variable, and thinking style was not a significant covariate, except in the case 
when a single item (severity) was used as the dependent variable.  
Main Study 
Participants for Main Study 
  Participants were 568 undergraduates taking the basic communication general 
education course at the University of Maryland, College Park.  There were 283 (49.8%) 
females and 278 (48.4%) males; one person identified as gender neutral and one as 
transgender, four participants indicated that they preferred not to answer that question, 
and four omitted an answer. More than half of the participants (52.6%) identified 
themselves as freshmen, 13.7% as sophomores, 14.4% as juniors, and 18.5% as seniors; 
only 4 participants (0.7%) did not indicate their university standing. Over 70 different 
majors were represented by the sample. The vast majority of the participants fell into the 
18–21 age group (85.0%), with 12.1% falling in the 22–25 age group. 
 When asked to indicate the racial/ethnic group with which they most identified, 
60.9% indicated White/Caucasian, 14.1% Asian/Pacific Islands, 12.3% Black/African 
American, and 6.7% Hispanic/Latino; one person identified as Native American, 20 
stated that they preferred not to answer the ethnicity question, and 13 people omitted an 




insurance, homestate/country, and political philosophy were asked because of the study’s 
interest in demographic similarity between the participants in the study and the characters 
in the study narratives. The vast majority (80.1%) of participants categorized themselves 
as being either middle class (36.8%) or upper middle-class (43.0%), with 7.2% 
identifying themselves as being in the upper class; 9.7% categorized themselves as being 
in the working class (7.0%) or lower class (2.7%), and seven participants did not answer 
the question about social class. There were slightly more participants with a full-time or 
part-time job (51.1%) than without (47.9%); six participants (1.1%) did not indicate their 
job status. 
 More than half of the participants (60%) stated that they considered Maryland 
their home, with roughly an additional 20% considering another state in the South 
Atlantic region of the United States their home. Only about 2% considered a country 
outside of the United States their home. This variable (where one considers home) was 
included because it was thought that it could influence the way scene similarity in the 
message was processed. 
 With regard to health insurance, 82.9% of the participants stated that they were 
covered under their parents’ health insurance plan, 8.5% stated that they had their own 
health insurance, and 1.9% stated that they did not have health insurance; eight 
participants (0.9 %) indicated that they were on Medicaid, and 3.7% did not answer the 
health insurance question. 
Procedures for Main Study 
 Participants were recruited through the Department of Communication online 




SurveyMonkey link where the study was posted. Participants were randomly assigned to 
one of 8 conditions, in which they were asked to read a brochure on drought (framed 
either as a health risk or an environmental risk) and then complete a questionnaire. 
Participants received extra credit for their participation.  
 Instrumentation. Instrumentation involved the use of all scales used in Pilot 2 as 
well as a few additional scales, including the severity and susceptibility scales from Pilot 
Study 1 (see Appendix E for this instrument).  A confirmatory factor analysis was 
conducted for all main study scales simultaneously to determine whether the latent 
constructs accounted for statistically significant amounts of variance in their related 
items, and whether there were significant cross-loadings between scales for any of the 
items. Based on the results of this CFA, a few changes were made to the scales used in 
Pilot 2, details of which are given in the following section. Although reliabilities and fit 
indices of the confirmatory factor analyses are given below, examples of items were not 
repeated if the details were already given in the instrumentation section of either Pilot 
Study 1 or Pilot Study 2. Inter-item reliabilities are found in Table 6 and inter-scale/inter-
item correlations are found in Table 7. 
Main Study Dependent Variables 
 Susceptibility.  As in Pilot Study 1, the susceptibility scale comprised three items 
from the susceptibility subscale of the Risk Behavior Diagnostic Scale (RBD; Witte, 
McKeon, Cameron, & Berkowitz, 1995) and one additional item regarding the extent to 
which one could be personally affected by the risk. The internal consistency of the scale 




that a good fit based on two fit indices (SRMR = .020, CFI = .99) but the root mean 
square error of approximation was larger than desired (RMSEA = .13). 
 Severity. The severity scale included the severity subscale from the Risk 
Behavior Diagnostic Scale (RBD; Witte, McKeon, Cameron, & Berkowitz, 1995) and 
one additional item regarding the perceived scale of the consequences of the risk, just as 
in Pilot Study 1. Internal consistency of the scale was measured Cronbach’s alpha (α = 
.828). Confirmatory factor analysis showed a good fit based on two out of three fit 
indices (SRMR = .042, CFI = .97, RMSEA = .16). 
 Demographic similarity. The demographic similarity scale consisted of nine 
items, one item less than the 10-item version based on McCroskey, Richmond, and 
Daly’s (1975) homophily scale that was used in Pilot Study 2. Results from the 
simultaneous CFA suggested that an item (“The characters in this story and I come from 
a very similar geographic region”) that was originally part of the demographic similarity 
scale was actually a better indicator of scene similarity than demographic similarity; this 
item was therefore dropped from the demographic similarity scale and transferred to the 
scene similarity scale. Again demographic similarity was measured on a scale of 0 to 100, 
where 0 = strongly disagree and 100 = strongly agree. The inter-item reliability was 
assessed using Cronbach’s alpha (α  = .899). As was the case with the scene similarity 
scale, confirmatory factor analysis showed a less than desirable fit (SRMR= .13, CFI= 
.85, RMSEA = .27). 
 Scene similarity. This scale included the identical 10-item version (modeled from 
McCroskey, Richmond, and Daly’s (1975) homophily scale) used in Pilot Study 2, and an 




results from the simultaneous CFA suggested that this new item (“The characters in this 
story and I come from a very similar geographic region”) was a better indicator of scene 
similarity scale than demographic similarity. As in the case of Pilot Study 2, scene 
similarity was measured on a scale of 0 to 100, where 0 = strongly disagree and 100 = 
strongly agree. The scale showed good internal consistency (α = .887) however as was 
the case with demographic similarity, the confirmatory factor analysis showed a less than 
desirable fit (SRMR = .12, CFI = .86, RMSEA = .24). 
 Self referencing. The same four-item scale designed by Burnkrant and Unnava 
(1989) that was used in Pilot 2 was reused in the main study, but an additional item 
(“While reading this story, I felt as if I were part of what was taking place”) was 
included. This new item was transferred from the identification scale after modification 
indices from the simultaneous CFA suggested that it item cross-loaded onto both the self-
referencing and the identification scales.  Responses were measured on a scale of 0 to 
100, where 0 = strongly disagree and 100 = strongly agree. The inter-item reliability for 
this scale (measured using Cronbach’s alpha) was .803. The confirmatory factor analysis 
indicated an acceptable fit for one fit index (SRMR= .071), a reasonable fit for another 
(CFI= .93), although the other fit index was poor (RMSEA = .18). 
 Identification. This scale consisted of eight items, two less than the 10-item 
version based on Cohen (2001) and Sestir and Green (2010) that was used in Pilot Study 
2. The simultaneous CFA showed that an item (“While reading this story, I felt as if I 
were part of what was taking place”) cross-loaded onto both the identification and the 
self-referencing scale therefore it was dropped from the identification scale and 




item (“While reading this story, I forgot myself and was fully absorbed”) was a better 
indicator of transportation than identification therefore this item was transferred to the 
transportation scale. Identification was measured on a 0 to 100 point scale, where 0 = 
strongly disagree; 100 = strongly agree. The inter-item reliability for this scale (measured 
using Cronbach’s alpha) was .882. The confirmatory factor analysis revealed a less than 
desirable fit (SRMR= .098, CFI= .86, RMSEA = .23). 
 Transportation. The 19-item version of the Green and Brock (2000) 
transportation scale that was adapted by Dal Cin, Zanna, and Fong (2004) and used in 
Pilot Study 2 was shortened to 11 items in the main study data collection however only 
seven of these items were retained as part of the transportation scale.2 Three of the items 
from the 11-item version were dropped because the simultaneous CFA revealed that the 
latent factor transportation accounted for a relatively miniscule amount of variance in 
each of these three indicators, specifically: “I found it difficult to tune our activity around 
me while I was reading the story” (R2 = .008); “I easily put the story out of my mind after 
reading it” (R2 = .013); and “My mind often wandered while I was reading the story” (R2 
=.000)3.  Another item (“I sometimes felt as though I was part of this story’) was dropped 
from the transportation scale because it had similar wording to an item (“While reading 
this story, I felt as if I were part of what was taking place”) in the identification scale that 
was transferred to the self-referencing scale because of a problem with cross-loading. In 
addition to the four items dropped from the 11-item version of the scale, a new item 
(“While reading this story, I felt as if I were part of what was taking place”) was 
transferred from the identification scale to the transportation scale because it was shown 




scale used in the main study analyses consisted of eight items. As in Pilot Study 2, 
participants were asked to state their level of agreement with specific statements on a 
scale of 0 to 100, where 0 = strongly disagree and 100 = strongly agree. The inter-item 
reliability for the transportation scale (measured using Cronbach’s alpha) was .888. 
Confirmatory factor analysis showed that the model fit was less than desirable, but 
acceptable (SRMR= .058, CFI= .94, RMSEA = .15). 
 Behavioral intention, behavioral expectation, and response efficacy. Warshaw 
and Davis (1985) and Sheppard et al. (1988) noted that there is a difference between 
one’s intention to perform a specific behavior, and one’s estimates that he or she will 
actually follow through with that behavior. To avoid potential conflation between 
behavioral intention and behavioral expectations, both these constructs were measured. 
The extent to which participants thought that a specific behavior would actually reduce 
the risk was also measured. The three constructs (behavioral intention, behavioral 
expectation, response efficacy) were measured using slight variations of the same items. 
Analyses were done using the three of the items that were the same across all treatment 
groups; these items were related to water conservation and information seeking. For 
example the behavioral intention item regarding water conservation stated, “Write a 
number between 0 and 100 to indicate the extent to which you intend to increase water 
conservation now.” The behavioral expectation version of that item was identical except 
that intend was changed to expect and the word actually was included (i.e., “…indicate 
the extent to which you expect to actually increase water conservation now”).  The words 
intend and expect were capitalized in the questionnaire for emphasis and to highlight the 




 The response efficacy version of the water conservation item stated, “Write a 
number between 0 and 100 to indicate the extent to which increasing water conservation 
now will actually reduce the risk you read about in the story.”  The information seeking 
items asked participants to indicate the extent to which they intended and expected to 
seek information on drought within one week of reading the message, and another set of 
items asked them to indicate the extent to which they intended and expected to seek 
information about drought whenever they had time. The response efficacy items 
regarding information seeking asked participants to indicate the extent to which 
information seeking would reduce the risk they read about in the message. 
 Single-items. Apart from the demographic questions, the main study consisted of 
a few single items that were identical to the single items asked in Pilot Study 2 about the 
perceived primary target of the risk (people vs. the environment), and personal 
experience with the risk.  An additional item intended to measure vicarious experience 
with the risk was also added in the main study; the item stated “Think of someone you 
personally know who has experienced the risk described in the story. To what extent has 
that person been affected by this risk?” and was measured on a scale of 0 to 100, where 0 
= the person has not been affected at all and 100 = the person has been affected to a great 
extent. 
Main Study Covariates 
 Personal relevance. Based on the results of Pilot Study 2, personal relevance was 
used as a covariate in some of the analyses, however as shown in the supplemental 
analyses (reported at the end of Chapter 4), personal relevance also turned out to be an 




relevance scale was identical to the eight-item bipolar scale adapted from Zaiwkowsky 
(1994) Personal Involvement Inventory (PII) that was used in Pilot Study 2. Zaichowsky 
operationalized involvement as perceived personal relevance. The inter-item reliability 
(measured using Cronbach’s alpha) was .940. Confirmatory factor analysis revealed a 
good fit (SRMR= .029, CFI= .98, RMSEA = .12). 
 Climate change. The scale measuring attitude toward climate change was 
adapted from Kellstedt et al. (2008) and consisted of eight items measured on a 0 to 100 
scale, where 0 = strongly disagree and 100 = strongly agree.  The main modification to 
the Kellstedt et al.’s scale is that, for this study, the items only asked about climate 
change, whereas the original scale asked about both climate change and global warming 
in each item.  Another modification was that this study included a 25-year time factor in 
each item, whereas the original scale included the 25-year time factor in only two of the 
items. Two of the items used in this study were, “Climate change will have a noticeably 
negative impact on my overall quality of life in the next 25 years” and “Climate change 
will have a noticeably negative impact on the environment in my state in the next 25 
years.” The inter-item reliability (measured using Cronbach’s alpha) was .947. 
Confirmatory factor analysis indicated a good fit for two out of three goodness of fit 
indices (SRMR= .043, CFI= .95, RMSEA = .17).  
 Optimistic bias. As in Pilot Study 2, optimistic bias was measured by asking 
about the likelihood of the risk affecting self, someone very similar to self, and someone 
very different from self, and then taking the difference score between risk to self and risk 
to others. However only the difference score between risk to self and risk to someone 




assessment of personal relevance, climate change, and optimistic bias as suitable 
covariates for the main study are discussed in the following section on data preparation. 
Main Study Data Preparation 
 Data cleaning. Although the initial number of study participants was 586, not all 
of the cases were usable. I deleted 18 cases associated with abandonment of the study; 
these cases ranged from having no answers whatsoever to having only a small portion of 
the questionnaire completed (0 - 30%). After deletions the final sample size was 568. 
 After deletions, I proceeded to correct the story number in cases where it was 
incorrect. Whenever participants indicated an incorrect story (flyer) number, there was a 
way to tell which number they should have written. This is because during the set-up 
process, each randomized story was assigned a unique question that required the 
participant to confirm the number of the flyer in his or her condition. For example, people 
who read flyer 5 were the only people who had access to question 24, therefore if a 
number other than 5 were written in answer to question 24, it was mistake and was 
therefore changed to the correct number; 15 such corrections were made. 
 GLM assumptions. I then checked my data to see if they confirmed to the basic 
general linear model (GLM) assumptions. Normality was evaluated using skewness and 
kurtosis, and as in the case of Pilot Studies 1 and 2, Bulmer’s (1965) rule of thumb was 
used such that highly skewed distributions were considered to have skewness values 
smaller than -1 or bigger than 1, moderately skewed distributions were those within -1.0 
and -0.5, and within 0.5 and 1.0; and approximately symmetric distributions were those 
between -0.5 and 0.5. Except for two items in the severity scale, SEV2 and SEV3, which 




1.157 and -1.079, respectively), and variables in the anger and hope scales (both of which 
are not crucial to the dissertation study), all of the other variables were either 
approximately symmetric or moderately skewed, and therefore no transformations were 
done on these variables (see Appendix A for skewness and kurtosis values). The two 
highly skewed severity items were transformed using log10 (see Tabachnick & Fidell, 
2013); the skewness value for the transformed SEV2 was -0.428, and -0.668 for the 
transformed SEV3.  The principal component of the severity scale was extracted and 
subsequently used as an index of severity. Most of the distributions had kurtosis values 
under 1.00 except for the previously mentioned SEV2 and SEV3 in the severity scale, 
some items in the anger and hope scales, and in the perceived scene similarity scale, but 
even then, the values were generally just slightly larger than 1.00.  
 Linearity was assessed by looking at bivariate scatterplots between a number of 
variable pairs, which generally displayed the oval shape typical of linear relationships 
(Tabachnick & Fidell, 2013). For datasets with a large number of variables, Tabachnick 
and Fidell (2013) suggested that because it may be impractical to check bivariate 
scatterplots for all pairs of variables that researchers can concentrate on scatterplots of 
highly skewed variables. Because two of the items in the severity scale were highly 
skewed, a multivariate scatterplot of the four severity items was checked for linearity. 
The plots did not show any major deviations from the typical oval shape indicating 
linearity.  Additionally, standardized residuals against predicted values were assessed for 
patterns; no patterns were seen therefore the relationship between variables was 




  Homogeneity of variance was tested during the ANCOVA analyses reported in 
Chapter 5, and unless otherwise noted, the Levene’s test of equality of error variances 
was not significant, suggesting equal error variance of the dependent variable across 
groups. According to Tabachnick and Fidell (2013), unequal group variances are less of a 
problem in one-way ANOVA than in factorial designs, and Pallant (2010) suggested that 
in cases of unequal variances in factorial ANOVA that a stricter significance level (.01 
instead of .05) be used as the significance criterion. 
 Evaluating covariates for the main study. Based on the results of Pilot Study 2, 
personal relevance and optimistic bias were retained as covariates for the main study, and 
attitude towards climate change was also included as a covariate. In an article about the 
health impacts of climate variability and change on human health, Greenough et al. 
(2001) noted the potential of climate change to influence the probability of extreme 
weather events such as drought4. With this in mind, a statement about the influence of 
climate change on drought was included in all of the study messages for the main study.  
 Analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) assumes that covariates are reliable, that they 
do not correlate highly with each other, that there is a linear relationship between the 
covariates and the dependent variables, and that the regression slopes of the covariates 
and the dependent variables are equal (homogeneity of regression), meaning that the 
relationship between the covariates and the dependent variable should be the same for all 
groups. Additionally, the covariates should not be influenced by the treatment (Pallant, 
2010).   
 The reliability of the covariates have been noted in the instrumentation section of 








Main Study Reliabilities (N = 568) 
 
Scale No. of items Cronbach’s Alpha 
Severity 4 .828 
Susceptibility 4 .904 
Climate change attitude 8 .947 
Demographic similarity (perceived) 9 .899 
Scene similarity (perceived) 11 .887 
Self referencing 5 .803 
Identification 8 .882 
Transportation 8 .888 
Personal relevance 8 .940 
 
 The correlations among the covariates are shown in Table 7, which also shows 
correlations between the covariates and the dependent variables (severity, susceptibility, 
self referencing, identification, transportation, behavioral intention, behavioral 
expectation, response efficacy). The covariates are listed in the first three columns. 
Pallant (2010) suggested that if variables have a correlation of .80 or higher, both should 
not be used as covariates. As shown in Table 7, the highest correlation between a 
covariate pair was .375 between personal relevance and attitude towards climate change. 
Linearity between the covariates and the dependent variables was determined by 
assessing the significance of the test for linearity in the ANOVA table of the compare 
means panel of SPSS version 21; a significance level of .05 was used. There were no 
violations for the relationship between personal relevance and the dependent variables, 




test showed that optimistic bias had a nonlinear relationship with severity and 
identification, as well as with two of the behavioral intention variables (regarding water 
conservation and seeking information when there is time) and two of the response 
efficacy variables (regarding seeking information within one week of reading the 
message and seeking information when there is time). 
 The suitability of the covariates was also determined by testing for homogeneity 
of regression slopes to ensure that there is a constant relationship between the covariates 
and the dependent variables across treatment groups. This is done by testing for an 
interaction between the independent variables and the covariates (see Pallant, 2010; 
Tabachnick & Fidell, 2013). Violations of homogeneity of regression were found for 
personal relevance (covariate) when self referencing, identification, and transportation 
were the dependent variables, when optimistic bias was the covariate and transportation 
the dependent variables, and when attitude to climate change was the covariate and 
behavioral intention and behavioral expectation regarded water conservation. As will be 
noted in Chapter 4 (Results of the Main Study), whenever covariates violated the 
homogeneity of regression assumption they were not included in the analyses for the 









Main Study Inter-scale/Inter-Item Correlations and Standard Deviations (N = 568) 
 
Note. PR: personal relevance; OB: optimistic bias; CC: climate change attitude; SEV: severity; SUS: susceptibility; SR: self referencing; ID: 
identification; TR: transportation; SS: perceived scene similarity; DS: perceived demographic similarity; BI: behavioral intention; BE: behavioral 
expectation; RE: response efficacy. BI1/BE1/RE1: conserve water now; BI2/BE2/RE2: seek information about drought with one week of reading 
message; BI3/BE3/RE3: seek information about drought when there is time.
 
PR OB CC SEV SUS SR ID TR SS DS BI1 BI2 BI3 BE1 BE2 BE3 RE1 RE2 RE3 
PR 1.000                   
OB -.202 1.000                  
CC .375 -.057 1.000                 
SEV .562 .064 .356 1.000                
SUS .607 -.382 .410 .406 1.000               
SR .544 -.276 .337 .283 .473 1.000              
ID .400 -.078 .320 .381 .321 .508 1.000             
TR .533 -.166 .332 .299 .399 .598 .646 1.000            
SS .092 -.287 .040 -.052 .174 .290 .169 .168 1.000           
DS .140 -.218 .013 -.019 .176 .276 .086 .135 .514 1.000          
BI1 .466 .011 .294 .335 .243 .237 .220 .287 -.046 .045 1.000         
BI2 .516 -.103 .237 .277 .345 .372 .217 .404 .020 .142 .456 1.000        
BI3 .556 -.067 .264 .296 .317 .368 .247 .391 .056 .113 .464 .764 1.000       
BE1 .463 .003 .281 .316 .231 .254 .203 .320 -.056 .028 .765 .439 .466 1.000      
BE2 .514 -.109 .266 .222 .363 .376 .248 .416 .058 .125 .397 .794 .672 .508 1.000     
BE3 .507 -.104 .270 .236 .325 .367 .243 .380 .058 .084 .398 .682 .808 .503 .810 1.000    
RE1 .400 .054 .266 .398 .214 .171 .216 .253 -.101 -.125 .414 .297 .310 .425 .279 .288 1.000   
RE2 .411 -.021 .262 .297 .280 .272 .221 .328 .056 .090 .277 .420 .381 .294 .458 .415 .449 1.000  
RE3 .424 -.034 .275 .283 .271 .321 .263 .370 .087 .077 .272 .403 .411 .293 .485 .473 .446 .856 1.000 
Std.Dev. 23.17 34.59 24.88 20.81 24.86 22.34 21.92 22.20 23.12 22.00 30.02 30.08 31.07 32.31 28.63 31.31 30.57 32.97 32.29 
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Chapter 4: Results of the Main Study 
 
 This chapter summarizes the results of the main study, a 2 (risk frame: health, 
environmental) × 2 (demographic similarity: high, low) × 2 (scene similarity: high, low) 
between-subjects experiment in which participants were randomly assigned to read a 
narrative about drought before completing a questionnaire that measured variables related 
to risk perception, narrative persuasion, and behavioral intention (see Table 8). The 
hypotheses were tested using analysis of covariance, and the same procedure was used to 
answer the research questions.  
Table 8 
Main Study Design 
 Scene Similarity 




















    
 
High 
    
 
 Personal relevance, optimistic bias, and attitude toward climate change were 
chosen as the covariates having met all of the covariate-related assumptions required for 
ANCOVA (see the end of Chapter 3 for details on covariate testing). The analyses were 
done simultaneously by entering the three independent variables (risk frame, 
demographic similarity, and scene similarity) into the 2 × 2 ×2 ANCOVA model for each 




expectation, response efficacy, identification, transportation, self-referencing). The 
manipulation checks were included in the ANCOVA analyses. The statistical significance 
of the covariates and model R2 are noted in Table 10.  
 Group means reported in the text are estimated marginal means (rather than 
descriptive means) because they reflect the adjustment for the covariates in the model. 
The Bonferroni adjustment was used in all cases to correct for family-wise Type I error. 
Unless otherwise stated, the Levene’s test was not significant, therefore equal variances 
between groups are assumed. Estimated marginal means and standard errors for treatment 
groups in the 2 × 2 × 2 ANCOVA model for each outcome variable are found in 
Appendix H. 
Manipulation Checks  
 Demographic similarity. The induction for demographic similarity was 
successful, F (1, 534) = 207.285, p < .001, η2=.249). Participants in the high demographic 
similarity conditions perceived greater demographic similarity (M = 51.95, SE= 1.15) 
between themselves and the characters in the narrative than participants in the low 
demographic similarity conditions (M = 28.69, SE = 1.13).  
 Scene similarity.  The scene similarity induction was also successful, F (1, 534) 
= 181.420, p < .001, η2=.221. Participants in the high scene similarity conditions 
perceived greater scene similarity (M =53.57, SE = 1.11) between their locale and the 
locale in the narrative than participants in the low scene similarity conditions (M =32.47, 
SE = 1.10).  
 Risk frame. The risk frame induction was also successful, F (1, 532) = 6.189, p < 




statement, “The risk described in the story is more of a threat to the environment than to 
people.” Participants in the environmental frame perceived the risk to be more of a threat 
to the environment (M = 48.38, SE = 1.78) than participants in the health frame (M 
=41.97, SE = 1.86). 
 Following are results related to the hypotheses and research questions laid out in 
Chapter 2. The results summarize main effects and interactions of the independent 
variables (risk frame, scene similarity, demographic similarity) on the dependent 
variables (also referred to as outcome variables in this dissertation), which have been 
divided into three groups, namely, risk perception (susceptibility and severity); behavior 
related variables (behavioral intention, behavioral expectation, and response efficacy); 
and narrative persuasion (identification, transportation, and self-referencing). Results 
regarding the behavior-related variables are specific to the three recommendations that 
were common to all treatment groups, namely, “increase water conservation now”; “seek 
more information about drought within one week of participating in this study,” and, 
“seek more information about drought whenever I have the time.”  
Effect of Framing on Outcomes 
 H1. Hypothesis 1 predicted a main effect for risk frame such that there would be 
greater levels of susceptibility, severity, behavioral intention, behavioral expectation, 
response efficacy, identification, and self-referencing for the health frame than for the 
environmental frame. This hypothesis was only partially supported. There was a main 
effect for risk frame on susceptibility, F (1,534) = 9.992, p < .05, η2=.009; there was 
higher perceived susceptibility for the environmental frame (M =40.00, SE=1.07) than for 




severity, F (1,534) = .296, p = .587; people in the health frame condition (M =69.20, SE 
=1.04) perceived a similar level of severity as those in the environmental frame condition 
(M =68.42, SE =1.00). 
 There was a main effect for risk frame on behavioral intention regarding one of 
the three behavioral recommendations, conservation of water, F (1,532) = 19.745, p < 
.001, η2= .026; participants in the health frame (M = 63.96, SE = 1.60) condition had a 
greater intention to conserve water than those in the environmental frame condition (M = 
54.11, SE = 1.53). There were however no main effects for seeking information within 
one week of reading the message, F (1,531) = 1.794, p = .181, or for seeking information 
whenever there is time, F (1,533) = 0.276, p = .600. There was also a main effect for risk 
frame on behavioral expectation to conserve water, F (1,533) = 4.118, p < .05, η2= .006; 
participants who read the health-framed message (M = 52.69, SE = 1.77) had a greater 
behavioral expectation than those who read the environmental-framed one (M = 47.71, 
SE = 1.70). No main effects were seen however for seeking information within one week 
of reading the message, F (1,532) = 1.457, p = .228, or for seeking information whenever 
there is time, F (1,534) = 0.005, p = .941.  
 There was a main effect for risk frame on response efficacy for two of the 
behavioral recommendations: seeking information within one week of reading the 
message, F (1,533) = 39.945, p < .001, η2= .056, and seeking information whenever there 
is time, F (1,533) = 32.249, p < .001, η2= .045. Perceptions about the extent to which 
seeking information within one week would actually reduce the risk was greater for 
participants in the health frame (M = 45.58, SE = 1.77) than for those in the 




which seeking information whenever there is time would actually reduce the risk was 
greater for the health frame (M = 46.03, SE = 1.79) than for the environmental frame (M 
= 31.66, SE = 1.70). There was no main effect for response efficacy in terms of 
conserving water, F (1,534) = 0.004, p = .950; participants in the health frame condition 
(M =62.60, SE =1.72) perceived a similar level of response efficacy as those in the 
environmental frame condition (M =62.75, SE =1.64). 
 There were no main effects for risk frame on the narrative persuasion variables: 
identification, F (1,534) = .000, p = .994; transportation, F (1,534) = 0.523, p = .470; and 
self-referencing, F (1,534) = 0.913, p = .340. The level of identification for the health 
frame (M =49.32, SE =1.17) was similar to that for the environmental frame (M =49.31, 
SE =1.12). Likewise, participants who read the health-framed message (M =37.92, SE 
=1.12) condition experienced a similar level of transportation as those who read the 
environmental-framed one (M = 36.43, SE =1.14). And, self referencing occurred at a 
similar level in the health frame (M =33.09, SE =1.12) as in the environmental frame (M 
=31.60, SE =1.07) conditions. 
Effect of Similarity on Outcomes 
H2. Hypothesis 2 predicted greater levels of susceptibility, severity,  
behavioral intention, behavioral expectation, identification, transportation, and self-
referencing when both demographic similarity and scene similarity were high rather than 
low. This hypothesis was largely unsupported with two exceptions. The first exception 
was that there was a main effect for scene similarity on self-referencing, F (1, 534) = 
6.114, p < .05, η2= .007; people engaged in more self-referencing when scene similarity 




however no main effect for demographic similarity on self-referencing, F (1, 534) = 
2.676, p = .102.  No group differences were seen for the other narrative persuasion 
processes (identification and transportation) for either type of similarity. There was no 
main effect for demographic similarity, F (1,534) = 0.192, p = .661, or scene similarity, F 
(1, 534) = 0.344, p = .558 on identification, and no main effect for demographic 
similarity, F (1, 534) = 0.875, p = .350, or for scene similarity on transportation, F (1, 
534) = 0.178, p = .673. 
 The second exception in the results for hypothesis 2 was that there was a main 
effect for scene similarity on behavioral intention regarding one of the three behavioral 
recommendations, namely, intention to conserve water, F (1, 532) = 5.155, p < .05, η2= 
.007; participants in the low scene similarity condition (M = 61.55, SE = 1.56) had greater 
behavioral intention to conserve water than those in the high scene similarity condition 
(M = 56.52, SE = 1.57). No other main effects emerged. There were no differences 
between the high and low scene similarity conditions for seeking information in one 
week, F (1, 532) = 0.381, p = .537, or seeking information whenever there is time, F (1, 
532) = 0.000, p = .989.  There was also no main effect for demographic similarity on 
behavioral intention for any of the recommendations: conserve water, F (1, 532) = .077, p 
= .782; seek information within one week, F (1, 532) = 1.638, p = .201, and seek 
information when there is time, F (1, 532) = 1.238, p = .266.  
 There was no main effect for demographic similarity on behavioral expectation 
for any of the recommendations: conserve water F (1, 533) = 0.263, p = .608; seek 
information within one week, F (1, 532) = 1.886, p = .170, and seek information when 




similarity on behavioral expectation for any of the recommendations: conserve water, F 
(1, 533) = .795, p = .373; seek information within one week, F (1, 532) = 1.454, p = .228, 
and seek information when there is time, F (1, 534) = 0.267, p = .606.  
  There were also no differences between the high and low conditions for either 
type of similarity for the risk perception variables. There was no main effect for 
demographic similarity on susceptibility, F (1, 534) = 0.356, p = .551, or scene similarity 
on susceptibility, F (1, 541) = .202, p = .653. There was also no main effect for 
demographic similarity on severity, F (1, 534) = 1.916, p = .167, or for scene similarity 
on severity, F (1, 534) = .444, p = .506. 
Effect of Risk Frame × Similarity on Outcomes 
H3. Hypothesis 3 predicted a two-way interaction between risk frame and 
demographic similarity (H3a), as well as a two-way interaction between risk frame and 
scene similarity (H3b) on susceptibility, severity, behavioral intention, behavioral 
expectation, identification, transportation, and self-referencing. In other words it was 
expected that the influence of risk frame on these variables would be moderated by the 
level of similarity (both scene and demographic) in the message. This hypothesis was 
largely unsupported except for the risk frame × scene similarity interaction for 
identification and transportation, and for behavioral expectation to conserve water. 
 There was an interaction between risk frame and scene similarity for 
identification F (1,534) = 5.701, p < .05, η2=.008 (see Figure 1). Moving from low to 
high scene similarity resulted in an increased level of identification for the health frame 
condition (M = 49.14, SE = 1.69 for low scene similarity, and M = 54.25, SE = 1.78 for 




(M = 53.44, SE = 1.68 for low scene similarity; and M = 50.44, SE = 1.64 for high scene 
similarity). There was also an interaction between risk frame and scene similarity on 
transportation, F (1, 530) = 6.376, p < .05, η2=.008 (see Figure 2). Moving from low to 
high scene similarity resulted in an increase in transportation for the health frame 
condition (M = 35.40; SE = 1.59 for low scene similarity, and M = 40.11, SE = 1.67 for 
high scene similarity), but for the environmental frame condition, moving from low to 
high scene similarity led to a decrease in transportation (M = 38.28, SE = 1.59 for low 
scene similarity and M = 34.91, SE = 1.55 for high scene similarity). 
. 





Figure 2. Interaction between risk frame and scene similarity for transportation.  
 
 There was no risk frame × scene similarity interaction for self- referencing, F (1, 
534) = 1.756, p = .186, nor was there any risk frame × demographic similarity interaction 
for any of the narrative persuasion variables: identification, F (1, 534) = .214, p = .644; 
transportation, F (1, 534) = 2.145, p = .144; and self-referencing, F (1, 534) = 3.721, p = 
.054, which was almost significant at the .05 level. 
 There was an interaction between risk type and scene similarity for behavioral 
expectation to conserve water, F (1, 533) = 5.856, p = < .05, η2=.008. (see Figure 3). 
Increasing scene similarity from low to high caused an increase in behavioral expectation 
to conserve water in the environmental frame condition, but a decrease in behavioral 
expectation in the health frame. Participants in the health frame—low scene similarity 
condition (M = 56.75, SE = 2.44) had the highest level of behavioral expectation to 
implement the recommendation, and those in the environmental frame—low scene 






Figure 3. Interaction between risk frame and scene similarity for behavioral expectation 
to conserve water.  
 There was no interaction between risk type and scene similarity for behavioral 
expectation to seek information within one week of reading the message, F (1, 532) = 
0.214, p = .644, or whenever there was time, F (1, 532) = 1.228, p = .268. Furthermore, 
there was no interaction between risk frame and either type of similarity for behavioral 
intention regarding any of the recommendations. For demographic similarity: conserve 
water, F (1, 532) = 3.106, p = .079); seek information within one week, F (1, 531) = 
0.350, p = .554, and seek information when there is time, F (1, 534) = 0.084, p = .772. 
And, for scene similarity: conserve water, F (1, 532) = 3.448, p = .064; seek information 
within one week, F (1, 531) = 0.449, p = .503, and seek information when there is time, F 
(1, 534) = 0.074, p = .786. 
 There were also no additional interactions for any of the other outcome variables. 




similarity, demographic similarity, F (1, 534) = .097, p = .756, or scene similarity, F (1, 
534) = .515, p = .473, in terms of susceptibility. And in terms of severity, there was also 
no interaction between risk frame and either type of similarity: demographic similarity, F 
(1, 534) = 2.139, p = .144, or scene similarity, F (1, 534) = .701, p = .403, for severity.  
H4. A three-way interaction (risk frame × demographic similarity × scene 
similarity) was predicted for susceptibility, severity, behavioral intention, behavioral 
expectation, identification, transportation, and self-referencing. This hypothesis was not 
supported: susceptibility, F (1, 534) = 004, p = .953; severity, F (1, 534) = 1.191, p = 
.276; identification, F (1, 534) = .921, p = .338; transportation, F (1, 534) = .677, p = 
.411; and self-referencing, F (1, 534) = 1.225, p = .269. There was also no three-way 
interaction for either of the risk perception variables: F (1, 534) = .004, p = .953 for 
susceptibility, and F (1, 534) = 1.191, p = .276 for severity. Additionally there was no 
three-way interaction for behavioral intention for any of the recommendations: conserve 
water, F (1, 532) = 2.474, p = .116; seek information within one week, F (1, 531) = 
3.170, p = .076, and seek information when there is time, F (1, 533) = .184, p = .668. 
There was also no three-way interaction for behavioral expectation for any of the 
recommendations: conserve water, F (1, 533) = .651, p = .420; seek information within 
one week, F (1, 532) = 0.293, p = .588, and seek information when there is time, F (1, 
534) = .481, p = .488.  
Research Questions 
RQ1. Research question 1 asked whether there was any demographic similarity × 
scene similarity interaction for any of the outcome variables, without the effect of 




η2=.006 (see Figure 4) and in the case of perceived demographic similarity, F (1, 534) = 
28.394, p = < .001, η2=.034 (see Figure 5). When demographic similarity was low, 
increasing scene similarity from low to high led to an increase in severity, M = 68.67, SE 
= 1.47 for low scene similarity, and M = 70.95, SE = 1.38 for high scene similarity), 
however when demographic similarity was high, increasing scene similarity from low to 
high led to a decrease in severity (M = 69.91, SE = 1.39 for low scene similarity, and M = 
65.71, SE = 1.52 for high scene similarity). 
 
Figure 4. Interaction between demographic similarity and scene similarity for severity.  
As shown in Figure 5, increasing scene similarity from low to high led to an increase in 
perceived demographic similarity for the high demographic similarity treatment group (M 
= 44.70, SE = 1.56 for low scene similarity, and M = 59.21, SE = 1.70 for high scene 
similarity),  but to a marginal decrease in perceived demographic similarity for the low 
demographic similarity treatment group (M = 30.02, SE = 1.65 for low scene similarity, 





Figure 5. Interaction between demographic similarity and scene similarity for perceived 
demographic similarity.  
 RQ2. Research question 2 asked about the effects of the independent variables 
(individually and jointly) on perceived demographic similarity and perceived scene 
similarity, which are not to be confused with the manipulated versions of demographic 
and scene similarity.  
 Individual effects. There was a main effect for risk frame on perceived scene 
similarity, F (1, 534) = 5.971, p = < .05, η2=.007, but not on perceived demographic 
similarity, F (1, 534) = 1.070, p = .301. Participants who read the health-framed message 
(M = 44.94, SE = 1.13) perceived a greater level of scene similarity than those who read 
the environmental-framed one (M = 41.11, SE = 1.08). Additionally, there was a main  
effect for demographic similarity on perceived scene similarity, F (1, 534) = 26.326, p = 
< .001, η2=.032; participants perceived a higher level of scene similarity when 
demographic similarity was high (M = 47.04, SE = 1.12) as opposed to low (M = 39.01, 
SE = 1.09). Alternately, there was a main effect for scene similarity on perceived 
92 
demographic similarity, F (1, 534) = 13.447, p = < .001, η2=.016; participants perceived a 
higher level of demographic similarity when scene similarity was high (M = 43.29, SE = 
1.15) as opposed to low (M = 37.36, SE = 1.13). 
Joint effects. There was risk frame × demographic similarity interaction for 
perceived demographic similarity, F (1,534) = 5.813, p < .05, η2=.007, but not for 
perceived scene similarity, F (1,534) = 0.000, p = .986. Moving from low to high 
demographic similarity resulted in an increased level of perceived demographic similarity 
for the health frame condition (M = 27.59, SE = 1.63 for low demographic similarity, and 
M = 54.73, SE = 1.66 for high demographic similarity), as well as the environmental 
condition (M = 29.80, SE = 1.56 for low demographic similarity; and M = 49.18, SE = 
1.60 for high demographic similarity), however the increase in perceived demographic 
similarity was greater for the health frame. There was no risk frame × demographic 
similarity (see Figure 6). 
There was a demographic similarity × scene similarity × risk frame interaction for 
perceived scene similarity, F (1,534) = 5.602, p < .05, η2=.007, but not for perceived 
demographic similarity, F (1,534) = 0.106, p = .745. As shown in Figure 7 in the graph 
on the left, for the low demographic similarity condition, increasing scene similarity from 
low to high led to an increase in perceived scene similarity for both the health frame and 
the environmental frame conditions, however the increase was marginally greater in the 
health condition. However as shown in Figure 7 in the graph on the right, for the high 
demographic similarity condition, although increasing scene similarity from low to high 
led to an increase in perceived scene similarity for both the health frame and the 
environmental frame conditions, the increase was marginally greater for the 
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environmental frame. 
Figure 6. Demographic similarity × risk frame interaction for perceived demographic 
similarity. 
Figure 7. Demographic similarity × scene similarity × risk frame interaction for 
perceived scene similarity; the health frame condition is on the left, and the 
environmental frame 
Supplemental Analyses: Effects of Personal Relevance on Outcomes 
As shown in Table 10, personal relevance was a significant covariate in the 
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ANCOVA analyses for all dependent variables except perceived scene similarity. The 
importance of personal relevance in risk perception, behavior related, and narrative 
persuasion outcomes is also evident in Table 7, which reveals that it has a robust and 
positive bivariate correlation with most of the outcomes of interest.  Because of its robust 
relationship with the dependent variables, I wanted to further assess the power of 
personal relevance in determining the outcomes central to this dissertation.  I took the 
continuous personal relevance measure and split the sample by employing a median split 
(median = 47.31; low ≤ 47.31, high > 47.31).  This dichotomized measure was entered 
into the ANOVA model with the other independent variables, with each dependent 
variable analyzed separately.  Those results are presented next. Estimated marginal 
means for the personal relevance × risk frame × demographic similarity × scene 
similarity ANOVA model are found in Appendix I. 
Independent effects. There was a main effect for personal relevance on risk 
perception variables: susceptibility, F (1,552) = 179.251, p < .001, η2 =.237, and severity, 
F (1,552) = 103.186, p < .001, η2=.154. Participants for whom personal relevance was 
high (M = 50.48, SE = 1.30) perceived a greater level of susceptibility than participants 
for whom personal relevance was low (M = 26.08, SE = 1.27). And, participants for 
whom personal relevance was high (M = 77.34, SE = 1.16) perceived a higher level of 
severity than participants for whom personal relevance was low (M = 60.88, SE = 1.13). 
Personal relevance also influenced narrative persuasion processes. There was a 
main effect for personal relevance on identification, F (1,552) = 55.794, p < .001, 
η2=.090, such that there was a greater level of identification for participants in the high 
personal relevance condition (M = 58.58, SE = 1.27) than in the low personal relevance 
95 
condition (M = 45.36, SE = 1.24). There was also a main effect for personal relevance on 
transportation, F (1,552) = 126.276, p < .001, η2=.180, such that there was a greater level 
of transportation for participants in the high personal relevance condition (M = 47.09, SE 
= 1.21) than in the low personal relevance condition (M = 28.11, SE = 1.18). 
Additionally, there was a main effect for personal relevance on self-referencing, F 
(1,552) = 132.676, p < .001, η2=.188, such that participants in the high personal relevance 
condition (M = 42.42, SE = 1.21) did more self referencing than participants in the low 
personal relevance condition (M = 22.93, SE = 1.18). 
The behavior-related outcome variables were also influenced by personal 
relevance. There was a main effect for personal relevance on behavioral intention for 
each recommendation: conserve water, F (1,550) = 88.215, p < .001, η2=.129; seek 
information within one week of reading the message, F (1,549) = 112.373, p < .001, η2= 
.167, and seek information whenever there is time, F (1,551) = 133.086, p < .001, η2= 
.191. There was also a main effect for personal relevance on behavioral expectation for 
each recommendation: conserve water, F (1,551) = 76.340, p < .001, η2=.117; seek 
information within one week of reading the message, F (1,550) = 136.508, p < .001, η2= 
.197, and seek information whenever there is time, F (1,551) = 136.026, p < .001, η2= 
.196. Additionally, there was a main effect for personal relevance on response efficacy 
for each recommendation: conserve water, F (1,547) = 64.093, p < .001, η2=.103; seek 
information within one week of reading the message, F (1,550) = 72.597, p < .001, η2= 
.110, and seek information whenever there is time, F (1,550) = 85.216, p < .001, η2= 
.127. Estimated marginal means for each treatment group are found in Table 9. 
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Table 9 












Conserve water 70.172 1.653 48.487 1.612 
Seek information within one week 43.432 1.670 18.694 1.630 
Seek information when there is time 




Conserve water 61.831 1.824 39.554 1.781 
Seek information within one week 38.077 1.567 12.462 1.533 
Seek information when there is time 




Conserve water 73.014 1.769 53.236 1.725 
Seek information within one week 49.634 1.845 27.647 1.804 
Seek information when there is time 50.349 1.792 27.217 1.752 
Joint effects. There was a personal relevance × risk frame interaction for 
behavioral intention to conserve water, F (1, 550) = 4.574, p < .05, η2=.007). As shown in 
the graph on te left in Figure 8, increasing the level of personal relevance from low to 
high increased behavioral intention in both the health frame and environmental frame 
conditions, however the increase in the environmental frame was larger. In the health 
frame, there was an increase in behavioral intention from M = 56.35 (SE = 2.28) for low 
personal relevance to M = 73.10 (SE = 2.42) for high personal relevance, and in the case 
of the environmental frame, there was an increase in behavioral intention from M = 40.62 
(SE = 2.28) personal relevance to M = 67.25 (SE = 2.25) for high personal relevance. The 
graph on the right in Figure 8 also shows the same interaction from a different 
perspective, that is, when personal relevance is low, framing has a greater effect on 
behavioral intention than when personal relevance is low rather than high; that is, 
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switching from an environmental frame to a health frame leads to a greater increase in 
behavioral intention when personal relevance is low, rather than high. This perspective is 
reinforced by the steepness of the slopes in the graph on the left, which shows that the 
low personal relevance line is steeper than the high personal relevance line. 
Figure 8. Interaction between personal relevance and risk frame for behavioral intention 
to conserve water, with each graph showing the interaction from a different perspective. 
There was a personal relevance × scene similarity interaction for behavioral 
expectation to conserve water, F (1,551) = 5.185, p < .05, η2=.008). As shown in graph 
on the left in Figure 9, when personal relevance is low, increasing the scene similarity 
from low to high resulted in a decrease in behavioral expectation to conserve water, M = 
44.20 (SE = 2.53) to M = 34.91 (SE = 2.50), but there was negligible change in 
behavioral expectation when personal relevance was high, M = 60.67 (SE = 2.52) to M = 
63.00 (SE = 2.63). 
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Figure 9. Interaction between personal relevance and scene similarity for behavioral 















R2 F Sig. η2 F Sig. η2 F   Sig. η2 
Susceptibility 1 534 185.434 .000 .176 70.086 .000 .067 44.869 .000 .043 .483 
Severity 1 534 187.089 .000 .218 24.586 .000 .029 25.066 .000 .029 .366 
Self-Referencing 1 534 147.149 .000 .173 22.346 .000 .026 15.109 .000 .018 .359 
Identification 1 534 59.384 .000 .088 .012 .912 .000 23.299 .000 .034 .198 
Transportation 1 534 138.040 .000 .175 3.139 .077 .004 13.815 .000 .018 .309 
Perceived Demographic 
Similarity 
1 534 10.485 .001 .013 22.116 .000 .027 0.669 .414 .000 .348 
Perceived Scene Similarity 1 534 2.459 .117 .005 54.676 .000 .067 0.209 .648 .000 .336 
Behavioral Intention-1 1 532 116.663 .000 .154 5.967 .015 .008 13.010 .000 .017 .284 
Behavioral Intention-2 1 531 143.756 .000 .196 .043 .835 .000 1.582 .209 .002 .262 
Behavioral Intention-3 1 533 181.465 .000 .235 1.678 .196 .002 2.944 .087 .004 .298 
Behavioral Expectation-1 1 533 109.409 .000 .153 5.513 .019 .000 9.843 .002 .014 .242 
Behavioral Expectation-2 1 532 138.300 .000 .189 .165 .685 .000 4.259 .040 .006 .260 
Behavioral Expectation-3 1 534 131.053 .000 .180 .046 .831 .000 5.287 .022 .007 .254 
Response Efficacy-1 1 530 75.566 .000 .113 11.821 .001 .018 10.884 .001 .016 .192 
Response Efficacy-2 1 533 87.538 .000 .123 1.376 .241 .002 7.628 .006 .011 .236 
Response Efficacy-3 1 533 90.692 .000 .127 .838 .360 .001 9.027 .003 .013 .238 
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Chapter 5: Discussion 
Summary of Results 
Recall that the main argument of this dissertation is that because health and 
environmental risks are different and are perceived as such, messages about risks that can 
threaten both health and the environment can be framed as either a health risk or an 
environmental risk as a means of altering perceptions about the risk. More importantly, 
all things being equal, a particular set of message features will achieve different results 
depending on which message frame is used. As a means of investigating this claim, two 
types of similarity (demographic similarity and scene similarity) were manipulated in 
messages about drought framed as either a health or an environmental risk. A 2 (risk 
frame: health, environmental) × 2 (demographic similarity: high, low) × 2 (scene 
similarity: high, low) between subjects design was used. 
Main effects. It was hypothesized that, all things being equal, risk perception 
(susceptibility and severity), narrative persuasion processes (identification, transportation, 
self-referening), and behavior-related variables (behavioral intention, behavioral 
expectation, and response efficacy) would be greater when the risk was framed as a 
health risk than when it was framed as an environmental risk. This hypothesis was 
supported only in the case of behavioral intention and behavioral expectation to conserve 
water; people had greater intentions and expectations to adopt this recommendation when 
the risk threatened personal health as opposed to when it threatened the environment.  
Although the hypothesis was not supported for the risk perception variables, finding a 
statistically significant effect for behavioral intention (and expectation) is encouraging 
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because intention is considered a more direct predictor of behavior change than 
attitudinal variables such as risk perception are (see Sheppard, Hartwick, & Warshaw, 
1988). Interestingly, people who read the environmental-frame message perceived a 
statistically significantly greater level of susceptibility to the risk than those who read the 
health-frame; this was unexpected given that people tend to feel more vulnerable when 
the risk threatens personal health as opposed to environmental health (e.g., Kahlor et al., 
2006). One possibility for this unexpected result could be that participants in the health 
frame condition perceived the risk (contracting Cryptosporidiosis, a serious and 
potentially fatal waterborne disease) as extreme.  However the threat of contracting 
Cryptosporidiosis during or after a drought is not improbable; in 1993 this disease was 
blamed for the death of 69 and the sickening of 403, 000 residents of greater Milwaukee 
at a reported cost of $96.2 million (Corso et al., 2003). 
There were no main effects for demographic similarity on the dependent 
variables, suggesting that as a message feature this variable may not be an important 
independent predictor of risk perception, narrative persuasion processes, or behavior-
related variables.  Scene similarity did not fare very well either as an independent 
predictor of risk perception, but high scene similarity did lead to a statistically 
significantly greater level of self-referencing and behavioral intention to conserve water 
than low scene similarity. 
Interaction effects.  The two-way interactions provided a way to test the strength 
of the argument that the level (high vs. low) of demographic and scene similarity operate 
differently in health-frame messages than they do in environmental-frame messages. On 
the one hand, a risk frame × demographic similarity interaction was expected to show 
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that increasing the demographic similarity from low to high in the health frame leads to 
greater levels of the dependent variables when compared with low to high increases in the 
environmental frame. This was, however, not the case. On the other hand, it was expected 
that scene similarity would have a greater effect on dependent variables when the risk 
was framed as an environmental threat than when it was a health threat. This was, 
however, not the case; instead, scene similarity from low to high lead to greater amount 
of change in identification and transportation when the risk was framed as a health threat. 
The manner in which scene similarity interacted with risk frame has implications 
for narrative persuasion, particularly as it concerns identification and transportation. 
Although narratives persuasion processes seem to center on the characters in the story 
(see the items for related scales in Appendix  D), the results show that the scene matters 
such that all things being equal, people will engage in greater levels of identification and 
transportation for a health risk when the scene similarity is high rather than low, and they 
will engage in greater levels of identification and transportation for an environmental risk 
when the scene similarity is low rather than high. 
The pattern in the risk frame × scene similarity interaction on identification and 
transportation (see Figures 1 and 2) raises the issue of risk-relevant similarity as 
discussed in Chapter 2 (see Simons et al., 1970). It could be that when drought was 
framed as environmental risk that participants perceived the risk as being more relevant 
to a rural scene, which was the depiction in the low scene similarity condition. It appears 
therefore that in addition to the common attitude that environmental risks occur 
somewhere else, for example in distant places (see Leiserowitz, 2005, 2007), people may 
also perceive environmental risks to occur in different places, in other words, not only 
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does proximity matter, but similarity as well. Recall that the manipulation check showed 
that participants perceived the urban scene to be more similar to their own locale than the 
rural scene.  Note, that as shown in Figures 1 and 2, that although participants engaged in 
the highest levels of identification, and transportation when the risk was framed as a 
health threat and the scene similarity was high (urban setting), they also engaged in a 
relatively high level of identification and transportation when the risk was an 
environmental risk but only when the scene similarity was low (rural setting). The notion 
of risk-relevance should therefore be investigated from the perspective of the message 
receivers because although risk communicators may consider that a particular 
environmental risk is relevant to a particular setting (e.g., an urban setting), the audience 
may think that it is more relevant to a different setting (e.g., a rural setting). 
Covariate effects. The relatively large effect sizes associated with personal 
relevance as a covariate in the various analyses support Kahlor et al.’s (2006) claim that 
one of the reasons members of the public do not readily engage in recommended 
behaviors to mitigate climate change and related risks (drought is considered a related 
risk) is that they do not find them to be personally relevant. Attitude toward climate 
change was also shown to be an important covariate, though with much smaller effect 
sizes that personal relevance. Optimistic bias was a significant covariate in some cases, 
but less often that climate change attitude (see Table 10). It is possible, however, that 
with a better measure of optimistic bias, its role as a covariate could be greater.  
Implications and Future Research Directions 
Scene similarity.  One of the more significant contributions this dissertation 
makes is highlighting the need to consider place-related contextual matters in risk 
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communication in the form scene similarity. There were more significant effects 
involving scene similarity than involving demographic similarity, and this suggests a 
great opportunity for the extension of the literature on similarity as a persuasive feature in 
messages. One of the challenges of such research would be to determine which aspects of 
the scene can be highlighted to achieve the largest desired effect, and more importantly, 
when, how, and for whom scene similarity could and should be optimized.  Research on 
scene similarity may be particularly relevant when it comes to communication, 
mitigation, and adaptation of climate change and related risks. 
Additional research on how scene similarity influences identification and 
transportation, and possibly other narrative persuasion variables (e.g., parasocial 
interaction), can also be pursued as it may open new possibilities for entertainment 
education, which has traditionally used demographic similarity in telenovelas to increase 
risk perception about health risks. The results also suggest that scene similarity can be 
used to leverage the effect of demographic similarity and vice versa. In other words, 
participants were likely to see themselves as being more similar to characters in a 
narrative.  Likewise, participants considered their environment to be more similar to the 
environment in a story if the people in the story are also similar to them, a finding that 
may be of interest to practitioners who seek to highlight risks to the environment. 
Risk-relevant similarity. Future research should also approach the issue of risk-
relevant similarity from the point of view of the audience. According to O’Keefe (2002), 
the influence of similarity on persuasive outcomes is complex and depends on the 
relevance of the similarity, the message content, and contextual factors. Although it may 
seem reasonable to suspect that demographic similarity is more relevant to health risks 
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and scene similarity than to environmental risks, this was not shown to be the case. 
Framing an environmental risk as a health risk may not negate long-standing attitudes 
that environmental risks primarily affect places rather than people, and therefore scene 
similarity may remain more influential than demographic similarity in environmental risk 
messages, even when these messages are framed in a health context. 
Research on scene similarity is also relevant in this suggested message framing—
narrative persuasion link because, as reported in the results section, framing an 
environmental risk as a health risk can lead to increased identification and transportation 
when high scene similarity in also included in the message. 
Framing environmental risks as threats to health. Several calls have been 
made to find ways that make environmental risks more personally relevant to target 
audiences by using a health approach to environmental risk communication (see for 
example, Frumkin et al., 2008; Semenza et al., 2011). This dissertation supports such 
calls because its results indicate that such an approach may be a way to engender attitude 
and behavior change. Additionally, this dissertation research showed possible linkages 
between studies on message framing and those on narrative persuasion processes. 
Connections with other research lines. Research on demographic and scene 
similarity in risk communication may have connections with existing research on 
psychological closeness, which suggests that people can feel close to others in similar 
situations regardless of proximity (see Carvalho et al., 2008). Research on place 
identification and place attachment, and other psychosocial and psychospatial models and 
theories, may also be relevant to studies on demographic and scene similarity (see Gattig 
& Hendrickx, 2007). 
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Underlying dimensions of risk perception. Future studies should seek to better 
understand the different results among the different treatment groups (i.e., different 
combinations of scene similarity, demographic similarity, and risk-frame). I argue that 
the differences in the treatment groups are related to the underlying dimensions of risk 
perception, specifically that risk perception may be based on perceptions of self and 
other. Investigating the why of the results should be a priority in the next steps of the 
research presented in this dissertation. Factor analysis of the Pilot Study 1 data showed a 
two-factor model for the eight risks in the Pilot 1 survey; six risks (drought, flood, heat 
wave, high pollen count, tornado, and West Nile Virus) loaded highly on Factor 1 but not 
on Factor 2, whereas the other two risks (global warming and climate change) loaded 
highly on Factor 2 and not on Factor 1. A two-factor model also emerged for the different 
characteristics of risks such that the self-related items (e.g., susceptibility, personal 
relevance, extreme harm) loaded highly onto Factor 1 but not on Factor 2, whereas target 
of the threat (the people in other countries and environment more than people) and 
abstractness loaded highly onto Factor 2 but not on Factor 1.  
Though given little attention in this dissertation, the factor analysis of the Pilot 
Study 1 data suggests that it may be possible that risk perceptions can vary on dimensions 
of self and other; this research should be pursued, perhaps beginning with the creation of 
scales to measure the concepts of self and other. Such research can inform a replication of 
this dissertation research in that risks that load highly on one factor can be compared with 
risks that load highly on another factor; this may make for greater differences among 
treatment groups and therefore greater effect sizes. Additionally because health and 
environmental risks have different characteristics, they may load differently on the 
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underlying dimensions of risk perception therefore making them well-suited to research 
that compares message features that may vary on those same dimensions. 
Studies regarding the underlying dimensions of risk perception should also seek 
to make connections with existing research in that area, for example research that indicate 
differences in attitude as it relates to perceptions of local and global risks. It is reasonable 
to assume that judgments about local risk may be a proxy for perceptions of risk-to-self 
whereas judgments regarding global risk may be a proxy for perceptions of risk-to-other; 
such relationships should be tested empirically. 
Behavior-related variables. More work on behavioral expectation should also be 
pursued. As shown in some of the analyses of the results, in general, estimated group 
means for behavioral expectation were lower than those for behavioral intention, and 
there were cases in which there were significant effects on behavioral intention but not on 
behavioral expectation, and vice versa. For example, there was a statistically significant 
main effect for scene similarity on behavioral intention but not on behavioral expectation, 
and there was a statistically significant risk frame × scene similarity interaction for 
behavioral expectation but not behavioral intention.  This raises the question of using 
behavioral intention as a precursor of behavior; perhaps behavioral expectation may be a 
better predictor of actual behavior. Future studies on the effects of risk messages and 
interventions that use attitude-behavior theories such as the Theory of Reasoned Action 
(Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975) or the Theory of Planned Behavior (Ajzen, 1985) should 
consider including behavioral expectation as an additional direct predictor of behavior 
(see Sheppard, Hartwick, & Warshaw, 1988). 
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Limitations and Related Recommendations 
Instrumentation. Although optimistic bias was shown to be a significant 
covariate in most of the analyses, it was measured using difference scores between only 
two items, likelihood of risk to self, and’ likelihood of risk to a different other. Even 
though this is one of the traditional ways of measuring optimistic bias, in the future, 
participants can be asked to indicate their perceived susceptibility using the revised Risk 
Behavior Diagnostic (RBD) scale (Witte, McKeon, Cameron, & Berkowitz, 1995) used 
in this dissertation, for both the self, and an average other. The difference scores between 
both scale indices can then be used as a measure of optimistic bias, and this may be more 
informative because it would be based on more than one item. The behavior related 
variables (behavioral intention, behavioral expectation, response efficacy) were also 
assessed as single items as opposed to creating an index from all of the recommended 
behaviors. It was felt that a behavioral index would be best if the behavioral 
recommendations related to one specific behavior (see Sheppard, Hartwick, & Warshaw, 
1988). Creating a behavioral index that included both information seeking and water 
conservation items would not have been ideal because those two behaviors are different. 
In future studies however several items should be used to assess intentions, expectations, 
and response efficacy for a specific behavior. 
Violation of data analysis assumptions. Although analysis of covariance is 
intended to increase the power of hypothesis testing by removing the effects of other 
influences on the dependent variables, it is suggested that covariates be tested before the 
study treatment is given. When covariates are measured after the treatment is given, they 
109 
may be affected by the treatment and, therefore, when they are removed, some of 
treatment effects may also be removed (Pallant, 2010).  
Implications for practitioners 
The results of the main study indicate that framing an environmental risk as a 
health risk can change behavioral intentions, as well as behavioral expectations. It is 
important to note also that the behavioral recommendation for which the health frame 
showed significant effects was conserving water now, rather than in the future. This is 
encouraging for risk communication that deals with environmental risks like drought that 
may not seem immediate. Of the eight risks studied in Pilot 1, drought ranked fifth in 
terms of having immediate consequences, after, tornado, flood, West Nile Virus, and heat 
wave. It shows that people may be willing to make immediate changes to prevent a risk 
perceived as relatively distant if they can be convinced that the risk affects their health, as 
opposed to the environment. 
In addition to paying more attention to the way a risk is framed, practitioners 
should also pay attention to the places in which characters are portrayed. The results also 
showed that in narratives about environmental risks, the places may be more important 
than people portrayed in the story in getting people to make connections between 
themselves and events in the narrative (self-referencing), as well as in engendering 
desired behavioral intentions. This is evident in the overall lack of significant effects for 
demographic similarity (even when the risk was framed as a health risk). At the same 
time however high scene similarity resulted in greater self-referencing and behavioral 
intention to conserve water than low scene similarity. Furthermore, the interaction effects 
on narrative persuasion processes involved scene similarity, rather than demographic 
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similarity. The results showed that the effect of the risk frame (health versus 
environment) on identification and transportation depends on the level of scene similarity 
in the story. Health frames worked better when scene similarity was high (in this case, an 
urban setting), and environmental frames worked better when scene similarity was low 
(in this case, a rural setting), perhaps because drought, when framed as an environmental 
risk, was associated with a rural scene.
6
The supplemental analyses highlight the importance of personal relevance in risk 
communication. Personal relevance independently increased the level of every outcome 
variable in a statistically significant manner, with medium effect sizes. Importantly, the 
effect of personal relevance on perceived susceptibility showed the largest effect size (η2
=.237) when compared to the effect of personal relevance on the other outcome variables. 
As shown in Figure 8, the interaction between personal relevance and risk frame for 
behavioral intention to conserve water revealed that framing an environmental risk as a 
health risk leads to a better outcome when personal relevance is low, rather than high. 
This result is encouraging, particularly for environmental risk communicators, because it 
provides some evidence that behavioral outcomes can be improved by framing perceived 
impersonal risks (i.e., those of low personal relevance) as health risks. However because 
the effect size for this result was small (η2=.007), it will worthwhile to conduct further 
research on the interaction between personal relevance and risk frames, perhaps using 
other perceived impersonal risks such as global warming, sea level rise, and other risks 




 Figure 9 shows that when personal relevance is high, the expectation to conserve 
water was relatively high regardless of the scene, however when personal relevance is 
low, behavioral expectation to conserve water is higher for low scene similarity (i.e., a 
rural setting) than for a high scene similarity (i.e., an urban setting). For narrative risk 
communicators who are trying to raise awareness about drought in an urban setting, and 
who are trying to engender water conservation practices in that setting, this result 
suggests that increasing the personal relevance of the risk may serve to increase 
behavioral expectation but making the scene in the story seem more urban may not be the 
best way to increase personal relevance because it appears that the need for action is 
being associated with rural (as opposed to urban) settings.   
 More research on the interaction between depictions of place and personal 
relevance is needed because the results may be different for other risks. Additionally, as 
discussed earlier in this chapter, the perceived relevance of a risk setting should also be 
studied. In other words, practitioners would be well-served if they had a better idea of 
when to increase the similarity of the place in the message, and when to decrease it. 
Figure 9 suggests that when personal relevance is low, it may be better to make the 
setting seem more like the perceived settings that people stereotype as being susceptible 
to drought. Weinstein’s (1980) ideas about the role of stereotype salience in risk 
perception may be relevant here; he stated that people have a stereotype of whom a risk 
affects and the more different from the stereotype they perceive themselves to be, the less 
likely they are to feel susceptible to the risk, because of optimistic bias. It is possible 





 Conclusion. This dissertation has several important lessons. First, context 
matters, particularly scene similarity, and this finding may have implications for various 
related lines of research including narrative risk communication, entertainment education, 
and similarity research as it relates to message effects. Second, message outcomes in the 
field of environmental communication may be enhanced if the messages are presented in 
a health context, which is connected to the challenge of helping audiences see and care 
about the inextricable link between humans and their environment. Such a link can be 
better made in research and practice when both risk communicators and practitioners take 
into consideration the centrality of risk perception to the outcomes of the messages that 
they deliver to their audiences. As long as risk communicators fail to understand the 
underlying dimensions on which people perceive risks, message effectiveness is likely to 
fall short of the desired mark. Criticisms of popular models used to assess risks 
perception include the contentions that they are not well-suited to assessing 
environmental risk perception and that when the correct data analyses methods are used, 
these models account for only 30–40% of the variance in risk perception (Sjöberg, 
2004)7. Research on message effects (e.g., effects of risk frame and similarity effects) can 
benefit from a more thorough investigation into the underlying dimensions of risk 
perception; without a clearer understanding of the why behind people’s risk perceptions 
(beyond current models), this dissertation (and others like it) may simply be contributing 





Appendix A: Skewness and Kurtosis Values 
 
Pilot 1: Skewness and Kurtosis Values (N = 171) 
 
Variable Skewness Kurtosis 
Statistic Std. Error Statistic Std. Error 
SEV_ClimateChange -.476 .186 -.312 .369 
SEV_Drought -.377 .186 -.836 .369 
SEV_Flood -.471 .186 -.607 .369 
SEV_GlobalWarming -.794 .186 .159 .369 
SEV_HeatWave -.154 .186 -.546 .369 
SEV_HighPollenCount .481 .186 -.463 .369 
SEV_Tornado -.556 .186 -.747 .369 
SEV_WestNileVirus -.215 .186 -1.173 .369 
SNC_ClimateChange -.821 .186 -.256 .369 
SNC_Drought -1.296 .186 1.394 .369 
SNC_Flood -1.342 .186 1.801 .369 
SNC_GlobalWarming -1.372 .186 1.344 .369 
SNC_HeatWave -.548 .186 -.311 .369 
SNC_HighPollenCount .268 .186 -.814 .369 
SNC_Tornado -1.266 .186 1.361 .369 
SNC_WestNileVirus -.860 .186 -.072 .369 
EH_ClimateChange -.463 .186 -.714 .370 
EH_Drought -.920 .186 .530 .369 
EH_Flood -.876 .186 .647 .369 
EH_GlobalWarming -.920 .186 .222 .369 
EH_HeatWave -.539 .186 -.546 .369 
EH_HighPollenCount .451 .186 -.539 .369 
EH_Tornado -1.142 .186 .842 .369 
EH_WestNileVirus -.886 .186 .162 .369 
LS_ClimateChange -1.156 .187 .713 .371 
LS_Drought -.154 .186 -.648 .370 
LS_Flood -.152 .186 -.727 .370 
LS_GlobalWarming -1.590 .186 2.113 .370 
LS_HeatWave -.102 .186 -.664 .370 
LS_HighPollenCount .469 .186 -.592 .370 
LS_Tornado .113 .186 -.962 .370 




Variable Skewness Kurtosis 
Statistic Std. Error Statistic Std. Error 
LA_ClimateChange -.727 .186 -.636 .369 
LA_Drought .486 .186 -.643 .369 
LA_Flood .388 .186 -.394 .369 
LA_GlobalWarming -.845 .186 -.551 .369 
LA_HeatWave -.158 .186 -1.075 .369 
LA_HighPollenCount .063 .186 -1.334 .369 
LA_Tornado .507 .186 -.662 .369 
LA_WestNileVirus 1.253 .186 .795 .369 
RA_ClimateChange -.701 .186 -.801 .369 
RA_Drought .480 .186 -.616 .369 
RA_Flood .503 .186 -.400 .369 
RA_GlobalWarming -.801 .186 -.601 .369 
RA_HeatWave -.009 .186 -1.121 .369 
RA_HighPollenCount .199 .186 -1.280 .369 
RA_Tornado .533 .186 -.679 .369 
RA_WestNileVirus 1.238 .186 .804 .369 
PA_ClimateChange -.959 .186 -.367 .369 
PA_Drought -.090 .186 -1.293 .369 
PA_Flood -.047 .186 -1.130 .369 
PA_GlobalWarming -1.205 .186 .398 .369 
PA_HeatWave -.382 .186 -1.128 .369 
PA_HighPollenCount -.230 .186 -1.352 .369 
PA_Tornado .006 .186 -1.302 .369 
PA_WestNileVirus .640 .186 -.890 .369 
EA_ClimateChange -.179 .186 -1.153 .369 
EA_Drought .454 .186 -.602 .369 
EA_Flood .212 .186 -.562 .369 
EA_GlobalWarming -.540 .186 -.785 .369 
EA_HeatWave .177 .186 -.847 .369 
EA_HighPollenCount .475 .186 -1.008 .369 
EA_Tornado .365 .186 -1.012 .369 
EA_WestNileVirus .785 .186 -.493 .369 
CI_ClimateChange .608 .186 -.871 .369 
CI_Drought -.128 .186 -1.098 .369 
CI_Flood -1.096 .186 .157 .369 
CI_GlobalWarming .493 .186 -.991 .369 
CI_HeatWave -.472 .186 -1.022 .369 




Variable Skewness Kurtosis 
Statistic Std. Error Statistic Std. Error 
CI_Tornado -1.484 .186 1.041 .369 
CI_WestNileVirus -.386 .186 -1.113 .369 
PS_ClimateChange -.148 .186 -1.505 .370 
PS_Drought .950 .186 -.220 .370 
PS_Flood 1.029 .186 .011 .370 
PS_GlobalWarming -.771 .186 -.810 .370 
PS_HeatWave 1.076 .186 .056 .370 
PS_HighPollenCount 1.232 .186 .411 .370 
PS_Tornado 1.134 .186 .019 .370 
PS_WestNileVirus .793 .186 -.726 .370 
AB_ClimateChange .194 .186 -1.429 .369 
AB_Drought .615 .186 -1.011 .369 
AB_Flood .797 .186 -.715 .369 
AB_GlobalWarming -.001 .186 -1.477 .369 
AB_HeatWave .806 .186 -.629 .369 
AB_HighPollenCount .603 .186 -1.110 .369 
AB_Tornado .823 .186 -.537 .369 
AB_WestNileVirus .288 .186 -1.368 .369 
POC_ClimateChange .498 .186 -1.126 .370 
POC_Drought -.657 .186 -.623 .370 
POC_Flood -.286 .186 -1.088 .370 
POC_GlobalWarming .513 .186 -1.179 .370 
POC_HeatWave -.489 .186 -.914 .370 
POC_HighPollenCount .555 .186 -.722 .370 
POC_Tornado .571 .186 -.893 .370 
POC_WestNileVirus -1.083 .186 .116 .370 
EMP_ClimateChange -.351 .186 -.854 .369 
EMP_Drought .278 .186 -.726 .369 
EMP_Flood .332 .186 -.776 .369 
EMP_GlobalWarming -.254 .186 -1.088 .369 
EMP_HeatWave .397 .186 -.655 .369 
EMP_HighPollenCount .754 .186 -.370 .369 
EMP_Tornado .404 .186 -.796 .369 
EMP_WestNileVirus 1.519 .186 1.665 .369 
PR_ClimateChange -.245 .186 -1.415 .370 
PR_Drought .664 .186 -.821 .370 
PR_Flood .602 .186 -.835 .370 




Variable Skewness Kurtosis 
Statistic Std. Error Statistic Std. Error 
PR_HeatWave .348 .186 -1.188 .370 
PR_HighPollenCount .442 .186 -1.220 .370 
PR_Tornado .691 .186 -.788 .370 
PR_WestNileVirus 1.231 .186 .383 .370 
WT_ClimateChange -.639 .186 -1.091 .369 
WT_Drought .564 .186 -.996 .369 
WT_Flood .977 .186 -.056 .369 
WT_GlobalWarming -1.420 .186 1.200 .369 
WT_HeatWave 1.168 .186 .468 .369 
WT_HighPollenCount 1.356 .186 .891 .369 
WT_Tornado 2.109 .186 3.951 .369 
WT_WestNileVirus .259 .186 -1.361 .369 






Pilot 2: Skewness and Kurtosis Values (N = 425) 
 
 Skewness Kurtosis 
Statistic Std. Error Statistic Std. Error 
DS_1_ClassSim  .252 .118 -1.175 .236 
DS_2_StatDif_REV .193 .118 -1.105 .236 
DS_3_EconDif_REV .203 .118 -.861 .236 
DS_4_BckgndSim  .423 .118 -.910 .236 
DS_5_StatSim  .338 .118 -1.009 .236 
DS_6_ClassDif_REV .174 .118 -.990 .236 
DS_7_EconSim  .293 .118 -.853 .236 
DS_8_BckgndDif_REV .318 .118 -.969 .236 
DS_9_GeogSim  .509 .118 -.782 .236 
DS_10_LotCmn  .450 .118 -.607 .236 
SS_1_LivePlSimLive  .447 .118 -1.053 .236 
SS_2_WorkDifClge_REV  .192 .118 -1.294 .236 
SS_3_CmntySim  .347 .118 -1.032 .236 
SS_4_ClgeDif_REV  .114 .118 -1.156 .236 
SS_5_LivePlDifLive_REV  .308 .118 -1.013 .236 
SS_6_WrkSimClge  .237 .118 -1.122 .236 
SS_7_CmntyDif_REV  .280 .118 -.983 .236 
SS_8_ClgeSim  .151 .118 -1.170 .236 
SS_9_IdfyWrkSchEnv  -.021 .118 -1.052 .236 
SS_10_IdfyResCmnty  .041 .118 -.939 .236 
PERS_1_Compel  -.531 .118 -.463 .236 
PERS_2_Persuasive  -.512 .118 -.500 .236 
PERS_3_Convince  -.709 .118 -.071 .236 
PERS_4_Sway  -.391 .118 -.549 .236 
REI_Rtl_1_NoLikeThink_REV -.333 .118 -.834 .236 
REI_Rtl_2_AvdDeepThink_REV -.524 .118 -.471 .236 
REI_Rtl_3_PrfrChlnge  -.441 .118 -.207 .236 
REI_Rtl_4_PrfrComplex  -.166 .118 -.626 .236 
REI_Rtl_5_ThinkLtleSatis_REV -.368 .118 -.623 .236 
REI_Epl_1_TrstFeelings  -.727 .118 .207 .236 
REI_Epl_2_TrstHunches  -.851 .118 .773 .236 
REI_Epl_3_IntlImpRight  -.621 .118 .376 .236 
REI_Epl_4_TrstGut  -.859 .118 .848 .236 
REI_Epl_5_FeelRghtWrng  -.669 .118 .511 .236 
PR_1_Importance  -.038 .118 -.911 .236 
PR_2_Concern  -.079 .118 -.909 .236 




 Skewness Kurtosis 
Statistic Std. Error Statistic Std. Error 
PR_4_Meaning  -.003 .118 -.879 .236 
PR_5_Triviality  .039 .118 -.555 .236 
PR_6_Matters  .044 .118 -.807 .236 
PR_7_Interest  .119 .118 -1.030 .236 
PR_8_Significance  .104 .118 -.907 .236 
SR_1_MeInMind -.434 .118 -.924 .236 
SR_2_RelateToMe .095 .118 -.992 .236 
SR_3_PersonalExp -.247 .118 -1.115 .236 
SR_4_OwnRisk -.672 .118 -.486 .236 
TR_1_Envision  -.804 .118 .074 .236 
TR_2_LoseSelf  .080 .118 -.782 .236 
TR_3_TuneOut_REV .048 .118 -.954 .236 
TR_4_EnvisionMe  -.047 .118 -.876 .236 
TR_5_VividImgScen  -.281 .118 -.773 .236 
TR_6_MentInv  -.220 .118 -.850 .236 
TR_7_PutStoryOut_REV .207 .118 -.616 .236 
TR_8_PartOfStory  .545 .118 -.610 .236 
TR_9_Impatient  .386 .118 -.812 .236 
TR_10_Perspective  -.177 .118 -.645 .236 
TR_11_EmotAffected  -.138 .118 -.872 .236 
TR_12_VividImgChar  -.094 .118 -.841 .236 
TR_13_OtherWays  .128 .118 -1.172 .236 
TR_14_MindWanders_REV .483 .118 -.633 .236 
TR_15_WhatCharFelt  -.001 .118 -1.010 .236 
TR_16_EvntsRelv  .658 .118 -.481 .236 
TR_17_StoriesImpact  -.294 .118 -.656 .236 
TR_18_IdentifyWChar  .255 .118 -.825 .236 
TR_19_VividImgEvents  -.080 .118 -.998 .236 
ID_1_Part  .574 .118 -.633 .236 
ID_2_ForgotSelf  .575 .118 -.547 .236 
ID_3_Understand  -.112 .118 -.816 .236 
ID_4_GoodUndChar  -.441 .118 -.431 .236 
ID_5_UndReasons  -.671 .118 .131 .236 
ID_6_FeelEmotions  -.214 .118 -.974 .236 
ID_7_InCharHeads  .103 .118 -.860 .236 
ID_8_KnewExactly  .192 .118 -.916 .236 
ID_9_Succeed  -.649 .118 -.489 .236 





 Main Study: Skewness and Kurtosis Values  (N = 568) 
 
 N Skewness Kurtosis 
Statistic Statistic Std. Error Statistic Std. Error 
SEV1 568 -.675 .103 -.269 .205 
SEV2 568 -1.157 .103 1.057 .205 
SEV3 568 -1.079 .103 .856 .205 
SEV4 568 -.302 .103 -.838 .205 
SUS1 568 .497 .103 -.651 .205 
SUS2 568 .502 .103 -.641 .205 
SUS3 568 .177 .103 -1.004 .205 
SUS4 568 .564 .103 -.617 .205 
PR1 568 .034 .103 -.942 .205 
PR2 568 .031 .103 -.911 .205 
PR3 568 .355 .103 -.832 .205 
PR4 568 -.026 .103 -.786 .205 
PR5 568 -.026 .103 -.598 .205 
PR6 568 -.064 .103 -.879 .205 
PR7 568 .158 .103 -.908 .205 
PR8 568 .189 .103 -.875 .205 
SR1 568 .822 .103 -.422 .205 
SR2 568 1.092 .103 .422 .205 
SR3 568 .523 .103 -.900 .205 
SR4 568 .156 .103 -1.184 .205 
CC1 568 -.312 .103 -.954 .205 
CC2 568 .073 .103 -.954 .205 
CC3 568 -.584 .103 -.558 .205 
CC4 568 -.264 .103 -.930 .205 
CC5 568 -.294 .103 -.779 .205 
CC6 568 -.123 .103 -.857 .205 
CC7 568 -.597 .103 -.590 .205 
CC8 568 -.243 .103 -.871 .205 
ID1 568 .850 .103 -.344 .205 
ID2 568 .773 .103 -.528 .205 
ID3 568 -.082 .103 -1.043 .205 
ID4 568 -.428 .103 -.731 .205 
ID5 568 -.536 .103 -.378 .205 
ID6 568 -.026 .103 -.990 .205 
ID7 568 .199 .103 -.917 .205 




 N Skewness Kurtosis 
Statistic Statistic Std. Error Statistic Std. Error 
ID9 568 -.664 .103 -.427 .205 
ID10 568 -.179 .103 -1.027 .205 
FR1 568 .520 .103 -.853 .205 
FR2 568 .591 .103 -.705 .205 
FR3 568 .197 .103 -1.128 .205 
FR4 568 -.030 .103 -.998 .205 
ANG1 568 1.077 .103 .167 .205 
ANG2 568 .971 .103 -.125 .205 
ANG3 568 -1.788 .103 2.396 .205 
HPE3 568 1.164 .103 .308 .205 
ANG4 568 1.052 .103 -.008 .205 
HPE1 568 .865 .103 -.264 .205 
HPE2 568 1.183 .103 .561 .205 
HPE4 568 .905 .103 -.246 .205 
REIr1 568 -.507 .103 -.764 .205 
REIr2 568 -.800 .103 -.321 .205 
REIr3 568 -.487 .103 -.349 .205 
REIr4 568 -.152 .103 -.721 .205 
REIr5 568 -.454 .103 -.733 .205 
REIe1 568 -.540 .103 -.444 .205 
REIe2 568 -.637 .103 -.089 .205 
REe3 568 -.436 .103 -.425 .205 
REIe4 568 -.580 .103 -.321 .205 
REIe5 568 -.537 .103 -.516 .205 
TR1 568 -.359 .103 -1.119 .205 
TR2 568 .116 .103 -.986 .205 
TR3 568 .099 .103 -.911 .205 
TR4 568 -.117 .103 -.959 .205 
TR5 568 .898 .103 -.097 .205 
TR6 568 .522 .103 -.897 .205 
TR7 568 .537 .103 -.798 .205 
TR8 568 .298 .103 -1.073 .205 
TR9 568 -.209 .103 -.979 .205 
TR10 568 .454 .103 -.848 .205 
TR11 568 .191 .103 -1.089 .205 
PERS1 568 .159 .103 -.941 .205 
PERS2 568 -.025 .103 -1.055 .205 




 N Skewness Kurtosis 
Statistic Statistic Std. Error Statistic Std. Error 
PERS4 568 .093 .103 -1.010 .205 
DS1 568 .324 .103 -1.130 .205 
DS2 568 .273 .103 -1.105 .205 
DS3 568 .266 .103 -.939 .205 
DS4 568 .410 .103 -.963 .205 
DS5 568 .421 .103 -.940 .205 
DS6 568 .102 .103 -1.103 .205 
DS7 568 .277 .103 -.945 .205 
DS8 568 .309 .103 -1.043 .205 
DS9 568 .682 .103 -.564 .205 
DS10 568 .560 .103 -.562 .205 
SS1 568 .688 .103 -.766 .205 
SS2 568 .053 .103 -1.275 .205 
SS3 568 .480 .103 -.826 .205 
SS4 568 -.042 .103 -1.162 .205 
SS5 568 .167 .103 -1.091 .205 
SS6 568 .233 .103 -1.064 .205 
SS7 568 .164 .103 -1.108 .205 
SS8 568 .163 .103 -1.075 .205 
SS9 568 -.071 .103 -1.018 .205 
SS10 568 .176 .103 -.939 .205 
SKP1 566 .872 .103 .208 .205 
SKP2 566 .330 .103 -.704 .205 
SKP3 566 .601 .103 -.175 .205 
SKP4 566 -.586 .103 -.334 .205 
PR 554 .017 .104 -.640 .207 
SR 568 .532 .103 -.317 .205 
CC 560 -.320 .103 -.537 .206 
ID 558 .034 .103 -.014 .206 
FR 567 .303 .103 -.824 .205 
HPE 562 .882 .103 -.141 .206 
REI 567 -.496 .103 -.143 .205 
PERS 566 -.003 .103 -.863 .205 
W 565 .037 .103 -.493 .205 
ANG 562 1.042 .103 .550 .206 
REIr 566 -.276 .103 .013 .205 
TR 557 .095 .104 -.271 .207 




 N Skewness Kurtosis 
Statistic Statistic Std. Error Statistic Std. Error 
SS 562 .226 .103 -.136 .206 
OB 564 .037 .103 .087 .205 
SKP 566 -.938 .103 2.404 .205 
SEV 568 -.816 .103 .729 .205 
SUS 568 .365 .103 -.670 .205 
BI1 568 -.402 .103 -.865 .205 
BI2 568 .755 .103 -.511 .205 
BI3 568 .436 .103 -1.000 .205 
BE1 568 -.072 .103 -1.186 .205 
BE2 568 1.073 .103 .193 .205 
BE3 568 .774 .103 -.589 .205 
RE1 568 -.532 .103 -.771 .205 
RE2 568 .527 .103 -.954 .205 
RE3 568 .489 .103 -.966 .205 
BI 568 .261 .103 -.704 .205 
BE 568 .581 .103 -.438 .205 
RE 568 .234 .103 -.745 .205 







Appendix B: Inter-Item Correlations 
 
Pilot 1:Inter-Item Correlations for Susceptibility Scale 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 
1. LA_CC 1.00                                
2  2. LA_DRT .343 1.00                               
3. LA_FLD .162 .612 1.00                              
4. LA_GW .782 .249 .116 1.00                             
5. LA_HW .429 .518 .422 .392 1.00                            
6. LA_HPC .247 .165 .207 .318 .354 1.00                           
7. LA_TOR .160 .352 .470 .191 .451 .191 1.00                          
8. LA_WNV .161 .525 .445 .157 .305 .187 .500 1.00                         
9. RA_CC .788 .380 .191 .687 .471 .319 .193 .234 1.00                        
10. RA_DRT .305 .657 .428 .256 .402 .125 .312 .321 .435 1.00                       
11. RA_FLD .174 .440 .621 .150 .359 .206 .408 .339 .310 .651 1.00                      
12. RA_GW .642 .286 .079 .746 .400 .271 .212 .218 .780 .334 .256 1.00                     
13. RA_HW .383 .408 .341 .301 .599 .303 .314 .219 .493 .604 .597 .414 1.00                    
14. RA_HPC .253 .227 .253 .328 .306 .814 .202 .195 .353 .276 .380 .320 .390 1.00                   
15. RA_TOR .249 .305 .368 .248 .318 .266 .647 .305 .307 .450 .597 .241 .498 .386 1.00                  
16. RA_WNV .167 .474 .369 .188 .266 .192 .408 .695 .233 .428 .403 .184 .265 .302 .513 1.00                 
17. PA_CC .684 .277 .106 .594 .405 .289 .142 .198 .815 .336 .244 .696 .450 .293 .190 .121 1.00                
18. PA_DRT .314 .498 .326 .257 .301 .197 .280 .287 .447 .609 .437 .389 .393 .267 .331 .300 .591 1.00               
19. PA_FLD .218 .352 .484 .209 .271 .162 .336 .135 .314 .463 .605 .290 .431 .329 .421 .203 .469 .764 1.00              
20. PA_GW .611 .268 .145 .752 .375 .284 .170 .175 .697 .291 .240 .822 .332 .333 .205 .203 .764 .502 .415 1.00             
21. PA_HW .421 .343 .319 .382 .564 .279 .316 .132 .550 .428 .430 .496 .696 .359 .360 .175 .660 .614 .672 .554 1.00            
22. PA_HPC .302 .206 .220 .312 .265 .615 .130 .081 .408 .248 .305 .359 .372 .672 .242 .134 .517 .523 .576 .483 .628 1.00           
23. PA_TOR .266 .227 .338 .221 .253 .224 .511 .176 .333 .336 .437 .266 .369 .315 .633 .299 .412 .628 .711 .355 .572 .525 1.00          
24. PA_WNV .175 .338 .240 .138 .104 .098 .261 .544 .242 .317 .298 .244 .230 .240 .350 .609 .331 .538 .477 .277 .376 .395 .554 1.00         
25. EA_CC .563 .402 .166 .467 .428 .200 .141 .368 .683 .399 .218 .537 .372 .224 .162 .268 .606 .330 .171 .453 .377 .247 .143 .276 1.00        
26. EA_DRT .207 .630 .462 .145 .355 .216 .299 .424 .289 .615 .417 .193 .394 .287 .323 .476 .208 .478 .341 .157 .311 .238 .277 .356 .519 1.00       
27. EA_FLD .142 .496 .590 .110 .348 .253 .378 .407 .196 .450 .540 .136 .328 .347 .380 .441 .113 .383 .435 .128 .253 .265 .344 .355 .328 .805 1.00      
28. EA_GW .591 .336 .133 .702 .363 .283 .227 .298 .635 .284 .121 .693 .272 .286 .207 .247 .580 .331 .203 .636 .350 .272 .194 .242 .741 .398 .292 1.00     




30. EA_HPC .160 .206 .217 .211 .247 .710 .187 .232 .250 .181 .245 .187 .287 .759 .320 .331 .206 .210 .233 .172 .263 .584 .253 .237 .252 .392 .426 .268 .442 1.00   
31. EA_TOR .165 .212 .369 .193 .232 .205 .618 .294 .200 .302 .364 .163 .299 .291 .632 .377 .151 .398 .404 .202 .331 .242 .600 .338 .060 .374 .514 .154 .417 .313 1.00 . 
32. EA_WNV .037 .271 .295 .046 .119 .235 .365 .550 .090 .272 .301 .123 .193 .324 .370 .570 .117 .328 .264 .141 .176 .265 .327 .620 .184 .453 .563 .187 .319 .393 .572 1.00 
SD                                 
 
Pilot 1: Inter-Item Correlations for Severity Scale 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 
1. SEV-CC 1.00                        
2. SEV-DRT .205 1.00                       
3. SEV-FLD .123 .703 1.00                      
4. SEV-GW .670 .195 .203 1.00                     
5. SEV-HW .476 .497 .462 .433 1.00                    
6. SEV-HPC .222 .192 .226 .202 .400 1.00                   
7. SEV-TOR .030 .584 .666 .120 .407 .151 1.00                  
8. SEV-WNV .052 .512 .524 .188 .464 .241 .603 1.00                 
9. SNC-CC .626 .025 -.003 .559 .269 .180 -.050 .047 1.00                
10. SNC-DRT .277 .311 .321 .228 .368 .175 .278 .282 .543 1.00               
11. SNC-FLD .136 .250 .400 .163 .302 .244 .325 .309 .418 .793 1.00              
12. SNC-GW .348 .031 .043 .617 .146 .116 .055 .035 .640 .446 .446 1.00             
13. SNC-HW .243 .208 .275 .298 .522 .281 .228 .347 .432 .690 .645 .514 1.00            
14. SNC-HPC .160 .102 .089 .211 .289 .664 .153 .241 .273 .419 .421 .331 .557 1.00           
15. SNC-TOR .030 .189 .320 .127 .143 .087 .510 .320 .241 .587 .686 .439 .492 .350 1.00          
16. SNC-WNV .020 .263 .284 .127 .266 .180 .392 .637 .182 .398 .450 .221 .417 .371 .594 1.00         
17. EH-CC .633 .028 -.037 .571 .252 .259 -.055 .032 .745 .312 .189 .490 .356 .327 .070 .047 1.00        
18. EH-DRT .273 .440 .303 .289 .348 .224 .313 .315 .438 .694 .562 .367 .552 .428 .431 .259 .434 1.00       
19. EH-FLD .300 .284 .448 .338 .402 .275 .310 .290 .402 .580 .602 .312 .503 .333 .456 .277 .379 .685 1.00      
20. EH-GW .453 .051 .006 .724 .228 .205 -.029 .067 .588 .265 .253 .792 .395 .299 .194 .125 .665 .381 .390 1.00     
21. EH-HW .348 .292 .220 .309 .519 .228 .165 .272 .350 .472 .475 .357 .693 .384 .274 .186 .454 .660 .546 .457 1.00    
22. EH-HPC .223 .164 .134 .277 .329 .648 .065 .315 .295 .336 .335 .280 .466 .745 .192 .247 .442 .454 .383 .353 .507 1.00   
23. EH-TOR .036 .320 .444 .148 .236 .148 .538 .343 .112 .450 .519 .226 .378 .200 .712 .379 .067 .516 .652 .188 .361 .231 1.00  
24. EH-WNV .069 .270 .296 .190 .276 .156 .353 .651 .113 .291 .341 .119 .323 .251 .449 .791 .116 .335 .406 .179 .295 .310 .506  1.00 





Appendix C: Pilot 1 Factor Loadings 
 





















Susceptibility scale (4 items): 
 
1. It is likely that I will be affected by ___. 
2. I am at risk for being affected by ___. 
3. It is possible that I will be affected by 
___. 
4. The extent to which I will be affected by 
___ is great. 
 
T_SUS_FLD .934 .127 -.487 .801 p <.001 
T_SUS_TOR .754 .057 
T_SUS_DRT .730 -.137 
T_SUS_WNV .655 .038 
T_SUS_HW .530 -.347 
T_SUS_HPC .385 -.209 
T_SUS_CC -.006 -.977 
T_SUS_GW .010 -.836 
Severity scale (3 items): 
 
1. I believe that ___ is severe. 
2. I believe that ___ has serious negative 
consequences. 
3. I believe that ___ is extremely harmful. 
 
T_SEVrbd_TOR .911 -.168 .381 .809 p <.001 
T_SEVrbd_FLD .832 .128 
T_SEVrbd_WNV .796 -.113 
T_SEVrbd_DRT .732 .257 
T_SEVrbd_HW .514 .505 
T_SEVrbd_CC -.126 .941 
T_SEVrbd_GW -.032 .864 



































SEV_TOR .836 -.128 .328 .786 p <.001 
SEV_FLD .827 -.012 
SEV_DRT .754 .063 
SEV_WNV .711 -.011 
SEV_CC -.156 .931 
SEV_GW .005 .730 
SEV_HW .462 .476 
SEV_HPC .216 .257 
I believe that ___ has serious 
negative consequences. 
 
(Serious negative consequences) 
 
[SNC] 
SNC_TOR .837 -.089 .482 .791 p <.001 
SNC_FLD .778 .137 
SNC_WNV .697 -.157 
SNC_DRT .644 .303 
SNC_HW .618 .262 
SNC_HPC .481 .111 
SNC_CC -.046 .910 
SNC_GW .209 .594 
 






EH_TOR .899 -.176 .418 .812 p <.001 
EH_FLD .702 .239 
EH_DRT .564 .379 
EH_WNV .552 -.007 
EH_CC -.169 .931 
EH_GW .005 .706 
EH_HW .374 .504 



























The effects of ___ occur on a large 
scale. 
 
(Large scale)  
 
[LS] 
LS_FLD .895 -.138 .185 .771 p <.001 
LS_DRT .766 .156 
LS_TOR .754 -.237 
LS_HW .712 .122 
LS_WNV .489 .015 
LS_HPC .485 .136 
LS_GW .065 .812 
LS_CC -.013 .725 
 
It is likely that I will be affected by 
___. 
 
(Likelihood of being affected)  
 
[LA] 
LA_FLD .788 .101 -.384 .722 p <.001 
LA_DRT .713 -.086 
LA_WNV .674 .055 
LA_TOR .633 .006 
LA_HW .504 -.321 
LA_GW -.089 -.934 
LA_CC -.019 -.863 
LA_HPC .195 -.273 
 
I am at risk for being affected by 
___. 
 
(Risk of being affected) 
 
[RA] 
RA_FLD .876 .098 -.471 .797 p <.001 
RA_TOR .765 .067 
RA_DRT .688 -.099 
RA_HW .602 -.229 
RA_WV .576 .056 
RA_HPC .397 -.180 
RA_CC .052 -.903 



























It is possible that I will be affected by 
___. 
 
Possibility of being affected  
 
(PA) 
PA_FLD .886 -.011 .602 .866 p <.001 
PA_TOR .878 -.095 
PA_DRT .711 .181 
PA_WNV .637 -.048 
PA_HPC .482 .294 
PA_HW .479 .419 
PA_CC .010 .921 
PA_GW -.008 .823 
The extent to which I will be affected 
by ___ is great. 
 
Extent to which affected  
 
(EA) 
EA_TOR .848 -.239 .313 .765 p <.001 
EA_WNV .830 -.140 
EA_FLD .807 .150 
EA_DRT .625 .411 
EA_HPC .560 .156 
EA_HW .535 .416 
EA_CC -.016 .931 
EA_GW -.009 .871 
I believe that the consequences of 
___ are immediate. 
 
Consequences immediate  
 
(CI) 








.767 p <.001 
CI_TOR .846 -.170 
CI_HW .742 .138 
CI_WNV .676 -.045 
CI_DRT .605 .209 
CI_HPC .494 .073 
CI_GW -.071 .967 




























There are steps that I should 
personally take to combat the 
effects of ___. 
 
Personal steps  
 
(PS) 
PS_TOR .901 -.173 .291 .814 p <.001 
PS_FLD .899 -.088 
PS_HW .752 .092 
PS_HPC .725 -.071 
PS_DRT .690 .256 
PS_WNV .473 .177 
PS_CC .084 .837 
PS_GW -.050 .814 






AB_FLD .896 -.036 .537 .838 p <.001 
AB_DRT .873 -.051 
AB_TOR .823 -.059 
AB_HW .751 .107 
AB_WNV .720 .021 
AB_HPC .672 .085 
AB_GW -.077 .993 
AB_CC .144 .717 
 
___ primarily affects people in other 
countries. 
 
People in other countries  
 
(POC) 
POC_FLD .824 N/A N/A .881 p <.001 
POC_HPC .791 N/A 
POC_CC .790 N/A 
POC_GW .778 N/A 
POC_HW .765 N/A 
POC_TOR .734 N/A 
POC_DRT .694 N/A 




























___ affects the natural environment 
more than it affects people. 
 
Environment more than people  
 
(EMP) 
EMP_FLD .763 -.152 -.540 .872 p <.001 
EMP_TOR .756 -.069 
EMP_WNV .731 .173 
EMP_HW .699 -.234 
EMP_HPC .662 .001 
EMP_DRT .635 -.319 
EMP_CC -.004 -.962 
EMP_GW .114 -.775 
I consider ___ to be personally 
relevant. 
 
Personal relevance  
 
(PR) 
PR_FLD .836 -.026 .590 .833 p <.001 
PR_DRT .806 .081 
PR_TOR .805 -.038 
PR_WNV .709 -.037 
PR_HW .679 .179 
PR_HPC .560 -.020 
PR_CC -.008 .972 
PR_GW .026 .801 
I think that humans can work 
together to prevent ___. 
 
Work Together  
 
(WT) 
WT_HW .912 -.048 .374 .841 p <.001 
WT_HPC .869 -.034 
WT_TOR .861 -.131 
WT_FLD .812 .021 
WT_DRT .647 .141 
WT_WNV .341 .218 
WT_CC .051 .917 
WT_GW -.035 .672 
 
Note: Data for ‘extent affected’ (EA) was obtained through principal component analysis. When principal axis factoring was tried (as in the other 





Appendix D: Measures 
Individual Information Processing Style 
0 - 100 point scale (0= definitely not true of myself; 100 = definitely true of myself) 
based on Pacini & Epstein (1999). 
 Modified Rational Experiential Inventory (REIm, Norris & Epstein, 2011)  
1. R  I enjoy problems that require hard thinking. 
2. R-  I am not very good in solving problems that require careful logical 
 analysis. 
3. R  I enjoy intellectual challenges. 
4. R  I prefer complex to simple problems. 
5. R-  I don’t like to have to do a lot of thinking. 
6. R-  Reasoning things out carefully is not one of my strong points. 
7. R-  I am not a very analytical thinker. 
8. R-  I try to avoid situations that require thinking in depth about something. 
9. R  I am much better at figuring things out logically than most people. 
10. R  I have a logical mind. 
11. R  Using logic usually works well for me in figuring out problems in my life. 
12. R-  Knowing the answer without understanding the reasoning behind it is 
 good enough for me. 
13. E I enjoy reading things that evoke visual images. 
14. E I enjoy imagining things. 
15. E I can clearly picture or remember some sculpture or natural object (not 




I think is very beautiful. 
16. E  I identify strongly with demographics in movies or books I read. 
17. E  I tend to describe things by using images or metaphors, or creative 
 comparisons. 
18. E  Art is really important to me. 
19. E Sometimes I like to just sit back and watch things happen. 
20. E  I have favorite poems and paintings that mean a lot to me. 
21. E When I travel or drive anywhere, I always watch the landscape and 
 scenery. 
22. E-  I almost never think in visual images. 
23. E-  My emotions don’t make much difference in my life. 
24. E- Emotions don’t really mean much: they come and go. 
25. E When I have a strong emotional experience, the effect stays with me for a 
 long time. 
26. E  When I’m sad, it’s often a very strong feeling. 
27. E Things that make me feel emotional don’t seem to affect other people as 
 much. 
28. E  Everyday experiences often evoke strong feelings in me. 
29. E  I’d rather be upset sometimes and happy sometimes, than always feel 
 calm. 
30. E-  I don’t react emotionally to scary movies or books as much as most 
 people do. 




32. E-  When I’m happy, the feeling is usually more like contentment than like 
 exhilaration or excitement. 
33. E I like to rely on my intuitive impressions. 
34. E  I often go by my instincts when deciding on a course of action. 
35. E-  I don’t think it is a good idea to rely on ones intuition for important 
 decisions. 
36. E-  I trust my initial feelings about people. 
37. E- I tend to use my heart as a guide for my actions. 
38. E I enjoy learning by doing something, instead of figuring it out first. 
39. E  I can often tell how people feel without them having to say anything. 
40. E-  I generally don’t depend on my feelings to help me make decisions. 
41. E  For me, descriptions of actual people’s experiences are more convincing 
 than discussions about ‘‘facts.’’ 
42. E-  I’m not a very spontaneous person. 
Transportation 
0 - 100 point scale (0 = completely disagree; 100 = completely agree) based on Green 
and Brock (2000).  This study will use a version of the scale adapted by Dal Cin, Zanna, 
and Fong (2004). The items are as follows: 
1. I can easily envision the events in the story. 
2. I find I can easily lose myself in the story. 
3. I find it difficult to tune out activity around me. 
4. I can easily envision myself in the events described in a story. 




6. I can easily put stories out of my mind after I’ve finished reading them. 
7. I sometimes feel as if I am part of the story. 
8. I am often impatient to find out how the story ends. 
9. I find that I can easily take the perspective of the demographic(s) in the story. 
10. I am often emotionally affected by what I’ve read. 
11. I have vivid images of the demographics. 
12. I find myself thinking of other ways the story could have ended. 
13. My mind often wanders. 
14. I find myself feeling what the demographics may feel. 
15. I find that events in the story are relevant to my everyday life. 
16. I often find that reading stories has an impact on the way I see things. 
17. I easily identify with demographics in the story. 
18. I have vivid images of the events in the story. 
Self Referencing  
0 - 100 point scale (0 = strongly agree; 100 = strongly disagree) reverse-coded, using a 
scale designed by Burnkrant and Unnava (1989). The blank spaces will be replaced by 
the relevant risk. The items for this scale are as follows: 
1. This message seemed to be written with me in mind. 
2. This message seemed to relate to me personally. 
3. This message made me think of my personal experiences with ______________. 





0 – 100 point scale (0 = not at all; 100 = very much) based on Cohen (2001) and Sestir 
and Green (2010).  The wording of the scale was adapted for this study for example 
“viewing program X” in the original scale was replaced by “reading the story.”   
1. While reading the story, I felt as if I was part of the action. 
2. While reading the story, I forgot myself and was fully absorbed. 
3. I was able to understand the events in the story in a manner similar to that in which the 
 demographics understood them. 
4. I think I have a good understanding of the demographics. 
5. I tend to understand the reasons why the demographics did what they did. 
6. While reading the story I could feel the emotions the demographics portrayed. 
7. During viewing, I felt I could really get inside the demographics’ head. 
8. At key moments in the story, I felt I knew exactly what the demographics were going 
 through. 
9. While reading the story, I wanted the demographics to succeed in achieving their 
 goals. 
10. When demographics succeeded I felt joy, but when they failed, I was sad. 
Personal Relevance 
0 – 100 point bipolar scale adapted from Zaiwkowsky (1994) personal involvement 
inventory. 
An adaptation of Zaichowsky instructions follows:  “Place a mark at the point in the scale 
that best represents how these adjectives describe ______.” The items with asterisks(*) 
will be reversely coded. 




2. Of no concern to me  ____ ____  ____  ____  ____  ____   Of concern to me 
3. Irrelevant   ____ ____  ____  ____  ____  ____  Relevant 
4. Means a lot to me  ____ ____  ____  ____  ____  ____   Means nothing to me* 
5. Trivial   ____ ____  ____  ____  ____  ____   Fundamental 
6. Matters to me   ____ ____  ____  ____  ____  ____  Doesn’t matter* 
7. Uninterested   ____ ____  ____  ____  ____  ____  Interested 
8. Significant   ____ ____  ____  ____  ____  ____  Insignificant* 
Susceptibility 
Taken from the Risk Behavior Diagnostic Scale (RBD; Witte, McKeon, Cameron, & 
Berkowitz, 1995), and one additional item added by the researcher.  Scale of 0 to 100 
where 0 = strongly disagree, and 100 = strongly agree. 
RBD Items:  
(1) it is likely that I will be affected by ___ 
(2) I am at risk for being affected by ___ 
(3) It is possible that I will be affected by___ 
Additional item: (4) The extent to which I will be affected by ___ is great 
Severity 
Taken from the Risk Behavior Diagnostic Scale (RBD; Witte, McKeon, Cameron, & 
Berkowitz, 1995), and one additional item added by the researcher.  Scale of 0 to 100 
where 0 = strongly disagree, and 100 = strongly agree. 
RBD Items:  
 (1) I believe that ___ is severe 




 (3) I believe that ___is extremely harmful 
Additional item: (4) The effects of ___ occur on a large scale 
Persuasiveness 
Taken from a scale developed by Turner (n.d.).  Scale of 0 to 100 where 0 = strongly 
disagree, and 100 = strongly agree 
1. The news story I read was compelling.  
2. The news story I read was persuasive.  
3. The news story I read was convincing.  
4. The news story I read was swaying. 
 
Behavioral Intention  
0 - 100 point scale (0 = completely disagree; 100 = completely agree) 
1. Behavior #1. Don’t drink tap water during a drought 
2. Behavior #2. Stay hydrated at all times 
3. Behavior #3. Use boiled water when preparing food 
4. Behavior #4. Increase water conservation 
5. Behavior #5. Seek more information about drought within 1 week 
6. Behavior #5. Seek more information about drought when I have time 
Behavioral Expectation  (Idea for including this variable taken from Warshaw & Davis, 
1985). 
0 - 100 point scale (0 = completely disagree; 100 = completely agree) 
1. Behavior #1. Don’t drink tap water during a drought 
2. Behavior #2. Stay hydrated at all times 
3. Behavior #3. Use boiled water when preparing food 
4. Behavior #4. Increase water conservation 
5. Behavior #5. Seek more information about drought within 1 week 





Demographic Similarity  
0 - 100 point scale (0 = completely disagree; 100 = completely agree) 
1. The social class of the characters in this story is very similar to mine. ____  
2. The status of the characters in this story is very different from mine. ____  
3. The economic situation of the characters in this story is very different from mine. 
____  
4. The background of the characters in this story is very similar to mine. ____  
5. The status of the characters in this story is very much like mine. ____  
6. The characters are from a social class very different from mine. ____  
7. The characters are from an economic situation very much like mine. ____  
8. The background of the characters in this story is very different from mine. ____  
9. The characters in this story and I come from a very similar geographic region. 
____  
10. The characters in this story and I have a lot in common. ____  
Scene Similarity 
0 - 100 point scale (0 = completely disagree; 100 = completely agree) 
1. The characters in this story live in a place very similar to where I currently live. 
____  
2. The characters in this story work in a place very different from where I attend 
college. ____  
3. The characters in this story are from a community very similar to mine. ____  
4. The college in this story is very different from mine. ____  
5. The characters in this story live in a place very different from where I currently 
live. ____ The characters in this story work in a place very similar to where I 
attend college. ____  
6. The characters in this story are from a community very different from mine. ____  
7. The college in this story is very similar to mine. ____  
8. I can identify with the work/school environment portrayed in this story. ____  






Appendix E: Study Questionnaires 
Pilot 1 questionnaire 
 (1) I believe that (name of risk below) is severe.  
 
[Please write a number between 0 and 100 next to EACH risk, where 0 = strongly 
disagree, and 100 = strongly agree indicating the extent to which you agree with the 
above statement.] 
 
Climate change _____  
Drought _____ 
Flood _____ 
Global warming _____ 
 
Heat wave _____ 
High pollen count _____ 
Tornado _____ 




(2) I believe that (name of risk below) has serious negative consequences. 
 
[Please write a number between 0 and 100 next to EACH risk, where 0 = strongly 
disagree, and 100 = strongly agree indicating the extent to which you agree with the 
above statement.] 
 
Climate change _____  
Drought _____ 
Flood _____ 
Global warming _____ 
 
Heat wave _____ 
High pollen count _____ 
Tornado _____ 




(3) I believe that (name of risk below) is extremely harmful. 
 
[Please write a number between 0 and 100 next to EACH risk, where 0 = strongly 
disagree, and 100 = strongly agree indicating the extent to which you agree with the 
above statement.] 
 
Climate change _____  
Drought _____ 
Flood _____ 
Global warming _____ 
Heat wave _____ 
High pollen count _____ 
Tornado _____ 
West Nile Virus _____ 
 
 
(4) The effects of (name of risk below) occur on a large-scale. 
 
[Please write a number between 0 and 100 next to EACH risk, where 0 = strongly 





Climate change _____  
Drought _____ 
Flood _____ 
Global warming _____ 
 
Heat wave _____ 
High pollen count _____ 
Tornado _____ 




(5)  It is likely that I will be affected by (name of risk below). 
 
[Please write a number between 0 and 100 next to EACH risk, where 0 = strongly 
disagree, and 100 = strongly agree indicating the extent to which you agree with the 
above statement.] 
 
Climate change _____  
Drought _____ 
Flood _____ 
Global warming _____ 
 
Heat wave _____ 
High pollen count _____ 
Tornado _____ 




(6) I am at risk for being affected by (name of risk below). 
 
[Please write a number between 0 and 100 next to EACH risk, where 0 = strongly 
disagree, and 100 = strongly agree indicating the extent to which you agree with the 
above statement.] 
 
Climate change _____  
Drought _____ 
Flood _____ 
Global warming _____ 
 
Heat wave    _____ 
High pollen count   _____ 
Tornado    _____ 




(7) It is possible that I will be affected by (name of risk below).  
 
[Please write a number between 0 and 100 next to EACH risk, where 0 = strongly 
disagree, and 100 = strongly agree indicating the extent to which you agree with the 
above statement.] 
 
Climate change _____  
Drought _____ 
Flood _____ 
Global warming _____ 
 
Heat wave    _____ 
High pollen count   _____ 
Tornado    _____ 









[Please write a number between 0 and 100 next to EACH risk, where 0 = strongly 
disagree, and 100 = strongly agree indicating the extent to which you agree with the 
above statement.] 
 
Climate change _____  
Drought _____ 
Flood _____ 
Global warming _____ 
 
Heat wave    _____ 
High pollen count   _____ 
Tornado    _____ 




(9) I believe that the consequences of (name of risk below) are immediate. 
 
[Please write a number between 0 and 100 next to EACH risk, where 0 = strongly 
disagree, and 100 = strongly agree indicating the extent to which you agree with the 
above statement.] 
 
Climate change _____  
Drought _____ 
Flood _____ 
Global warming _____ 
 
Heat wave    _____ 
High pollen count   _____ 
Tornado    _____ 




(10) There are steps that I should personally take to combat the effects of (name of 
risk below). 
 
[Please write a number between 0 and 100 next to EACH risk, where 0 = strongly 
disagree, and 100 = strongly agree indicating the extent to which you agree with the 
above statement.] 
 
Climate change _____  
Drought _____ 
Flood _____ 
Global warming _____ 
 
Heat wave    _____ 
High pollen count   _____ 
Tornado    _____ 




(11)  (Name of risk below) exists in a very abstract way in my mind. 
 
[Please write a number between 0 and 100 next to EACH risk, where 0 = strongly 
disagree, and 100 = strongly agree indicating the extent to which you agree with the 
above statement.] 
 
Climate change _____  
Drought _____ 
Flood _____ 
Global warming _____ 
 
Heat wave    _____ 
High pollen count   _____ 
Tornado    _____ 







(12) (Name of risk below) primarily affects people in other countries. 
 
[Please write a number between 0 and 100 next to EACH risk, where 0 = strongly 
disagree, and 100 = strongly agree indicating the extent to which you agree with the 
above statement.] 
 
Climate change _____  
Drought _____ 
Flood _____ 
Global warming _____ 
 
Heat wave    _____ 
High pollen count   _____ 
Tornado    _____ 




(13) (Name of risk below) affects the natural environment more than it affects 
people. 
 
[Please write a number between 0 and 100 next to EACH risk, where 0 = strongly 
disagree, and 100 = strongly agree indicating the extent to which you agree with the 
above statement.] 
 
Climate change _____  
Drought _____ 
Flood _____ 
Global warming _____ 
 
Heat wave    _____ 
High pollen count   _____ 
Tornado    _____ 
West Nile Virus    _____ 
 
 
(14)  I consider (name of risk below) to be personally relevant. 
 
[Please write a number between 0 and 100 next to EACH risk, where 0 = strongly 
disagree, and 100 = strongly agree indicating the extent to which you agree with the 
above statement.] 
 
Climate change _____  
Drought _____ 
Flood _____ 
Global warming _____ 
 
Heat wave    _____ 
High pollen count   _____ 
Tornado    _____ 
West Nile Virus    _____ 
 
 
(15) I think that humans can work together to prevent (name of risk below). 
 
[Please write a number between 0 and 100 next to EACH risk, where 0 = strongly 
disagree, and 100 = strongly agree indicating the extent to which you agree with the 
above statement.] 
 
Climate change _____  
Drought _____ 
Flood _____ 
Global warming _____ 
Heat wave    _____ 
High pollen count   _____ 
Tornado    _____ 






16. Which of the following events have you personally experienced? (Multiple 
answers okay). 
 
Climate change _____  
Drought _____ 
Flood _____ 
Global warming _____ 
 
Heat wave    _____ 
High pollen count   _____ 
Tornado    _____ 
West Nile Virus    _____ 
 
 
Tell us a little about yourself 
 
(a) How old are you? 
 
 18 – 21 years_____ 22 – 25_____        26 - 29_____          30 or over_____ 
 
(b) What is your major? 
_______________________________________________________ 
 
(c) Year in school? 
 
 Freshman_____ Sophomore_____ Junior_____ Senior_____
 Other_____ 
 
(d) Gender?  Male_____ Female_____  I prefer not to answer_____ 
 
(e) With which political philosophy do you most identify?  
 
Democratic_____ Republican_____ Other 
(specify)___________________________ 
 
(f) Which state (or country) do you consider 
home?___________________________________________ 
 
(g) Which type of place attachment is stronger for you in terms of the 
Maryland/Virginia/DC area?   






Pilot 2 Questionnaire 
Before you begin to answer the survey questions, please indicate your story numberStory 
#1___ 
a) Story #2___ 
b) Story #3___ 
c) Story #4___ 
d) Story #5___ 
e) Story #6___ 
f) Story #7___ 
g) Story #8__ 
Part 1 
Instructions: 
Please think about the story you just read and indicate the extent of your agreement or 
disagreement with EACH of the following statements by writing a number between 0 
and 100 next to EACH question, where 0 = Strongly disagree, AND 100 = Strongly 
agree. 
 
1. This story seemed to be written with me in mind. _____  
2.     This story seemed to relate to me personally. _____  
3.     This story made me think of my personal experiences with West Nile Virus/drought. 
 _____ 
4. I thought about my own risk of being affected by West Nile Virus/drought when I 




Please think about the story you just read, especially the characters involved, and 
indicate the extent of your agreement or disagreement with EACH of the following 
statements by writing a number between 0 and 100 next to EACH question, where 0 = 





Write a # between 0 & 100 to indicate your level of agreement with the following 
question:  
 
The status of the characters in this story is very much like mine. 
11. The social class of the characters in this story is very similar to mine. ____  
12. The status of the characters in this story is very different from mine. ____  
13. The economic situation of the characters in this story is very different from mine. 
____  
14. The background of the characters in this story is very similar to mine. ____  
15. The status of the characters in this story is very much like mine. ____  
16. The characters are from a social class very different from mine. ____  
17. The characters are from an economic situation very much like mine. ____  
18. The background of the characters in this story is very different from mine. ____  
19. The characters in this story and I come from a very similar geographic region. 
____  




Please think about the story you just read, especially the placed described, and indicate 
the extent of your agreement or disagreement with EACH of the following statements by 
writing a number between 0 and 100 next to EACH question, where 0 = Strongly 
disagree, AND 100 = Strongly agree. 
 
Write a # between 0 & 100 to indicate your level of agreement with the following 
question:  
The status of the characters in this story is very much like mine. 





2. The characters in this story work in a place very different from where I attend 
college. ____  
3. The characters in this story are from a community very similar to mine. ____  
4. The college in this story is very different from mine. ____  
5. The characters in this story live in a place very different from where I currently 
live. ____ 
6. The characters in this story work in a place very similar to where I attend college. 
____  
7. The characters in this story are from a community very different from mine. ____  
8. The college in this story is very similar to mine. ____  
9. I can identify with the work/school environment portrayed in this story. ____  




Please think about the story you just read, especially the characters involved, and 
indicate the extent of your agreement or disagreement with EACH of the following 
statements by writing a number between 0 and 100 next to EACH question, where 0 = 
Strongly disagree, AND 100 = Strongly agree. 
 
1. The news story I read was compelling. ____  
2. The news story I read was persuasive. ____  
3. The news story I read was convincing. ____  




Think about the emotions you felt when you read this story and indicate the extent to 
which the story made you feel different emotions by writing a number between 0 to 100 
in the space next to EACH question, where 0 = None of the emotion, AND 100 = The 




1. Please indicate the extent to which the story made you feel fear. ____  
2. Please indicate the extent to which the story made you feel frustration. ____  
3. Please indicate the extent to which the story made you feel sadness. ____  
4. Please indicate the extent to which the story made you feel worry. ____  
5. Please indicate the extent to which the story made you feel hope. ____  




Think about how this story applies to you personally and indicate the extent of this 
connection by writing a number between 0 to 100 in the space next to EACH question. 
The meaning of 0 and 100 is different for each question so please pay attention to EACH 
meaning as given at the end of each question. 
 
1. Please indicate the level of importance this story has to you. ____  
2. Please indicate the level of concern this story has to you. ____  
3. Please indicate the level of relevance this story has to you. ____  
4. Please indicate the level of meaning this story has to you. ____  
5. Please indicate the level of triviality or fundamentality this story has to you. ____  
6. Please indicate the level of how much this story matters to you. ____  
7. Please indicate your level of interest in this story. ____  




Please think about the story you just read and indicate the extent of your agreement or 
disagreement with EACH of the following statements by writing a number between 0 
and 100 next to EACH question, where 0 = Strongly disagree, AND 100 = Strongly 
agree. 
 




2. I was able to easily lose myself in this story._____  
3. I find it difficult to tune out activity around me._____  
4. I was able to easily envision myself in the events described in this story. _____  
5. I have vivid images of the scenes in the story._____  
6. I was mentally involved in this story._____  
7. I can easily put stories out of my mind after reading them. _____  
8. I sometimes felt as though I was part of this story._____  
9. I was impatient to find out how this story ended._____  
10. I was able to easily take the perspective of the characters in this story._____  
11. I am often emotionally affected by what I’ve read. _____  
12. I have vivid images of the characters in this story._____  
13. I found myself thinking of other ways this story could have ended._____  
14. My mind often wanders._____  
15. I found myself feeling what the characters in this story may have felt.____  
16. The events in this story are relevant to my everyday life.______  
17. I often find that reading stories has an impact on the way I see things._____  
18. I easily identify with characters in this story._____  




Please think about the story you just read and the characters involved, and indicate the 
extent of your agreement or disagreement with EACH of the following statements by 
writing a number between 0 and 100 next to EACH question, where 0 = Strongly 
disagree, AND 100 = Strongly agree. 
 
1. While reading this story, I felt as if I was part of what was taking place. ____  
2. While reading the story, I forgot myself and was fully absorbed. ____  
3. I was able to understand the events in this story in a manner similar to that in 
which the characters understood them. ____  




5. I tend to understand the reasons why the characters in this story did what they did.  
____  
6. While reading this story I could feel the emotions the characters portrayed. ____  
7. While reading this story, I felt I could really get inside the characters’ heads. ____  
8. At key moments in this story, I felt I knew exactly what the characters were going 
through. ____  
9. While reading the story, I wanted the characters to succeed in achieving their 
goals. ____  




We’d like to know a little bit about you.  The information provided is completely 
anonymous and will be combined with information from all other participants in this 
study to provide a general description of study participants as a whole.   
 
1. How old are you? 
2. 18 – 21 years____ 
3. 22 – 25_____ 
4. 26 - 29_____ 
5. 30 or over_____ 
2. What is your major? 
_______________________________________________________ 
3. Year in school? Freshman_____     
a) Sophomore_____      
b) Junior_____     
c) Senior____     
d) Other (specify)_________ 
4. GenderMale_____  
a) Female_____  




c) Transgender___     
d) I prefer not to answer_____ 
5. With which ethnic group do you identify?   




e) Native American Indian____ 
f) Other (specify)_______________ 
g) I prefer not to answer____ 
 
6. With which political philosophy do you most identify?  
a) Democratic_____  
b) Republican_____ 
c) Other (specify)____________     
d) I prefer not to answer_____ 
7. Which state (or country) do you consider 
home?______________________________________ 
8. Do you have a full or part-time job besides being a student?   Yes_____  No_____ 
9. How do you pay for your personal healthcare needs? I am covered under my parents’ 
health insurance plan ___ 
a) I have my own health insurance___ 
b) I have Medicaid___ 
c) I have no health insurance___ 
d) Other (please specify) ________________ 
e) I prefer not to answer ________________ 
10. Which type of place attachment is stronger for you in terms of the 
Maryland/Virginia/DC area?   
a) Goal/functional attachment_____ 




11. Please give an estimate of your personal annual 
income_______________________________ 
12. Please give an estimate of the total annual income of your 
parents_______________________ 
13. In which social class do you consider yourself? 
a) Lower lower class___ 
b) Upper lower class___ 
c) Working class___ 
d) Middle class___ 
e) Upper middle class___ 
f) Lower upper class___ 
g) Upper upper class____ 
13. What are you views on climate change? 
a) Definitely happening___ 
b) It’s a hoax___ 
c) Not sure___ 
 
FINAL PART 
Before we told you what this study was all about, did you honestly: 
(1) Think this as a real news story?     Yes____ No____ 
 Not sure ____  
(2) Figure out the real purpose of the study?  Yes____ No____




Main Study Questionnaire 
Treatment 
(Participants randomly assigned to read one of the stories found in Appendix G). 
 
Before you begin to answer the survey questions, please indicate your story number. 
a) Story #1___ 
b) Story #2___ 
c) Story #3___ 
d) Story #4___ 
e) Story #5___ 
f) Story #6___ 
g) Story #7___ 




In this story you read about a RISK, either WEST NILE VIRUS or DROUGHT.  Please 
indicate the extent to which you agree with EACH the following statements about the 
RISK IN THE STORY YOU JUST READ by writing a number between 0 to 100 in the 
space next to EACH question.  In this section 0 = Strongly disagree, AND 100 = 
Strongly agree. 
 
(1) I believe that the risk described in this story is severe. ___  
(2) I believe that the risk described in this story has serious negative consequences. ___  
(3) I believe that the risk described in this story is extremely harmful. ____  
(4) The effects of the risk described in this story occur on a large-scale. ____  
(5)  It is likely that I will be affected by the risk described in this story. ____  
(6) I am at risk for being affected by the risk described in this story. ____  
(7) It is possible that I will be affected by the risk described in this story. ____  







Think about how this story applies to you personally and indicate the extent of this 
connection by writing a number between 0 to 100 in the space next to EACH question. 
The meaning of 0 and 100 is different for each question so please pay attention to their 
meanings given at the end of each question. 
 
1. Please indicate the level of importance this story has to you. ____  
2. Please indicate the level of concern this story has to you. ____  
3. Please indicate the level of relevance this story has to you. ____  
4. Please indicate the level of meaning this story has to you. ____  
5. Please indicate the level of triviality or fundamentality this story has to you. ____  
6. Please indicate the level of how much this story matters to you. ____  
7. Please indicate your level of interest in this story. ____  




i. Please indicate the extent to which you INTEND to carry out the following behaviors, 
by writing a number between 0 to 100 in the space next to EACH behavior, where 0 = 
No intention at all, AND 100 = Every intention. 
 
7. Behavior #1. Don’t drink tap water during a drought 
8. Behavior #2. Stay hydrated at all times 
9. Behavior #3. Use boiled water when preparing food 
10. Behavior #4. Increase water conservation 
11. Behavior #5. Seek more information about drought within 1 week 






ii. Please indicate the extent to which you EXPECT to ACTUALLY carry out the 
following behaviors, by writing a number between 0 to 100 in the space next to EACH 
behavior, where 0 = No expectation at all, AND 100 = Every expectation. 
 
1. Behavior #1. Don’t drink tap water during a drought 
2. Behavior #2. Stay hydrated at all times 
3. Behavior #3. Use boiled water when preparing food 
4. Behavior #4. Increase water conservation 
5. Behavior #5. Seek more information about drought within 1 week 
6. Behavior #5. Seek more information about drought when I have time 
 
iii. Please indicate the extent to which you HAVE THE CAPABILITY of carrying out 
the following behaviors, by writing a number between 0 to 100 in the space next to 
EACH behavior, where 0 = No capability at all, AND 100 = Every capability. 
 
1. Behavior #1. Don’t drink tap water during a drought 
2. Behavior #2. Stay hydrated at all times 
3. Behavior #3. Use boiled water when preparing food 
4. Behavior #4. Increase water conservation 
5. Behavior #5. Seek more information about drought within 1 week 
6. Behavior #5. Seek more information about drought when I have time 
 
iv. Please indicate the extent to which the following behaviors WILL ACTUALLY 
REDUCE THE RISK you read about in the story, by writing a number between 0 to 100 
in the space next to EACH behavior, where 0 = Will not reduce the risk at all, AND 100 
= Will eliminate the risk. 
 
1. Behavior #1. Don’t drink tap water during a drought 
2. Behavior #2. Stay hydrated at all times 
3. Behavior #3. Use boiled water when preparing food 




5. Behavior #5. Seek more information about drought within 1 week 




People process information in different ways.  There is no right or wrong way. We’d like 
to know a little of how you generally process information.  Please indicate the extent to 
which you agree with the following statements by writing a number between  0 to 100 in 
the space next to EACH question, where 0 = Strongly disagree AND 100 = Strongly 
agree. 
 
1. I don't like to have to do a lot of thinking. _____  
2. I try to avoid situations that require thinking in depth about something. _____  
3. I prefer to do something that challenges my thinking abilities rather than 
something that requires little thought. _____  
4. I prefer complex to simple problems. _____  
5. Thinking hard and for a long time about something gives me little satisfaction. 
_____  
6. I trust my initial feelings about people. _____  
7. I believe in trusting my hunches. _____  
8. My initial impressions of people are almost always right. _____  
9. When it comes to trusting people, I can usually rely on my "gut feelings." _____  





In this story you read about a RISK, either WEST NILE VIRUS or DROUGHT.  Please 
answer the following questions by writing a number between 0 to 100 in the space next to 




JUST READ. The meaning of 0 and 100 is different for each question so please pay 
attention to EACH meaning as given at the end of each question. 
 
1. To what extent have YOU been personally affected by the risk described in the story? 
_____  
2. Think of SOMEONE YOU PERSONALLY KNOW who has experienced the risk 
described in the story? To what extent has that person been affected by this risk? _____  
3. To what extent are YOU likely to be affected by the risk described in the story? _____  
4. To what extent is someone very similar to you likely to be affected by the risk 
described in the story? _____  
5. To what extent is someone very different from you likely to be affected by the risk 
described in the story? _____  
6. In what general health condition do you consider yourself? _____  




Please indicate the extent of your agreement or disagreement with EACH of the 
following statements by writing a number between 0 and 100 next to EACH question, 
where 0 = Strongly disagree, and 100 = Strongly agree]. 
 
1. The balance of nature is very delicate and easily upset. _____  
2. Modifying the environment for human use seldom causes serious problems._____  
3. Plants and animals exist primarily to be used by humans. _____  
4. The earth is like a spaceship with only limited room and resources. _____  
5. There are limits to economic growth even for developed countries like ours. 
_____  
6. Humans were meant to rule over the rest of nature. _____  









i. Please think about the story you just read and indicate the extent of your agreement or 
disagreement with EACH of the following statements by writing a number between 0 
and 100 next to EACH question, where 0 = Strongly disagree, AND 100 = Strongly 
agree. 
 
1. I was able to easily envision the events in this story._____  
2. I was able to easily lose myself in this story._____ I find it difficult to tune out 
activity around me._____  
3. I was able to easily envision myself in the events described in this story. _____  
4. I have vivid images of the scenes in the story._____  
5. I was mentally involved in this story._____  
6. I can easily put stories out of my mind after reading them. _____  
7. I sometimes felt as though I was part of this story._____  
8. I was impatient to find out how this story ended._____  
9. I was able to easily take the perspective of the characters in this story._____  
10. I am often emotionally affected by what I’ve read. _____  
11. I have vivid images of the characters in this story._____  
12. I found myself thinking of other ways this story could have ended._____  
13. My mind often wanders._____  
14. I found myself feeling what the characters in this story may have felt.____  
15. The events in this story are relevant to my everyday life.______  
16. I often find that reading stories has an impact on the way I see things._____  
17. I easily identify with characters in this story._____  










ii. Please think about the story you just read and indicate the extent of your agreement or 
disagreement with EACH of the following statements by writing a number between 0 
and 100 next to EACH question, where 0 = Strongly disagree, AND 100 = Strongly 
agree. 
 
1. This story seemed to be written with me in mind. _____  
2. This story seemed to relate to me personally. _____  
3. This story made me think of my personal experiences with West Nile Virus/drought. 
_____ 
4. I thought about my own risk of being affected by West Nile Virus/drought when I was 





Please think about the story you just read and the characters involved, and indicate the 
extent of your agreement or disagreement with EACH of the following statements by 
writing a number between 0 and 100 next to EACH question, where 0 = Strongly 
disagree, AND 100 = Strongly agree. 
1. While reading this story, I felt as if I was part of what was taking place. ____  
2. While reading the story, I forgot myself and was fully absorbed. ____  
3. I was able to understand the events in this story in a manner similar to that in 
which the characters understood them. ____  
4. I think I have a good understanding of the characters in this story. ____  
5. I tend to understand the reasons why the characters in this story did what they did.  
____  
6. While reading this story I could feel the emotions the characters portrayed. ____  
7. While reading this story, I felt I could really get inside the characters’ heads. ____  
8. At key moments in this story, I felt I knew exactly what the characters were going 




9. While reading the story, I wanted the characters to succeed in achieving their 
goals. ____  




Think about the emotions you felt when you read this story and indicate the extent to 
which the story made you feel different emotions by writing a number between 0 to 
100 in the space next to EACH question, where 0 = None of the emotion, AND 100 = 
The maximum amount of the emotion you could possibly feel. 
 
1. Please indicate the extent to which the story made you feel fear. ____  
2. Please indicate the extent to which the story made you feel frustration. ____  
3. Please indicate the extent to which the story made you feel sadness. ____  
4. Please indicate the extent to which the story made you feel worry. ____  
5. Please indicate the extent to which the story made you feel hope. ____  




We would like to know a little bit about you.  The information provided is completely 
anonymous and will be combined with information from all other participants in this 
study to provide a general description of study participants as a whole.   
1. How old are you? 
a) 18 – 21 years____ 
b) 22 – 25_____ 
c) 26 - 29_____ 
d) 30 or over____ 
2. What is your major? 
_______________________________________________________ 




a) Freshman_____     
b) Sophomore_____      
c) Junior_____     
d) Senior____     
e) Other (specify)_________ 
4. Gender?  Male_____  
a) Female_____  
b) Gender neutral____  
c) Transgender___     
d) I prefer not to answer_____ 
e) 5. With which ethnic group do you identify?   




e) Native American Indian____ 
f) Other (specify)_______________ 
g) I prefer not to answer____ 
6. With which political philosophy do you most identify?  
a) Democratic_____  
b) Republican_____ 
c) Other (specify)____________     
d) I prefer not to answer____ 
7. Which state (or country) do you consider 
home?______________________________________ 
8. Do you have a full or part-time job besides being a student?   Yes_____  No_____ 
9. How do you pay for your personal healthcare needs. 
a)  I am covered under my parents’ health insurance plan ___ 
b)   I have my own health insurance__ 
c)   I have Medicaid___ 




e) Other (please specify) ________________ 
f) I prefer not to answer ________________ 
10. Which type of place attachment is stronger for you in terms of the 
Maryland/Virginia/DC area?   
a) Goal/functional attachment_____ 
b) Emotional/symbolic attachment______ 
11. Please give an estimate of your personal annual 
income_______________________________ 
12. Please give an estimate of the total annual income of your 
parents_______________________ 
13. In which social class do you consider yourself? 
a) Lower lower class___ 
b) Upper lower class___ 
c) Working class___ 
d) Middle class___ 
e) Upper middle class___ 
f) Lower upper class___ 





Please think about the story you just read, especially the characters involved, and 
indicate the extent of your agreement or disagreement with EACH of the following 
statements by writing a number between 0 and 100 next to EACH question, where 0 = 
Strongly disagree, AND 100 = Strongly agree. 
1. The social class of the characters in this story is very similar to mine. ____  
2. The status of the characters in this story is very different from mine. ____  
3. The economic situation of the characters in this story is very different from mine. 
____  




5. The status of the characters in this story is very much like mine. ____  
6. The characters are from a social class very different from mine. ____  
7. The characters are from an economic situation very much like mine. ____  
8. The background of the characters in this story is very different from mine. ____  
9. The characters in this story and I come from a very similar geographic region. 
____  





Please think about the story you just read, especially the placed described, and indicate 
the extent of your agreement or disagreement with EACH of the following statements by 
writing a number between 0 and 100 next to EACH question, where 0 = Strongly 
disagree, AND 100 = Strongly agree. 
10. The characters in this story live in a place very similar to where I currently live. 
____  
11. The characters in this story work in a place very different from where I attend 
college. ____  
12. The characters in this story are from a community very similar to mine. ____  
13. The college in this story is very different from mine. ____  
14. The characters in this story live in a place very different from where I currently 
live. ____ The characters in this story work in a place very similar to where I 
attend college. ____  
15. The characters in this story are from a community very different from mine. ____  
16. The college in this story is very similar to mine. ____  
17. I can identify with the work/school environment portrayed in this story. ____  







Before we told you what this study was all about, did you honestly: 
(1) Think this as a real news story?     Yes____ No____ 
 Not sure ____ 
(2) Figure out the real purpose of the study?  Yes____ No____










Appendix F: Study Messages 
PILOT 2  - TESTING THE MESSAGES 
 
Base Message - West Nile Virus 
 
Please Note: The information in the base message is authentic and was taken from facts 
sheets produced mainly by the United States Centers for Disease Control (CDC).  The 
information that comes after the base message is plausible, having been formulated based 
on various news stories and factual information, but the deception lies in the fact that the 
people mentioned are unreal and the series of events involving the people in the message 
were fabricated. The recommendations for reducing the risk are real. The sources of the 
photographs are below; some were manipulated specifically for the purpose of this 
research. The name of the message author was fabricated. 
 
By Jessica Stephens 
This past summer (2012) the U.S. saw its largest ever 
outbreak of West Nile Virus.  The Centers for Disease 
Control (CDC) reported over 5000 cases of the disease in 
48 states, including 219 deaths – all in 2012 alone. 
Humans contract the disease when they are bitten by 
mosquitoes that have fed on infected birds.  Symptoms 
include swollen lymph nodes, body aches, fatigue, 
headache, fever, and skin rash.    
 
About half of the West Nile Virus cases reported so far in 2012 have been of neuro-
invasive forms such as meningitis and encephalitis, which may cause permanent brain 
damage. According to the CDC, “Symptoms of severe disease include headache, high 
fever, disorientation, coma, tremors, convulsions, muscle weakness, and paralysis.”  
 
People need to become educated about West Nile Virus because even though it is 
relatively seasonal, its consequences persist throughout the year. Furthermore, awareness 
must continue all year round so that by the time Spring and Summer arrive, people know 
how to reduce their risk of becoming affected. 
 
THE TREATMENT GOES HERE 
West Nile Virus 
 
STORY #1: 
 Low demographic similarity (Married Latino adults [with children] working 
custodial jobs) 








 High demographic similarity (Young, healthy college students) 




 Low demographic similarity (Married Latino adults [with children] working 
custodial jobs)  
 High scene similarity (Large college campus/home in Metropolitan area) 
 
STORY #4: 
 High demographic similarity (Young, healthy college students) 




 Mosquito Photo courtesy aNewsCafe.com 
 Female cleaner Photo courtesy aisd.net  
 Male cleaner Photo courtesy ed101.bu.edu  
 College kids Photo courtesy idg-ed.com  




























WEST NILE VIRUS – CONSIDER YOUR RISK 
 
By Jessica Stephens 
This past summer (2012) the U.S. saw its largest ever 
outbreak of West Nile Virus.  The Centers for Disease 
Control (CDC) reported over 5000 cases of the disease in 
48 states, including 219 deaths – all in 2012 alone. 
Humans contract the disease when they are bitten by 
mosquitoes that have fed on infected birds.  Symptoms 
include swollen lymph nodes, body aches, fatigue, 
headache, fever, and skin rash.    
 
About half of the West Nile Virus cases reported so far in 2012 have been of neuro-
invasive forms such as meningitis and encephalitis, which may cause permanent brain 
damage. According to the CDC, “Symptoms of severe disease include headache, high 
fever, disorientation, coma, tremors, convulsions, muscle weakness, and paralysis.”  
 
People need to become educated about West Nile Virus because even though it is 
relatively seasonal, its consequences persist throughout the year. Furthermore, awareness 
must continue all year round so that by the time Spring and Summer arrive, people know 
how to reduce their risk of becoming infected. 
 
Although children, the elderly, and people with 
compromised immune systems are at highest risk for 
contracting West Nile Virus, healthy parents and adults 
can also become victims as was the case with married 
couple Isabella and Alejandro Ramirez.  Mr. & Mrs. 
Ramirez, both in their 40’s, live in a small farming 
community in a rural town, and work as custodians at a 
small equestrian college (that is, related to horse-riding). They have five children and 
work hard at their jobs so that they can meet their children’s needs. 
 
One morning Isabella noticed a rash on her leg but thought it was an allergy to something 
she ate. Not long after, Alejandro developed severe headaches but thought he was just 
suffering from migraines.  All seemed well until one morning while on her cleaning job 
at the small equestrian college, Isabella found that she was unable to hold the mop 
properly.  Her muscles felt weak and she noticed her temperature was elevated. Not long 
after she lost consciousness and had to be rushed to the emergency room.  By the time 
she regained consciousness, Alejandro had also been admitted to the same hospital.  After 
several tests, scans, and analyses, they were both diagnosed with West Nile Encephalitis, 
a severe form of West Nile Virus that can be fatal.  As healthy parents and adults, 
Isabella and Alejandro never imagined they were at risk for West Nile Virus, but they 









Today both Isabella and Alejandro are helping to spread 
the word about West Nile Virus to people in their small 
farming community.  They remind others that during 
Spring, Summer and early Fall, they need to: 
 Use bug spray 
 Wear long sleeves at dusk and dawn 
 Keep screens on their doors and windows 
 Get rid of potential breeding sites for                        
mosquitoes 
 Actively seek more information about West Nile Virus 
They know all too well that West Nile Virus and it severe forms (e.g., West Nile 
Encephalitis) can strike anyone, anywhere in the U.S., EVEN YOU. Scientists say 
climate change will increase the risk of West Nile Virus. It is not early to prepare 




 WEST NILE VIRUS – CONSIDER YOUR RISK 
 
By Jessica Stephens 
This past summer (2012) the U.S. saw its largest ever 
outbreak of West Nile Virus.  The Centers for Disease 
Control (CDC) reported over 5000 cases of the disease in 
48 states, including 219 deaths – all in 2012 alone. 
Humans contract the disease when they are bitten by 
mosquitoes that have fed on infected birds.  Symptoms 
include swollen lymph nodes, body aches, fatigue, 
headache, fever, and skin rash.    
 
About half of the West Nile Virus cases reported so far in 2012 have been of neuro-
invasive forms such as meningitis and encephalitis, which may cause permanent brain 
damage. According to the CDC, “Symptoms of severe disease include headache, high 
fever, disorientation, coma, tremors, convulsions, muscle weakness, and paralysis.”  
 
People need to become educated about West Nile Virus because even though it is 
relatively seasonal, its consequences persist throughout the year. Furthermore, awareness 
must continue all year round so that by the time Spring and Summer arrive, people know 
how to reduce their risk of becoming infected. 
 
Although children, the elderly, and people with 
compromised immune systems are at highest risk for 
contracting West Nile Virus, healthy college students 
can also become victims as was the case with college 
students Samantha Campbell and Thomas Johnson. 
Sam and Tom, both 18 – 21 years old, live in a small 
farming community in a rural town, and attend a small 
equestrian college (that is, related to horse-riding). They are both unmarried and study 
hard so they can graduate with good grades and get good jobs. 
 
One morning Sam noticed a rash on her leg but thought it was an allergy to something 
she ate. Around that same time, Tom developed severe headaches but thought he was just 
suffering from migraines. All seemed well until one evening while studying for an exam, 
Sam found that she was unable to hold her textbook properly.  Her muscles felt weak and 
she noticed her temperature was elevated. Not long after she lost consciousness and had 
to be rushed to the emergency room.  By the time she regained consciousness, Tom had 
also been admitted to the same hospital.  After several tests, scans, and analyses, they 
were both diagnosed with West Nile Encephalitis, a severe form of West Nile Virus that 
can be fatal.  As healthy college students, Sam and Tom never imagined they were at risk 










Today both Sam and Tom are helping to spread the word 
about West Nile Virus to people in their small farming 
community.  They remind others that during Spring, 
Summer and early Fall, they need to: 
 Use bug spray 
 Wear long sleeves at dusk and dawn 
 Keep screens on their doors and windows 
 Get rid of potential breeding sites for mosquitoes 
 Actively seek more information about West Nile Virus 
They know all too well that West Nile Virus and it severe forms (e.g., West Nile 
Encephalitis) can strike anyone, anywhere in the U.S., EVEN YOU. Scientists say 
climate change will increase the risk of West Nile Virus. It is not early to prepare 




WEST NILE VIRUS – CONSIDER YOUR RISK 
 
By Jessica Stephens 
This past summer (2012) the U.S. saw its largest ever 
outbreak of West Nile Virus.  The Centers for Disease 
Control (CDC) reported over 5000 cases of the disease in 
48 states, including 219 deaths – all in 2012 alone. 
Humans contract the disease when they are bitten by 
mosquitoes that have fed on infected birds.  Symptoms 
include swollen lymph nodes, body aches, fatigue, 
headache, fever, and skin rash.    
 
About half of the West Nile Virus cases reported so far in 2012 have been of neuro-
invasive forms such as meningitis and encephalitis, which may cause permanent brain 
damage. According to the CDC, “Symptoms of severe disease include headache, high 
fever, disorientation, coma, tremors, convulsions, muscle weakness, and paralysis.”  
 
People need to become educated about West Nile Virus because even though it is 
relatively seasonal, its consequences persist throughout the year. Furthermore, awareness 
must continue all year round so that by the time Spring and Summer arrive, people know 
how to reduce their risk of becoming infected. 
 
Although children, the elderly, and people with 
compromised immune systems are at highest risk for 
contracting West Nile Virus, healthy parents and adults 
can also become victims as was the case with married 
couple Isabella and Alejandro Ramirez.  Mr. & Mrs. 
Ramirez, both in their 40’s, live in a college town near to 
a large metropolitan area, and work as custodians at a 
large public research university. They have five children and work hard at their jobs so 
that they can meet their children’s needs. 
 
One morning Isabella noticed a rash on her leg but thought it was an allergy to something 
she ate. Not long after, Alejandro developed severe headaches but thought he was just 
suffering from migraines. All seemed well until one morning while on her cleaning job at 
the large public research university, Isabella found that she was unable to hold the mop 
properly.  Her muscles felt weak and she noticed her temperature was elevated. Not long 
after she lost consciousness and had to be rushed to the emergency room.  By the time 
she regained consciousness, Alejandro had also been admitted to the same hospital.  After 
several tests, scans, and analyses, they were both diagnosed with West Nile Encephalitis, 
a severe form of West Nile Virus that can be fatal.  As healthy parents and adults, 
Isabella and Alejandro never imagined they were at risk for West Nile Virus, but they 









Today both Isabella and Alejandro are helping to spread the 
word about West Nile Virus to people in the community 
around their college town.  They remind others that during 
Spring, Summer and early Fall, they need to: 
 Use bug spray 
 Wear long sleeves at dusk and dawn 
 Keep screens on their doors and windows 
 Get rid of potential breeding sites for 
mosquitoes 
 Actively seek more information about West Nile Virus 
They know all too well that West Nile Virus and it severe forms (e.g., West Nile 
Encephalitis) can strike anyone, anywhere in the U.S., EVEN YOU. Scientists say 
climate change will increase the risk of West Nile Virus. It is not early to prepare 




WEST NILE VIRUS – CONSIDER YOUR RISK 
 
By Jessica Stephens 
This past summer (2012) the U.S. saw its largest ever 
outbreak of West Nile Virus.  The Centers for Disease 
Control (CDC) reported over 5000 cases of the disease in 
48 states, including 219 deaths – all in 2012 alone. 
Humans contract the disease when they are bitten by 
mosquitoes that have fed on infected birds.  Symptoms 
include swollen lymph nodes, body aches, fatigue, 
headache, fever, and skin rash.    
 
About half of the West Nile Virus cases reported so far in 2012 have been of neuro-
invasive forms such as meningitis and encephalitis, which may cause permanent brain 
damage. According to the CDC, “Symptoms of severe disease include headache, high 
fever, disorientation, coma, tremors, convulsions, muscle weakness, and paralysis.”  
 
People need to become educated about West Nile Virus because even though it is 
relatively seasonal, its consequences persist throughout the year. Furthermore, awareness 
must continue all year round so that by the time Spring and Summer arrive, people know 
how to reduce their risk of becoming infected. 
 
Although children, the elderly, and people with 
compromised immune systems are at highest risk for 
contracting West Nile Virus, healthy college students can 
also become victims as was the case with college 
students Samantha Campbell and Thomas Johnson. Sam 
and Tom, both 18 – 21 years old, live in a college town 
near to a large metropolitan area, and attend a large 
public research university. They are both unmarried and study hard so they can graduate 
with good grades and get good jobs. 
 
One morning Sam noticed a rash on her leg but thought it was an allergy to something 
she ate. Around that same time, Tom developed severe headaches but thought he was just 
suffering from migraines. All seemed well until one evening while studying for an exam, 
Sam found that she was unable to hold her textbook properly.  Her muscles felt weak and 
she noticed her temperature was elevated. Not long after she lost consciousness and had 
to be rushed to the emergency room.  By the time she regained consciousness, Tom had 
also been admitted to the same hospital.  After several tests, scans, and analyses, they 
were both diagnosed with West Nile Encephalitis, a severe form of West Nile Virus that 
can be fatal.  As healthy college students Sam and Tom never imagined they were at risk 










Today both Sam and Tom are helping to spread the word 
about West Nile Virus to people on their college campus.  
They remind others that during Spring, Summer and early 
Fall, they need to: 
 Use bug spray 
 Wear long sleeves at dusk and dawn 
 Keep screens on their doors and windows 
 Get rid of potential breeding sites for mosquitoes 
 Actively seek more information about West Nile Virus 
They know all too well that West Nile Virus and it severe forms (e.g., West Nile 
Encephalitis) can strike anyone, anywhere in the U.S., EVEN YOU. Scientists say 
climate change will increase the risk of West Nile Virus. It is not early to prepare 








Base Message – Drought 
 
Please Note: The information in the base message is authentic and was taken from facts 
sheets produced mainly by the United States National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration (NOAA).  The information that comes after the base message is plausible, 
having been formulated based on various news stories and factual information, but the 
deception lies in the fact that the people mentioned are unreal and the series of events 
involving the people in the message were fabricated. The recommendations for reducing 
the risk are real. The sources of the photographs are below; some were manipulated 
specifically for the purpose of this research. The name of the message author was 
fabricated. 
 
By Jessica Stephens 
This past summer the National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration (NOAA) reported that on a national level, 
the 2012 drought in the U.S. has been the worst in 50 years.  
According to the NOAA’s drought experts, “about 64.6 
percent of the U.S.  experienced moderate to exceptional 
drought by the end of September, 2012.” Drought occurs 
naturally because of low rainfall levels and can have 
devastating impacts on health and the environment.  
 
Direct health effects include water contamination because of lower water levels and 
therefore higher concentration of pollutants. Drought also increases the risk of 
waterborne diseases caused by parasites, viruses and bacteria.  According to the 
Department of Health, symptoms of waterborne diseases “may include nausea or 
vomiting, abdominal cramping, diarrhea, muscle ache, or fever.” Environmental effects 
include the death of plants and animals, wildfires, and loss of rivers and streams. 
 
People need to become educated about drought because even though it occurs when there 
is low rainfall, its consequences persist throughout the year. Furthermore, awareness must 
continue all year round so that whenever there is a drought, people know how to reduce 
their risk of becoming victims of its consequences. 
 





 Low demographic similarity (Married Latino adults [with children] working 
custodial jobs) 
 Low scene similarity (Small equestrian college/home in farming community, rural 
town) 
 
STORY #6:  








 Low demographic similarity (Married Latino adults [with children] working 
custodial jobs)  
 High scene similarity (Large college campus/home in Metropolitan area) 
 
STORY #8:  
 High demographic similarity (Young, healthy college students) 
 High scene similarity (Large college campus/home in Metropolitan area) 
 
PHOTO SOURCES: 
 Drought Photo courtesy Wikipedia 
 Female cleaner Photo courtesy aisd.net  
 Male cleaner Photo courtesy ed101.bu.edu  
 College kids Photo courtesy idg-ed.com  























DROUGHT – CONSIDER YOUR RISK 
 
By Jessica Stephens 
This past summer the National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration (NOAA) reported that on a national level, 
the 2012 drought in the U.S. has been the worst in 50 years.  
According to the NOAA’s drought experts, “about 64.6 
percent of the U.S.  experienced moderate to exceptional 
drought by the end of September, 2012.” Drought occurs 
naturally because of low rainfall levels and can have 
devastating impacts on health and the environment.  
 
Direct health effects include water contamination because of lower water levels and 
therefore higher concentration of pollutants. Drought also increases the risk of 
waterborne diseases caused by parasites, viruses and bacteria.  According to the 
Department of Health, symptoms of waterborne diseases “may include nausea or 
vomiting, abdominal cramping, diarrhea, muscle ache, or fever.” Environmental effects 
include the death of plants and animals, wildfires, and loss of rivers and streams. 
 
People need to become educated about drought because even though it occurs when there 
is low rainfall, its consequences persist throughout the year. Furthermore, awareness must 
continue all year round so that whenever there is a drought, people know how to reduce 
their risk of becoming victims of its consequences. 
 
Although children, the elderly, and people with 
compromised immune systems are at highest risk for 
drought related waterborne diseases, healthy parents and 
adults can also become victims as was the case with 
married couple Isabella and Alejandro Ramirez. Mr. & 
Mrs. Ramirez, both in their 40’s, live in a small farming 
community in a rural town, and work as custodians at a 
small equestrian college (that is, related to horse-riding). 
They have five children and work hard at their jobs so that they can meet their children’s 
needs. 
 
For many weeks there had been no rain where the Ramirez family lives.  The earth was 
parched and cracked, and farmers lost just about all their crops and livestock. The 
community lake was dry, and a big wildfire had destroyed a favorite community 
recreational area and its resident plants and animals. One morning Isabella felt nauseous 
but attributed it to something she ate. Not long after, Alejandro developed severe muscle 
aches but thought it was related to something he lifted on the job. All seemed well until 
one morning while on her cleaning job at the small equestrian college, Isabella found that 
she was unable to hold the mop properly.  Her muscles felt weak and she noticed her 
temperature was elevated. Not long after she lost consciousness and had to be rushed to 
the emergency room.  By the time she regained consciousness, Alejandro had also been 
admitted to the same hospital.  After several tests, scans, and analyses, they were both 





diagnosed with Cryptosporidiosis (a.k.a. Crypto), a serious waterborne disease that can 
be fatal.  As healthy parents and adults Isabella and Alejandro never imagined they were 
at risk for drought related diseases, but they were at risk.  
 
Today both Isabella and Alejandro are helping to spread 
the word about drought to people in their small farming 
community.  They remind others that wasting water can 
exacerbate the personal effects of drought and that they 
need to: 
 Close the tap when brushing teeth  
 Take shorter showers  
 Consume only bottled water (even in food) when 
water levels are low 
 Don’t flush toilets after urinating (let yellow mellow, flush down brown) 
 Actively seek more information about drought 
They know all too well that drought and its serious consequences (e.g., high food costs) 
can strike anywhere and therefore anyone in the U.S., EVEN YOU. Scientists say 
climate change will increase the risk of drought. It is not early to prepare yourself 
































DROUGHT – CONSIDER YOUR RISK 
 
By Jessica Stephens 
This past summer the National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration (NOAA) reported that on a national level, 
the 2012 drought in the U.S. has been the worst in 50 years.  
According to the NOAA’s drought experts, “about 64.6 
percent of the U.S.  experienced moderate to exceptional 
drought by the end of September, 2012.” Drought occurs 
naturally because of low rainfall levels and can have 
devastating impacts on health and the environment.  
 
Direct health effects include water contamination because of lower water levels and 
therefore higher concentration of pollutants. Drought also increases the risk of 
waterborne diseases caused by parasites, viruses and bacteria.  According to the 
Department of Health, symptoms of waterborne diseases “may include nausea or 
vomiting, abdominal cramping, diarrhea, muscle ache, or fever.” Environmental effects 
include the death of plants and animals, wildfires, and loss of rivers and streams. 
 
People need to become educated about drought because even though it occurs when there 
is low rainfall, its consequences persist throughout the year. Furthermore, awareness must 
continue all year round so that whenever there is a drought, people know how to reduce 
their risk of becoming victims of its consequences. 
 
Although children, the elderly, and people with 
compromised immune systems are at highest risk for 
drought related waterborne diseases, healthy college 
students can also become victims as was the case with 
college students Samantha Campbell and Thomas 
Johnson. Sam and Tom, both 18 – 21 years old, live in a 
small farming community in a rural town, and attend a 
small equestrian college (that is, related to horse-riding). 
They are both unmarried and study hard so they can graduate with good grades and get 
good jobs. 
 
For many weeks there had been no rain where Sam and Tom live.  The earth was parched 
and cracked, and farmers lost just about all their crops and livestock. The community lake 
was dry, and a big wildfire had destroyed a favorite community recreational area and its 
resident plants and animals. One morning Sam felt nauseous but attributed it to 
something she ate. Not long after, Tom developed severe muscle aches but thought it was 
related to something he lifted for his professor. All seemed well until one evening while 
studying for an exam, Sam found that she was unable to hold her textbook properly. Her 
muscles felt weak and she noticed her temperature was elevated. Not long after she lost 
consciousness and had to be rushed to the emergency room.  By the time she regained 
consciousness, Tom had also been admitted to the same hospital.  After several tests, 





scans, and analyses, they were both diagnosed with Cryptosporidiosis (a.k.a. Crypto), a 
serious waterborne disease that can be fatal.  As healthy college students Sam and Tom 
never imagined they were at risk for drought related diseases, but they were at risk.  
 
Today both Sam and Tom are helping to spread the word 
about drought to people in their small farming community.  
They remind others that wasting water can exacerbate the 
personal effects of drought and that they need to: 
 Close the tap when brushing teeth  
 Take shorter showers  
 Consume only bottled water (even in food) when 
water levels are low 
 Don’t flush toilets after urinating (let yellow mellow, flush down brown) 
 Actively seek more information about drought 
They know all too well that drought and its serious consequences (e.g., high food costs) 
can strike anywhere and therefore anyone in the U.S., EVEN YOU. Scientists say 
climate change will increase the risk of drought. It is not early to prepare yourself 
































DROUGHT – CONSIDER YOUR RISK 
 
By Jessica Stephens 
This past summer the National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration (NOAA) reported that on a national level, 
the 2012 drought in the U.S. has been the worst in 50 years.  
According to the NOAA’s drought experts, “about 64.6 
percent of the U.S.  experienced moderate to exceptional 
drought by the end of September, 2012.” Drought occurs 
naturally because of low rainfall levels and can have 
devastating impacts on health and the environment.  
 
Direct health effects include water contamination because of lower water levels and 
therefore higher concentration of pollutants. Drought also increases the risk of 
waterborne diseases caused by parasites, viruses and bacteria.  According to the 
Department of Health, symptoms of waterborne diseases “may include nausea or 
vomiting, abdominal cramping, diarrhea, muscle ache, or fever.” Environmental effects 
include the death of plants and animals, wildfires, and loss of rivers and streams. 
 
People need to become educated about drought because even though it occurs when there 
is low rainfall, its consequences persist throughout the year. Furthermore, awareness must 
continue all year round so that whenever there is a drought, people know how to reduce 
their risk of becoming victims of its consequences. 
 
Although children, the elderly, and people with 
compromised immune systems are at highest risk for 
drought related waterborne diseases, healthy parents 
and adults can also become victims as was the case 
with married couple Isabella and Alejandro Ramirez. 
Mr. & Mrs. Ramirez, both in their 40’s, live in a 
college town near to a large metropolitan area, and 
work as custodians at a large public research university. They have five children and 
work hard at their jobs so that they can meet their children’s needs. 
 
For many weeks there had been no rain where the Ramirez family lives.  The earth was 
parched and cracked, lawns were brown, and yards were dusty. The lake in their college 
town was dry, and a big wildfire had destroyed a favorite recreational area and its 
resident plants and animals. One morning Isabella felt nauseous but attributed it to 
something she ate. Not long after, Alejandro developed severe muscle aches but thought 
it was related to something he lifted on the job. All seemed well until one morning while 
on her cleaning job at the large public university, Isabella found that she was unable to 
hold the mop properly.  Her muscles felt weak and she noticed her temperature was 
elevated. Not long after she lost consciousness and had to be rushed to the emergency 
room.  By the time she regained consciousness, Alejandro had also been admitted to the 
same hospital.  After several tests, scans, and analyses, they were both diagnosed with 
Cryptosporidiosis (a.k.a. Crypto), a serious waterborne disease that can be fatal.  As 





healthy parents and adults Isabella and Alejandro never imagined they were at risk for 
drought related diseases, but they were at risk.  
 
Today both Isabella and Alejandro are helping to spread 
the word about drought to people in their community.  
They remind others that wasting water can exacerbate the 
personal effects of drought and that they need to: 
 Close the tap when brushing teeth  
 Take shorter showers  
 Consume only bottled water (even in food) when 
water levels are low 
 Don’t flush toilets after urinating (let yellow mellow, flush down brown) 
 Actively seek more information about drought 
They know all too well that drought and its serious consequences (e.g., high food costs) 
can strike anywhere and therefore anyone in the U.S., EVEN YOU. Scientists say 
climate change will increase the risk of drought. It is not early to prepare yourself 
































DROUGHT – CONSIDER YOUR RISK 
 
By Jessica Stephens 
This past summer the National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration (NOAA) reported that on a national level, 
the 2012 drought in the U.S. has been the worst in 50 years.  
According to the NOAA’s drought experts, “about 64.6 
percent of the U.S.  experienced moderate to exceptional 
drought by the end of September, 2012.” Drought occurs 
naturally because of low rainfall levels and can have 
devastating impacts on health and the environment.  
 
Direct health effects include water contamination because of lower water levels and 
therefore higher concentration of pollutants. Drought also increases the risk of 
waterborne diseases caused by parasites, viruses and bacteria.  According to the 
Department of Health, symptoms of waterborne diseases “may include nausea or 
vomiting, abdominal cramping, diarrhea, muscle ache, or fever.” Environmental effects 
include the death of plants and animals, wildfires, and loss of rivers and streams. 
 
People need to become educated about drought because even though it occurs when there 
is low rainfall, its consequences persist throughout the year. Furthermore, awareness must 
continue all year round so that whenever there is a drought, people know how to reduce 
their risk of becoming victims of its consequences. 
 
Although children, the elderly, and people with 
compromised immune systems are at highest risk for 
drought related waterborne diseases, healthy college 
students can also become victims as was the case with 
college students Samantha Campbell and Thomas 
Johnson. Sam and Tom, both 18 – 21 years old, live in 
a college town near to a large metropolitan area, and 
attend a large public research university. They are both unmarried and study hard so they 
can graduate with good grades and get good jobs. 
 
For many weeks there had been no rain where Sam and Tom live. The earth was parched 
and cracked, lawns were brown, and yards were dusty. The lake in their college town was 
dry, and a big wildfire had destroyed a favorite recreational area and its resident plants 
and animals. One morning Sam felt nauseous but attributed it to something she ate. Not 
long after, Tom developed severe muscle aches but thought it was related to something 
he lifted for his professor. All seemed well until one evening while studying for an exam, 
Sam found that she was unable to hold her textbook properly. Her muscles felt weak and 
she noticed her temperature was elevated. Not long after she lost consciousness and had 
to be rushed to the emergency room.  By the time she regained consciousness, Tom had 
also been admitted to the same hospital.  After several tests, scans, and analyses, they 
were both diagnosed with Cryptosporidiosis (a.k.a. Crypto), a serious waterborne disease 





that can be fatal.  As healthy college students Sam and Tom never imagined they were at 
risk for drought related diseases, but they were at risk.  
 
Today both Sam and Tom are helping to spread the word 
about drought to people on their college campus.  They 
remind others that wasting water can exacerbate the 
personal effects of drought and that they need to: 
 Close the tap when brushing teeth  
 Take shorter showers  
 Consume only bottled water (even in food) when 
water levels are low 
 Don’t flush toilets after urinating (let yellow mellow, flush down brown) 
 Actively seek more information about drought 
They know all too well that drought and its serious consequences (e.g., high food costs) 
can strike anywhere and therefore anyone in the U.S., EVEN YOU. Scientists say 
climate change will increase the risk of drought. It is not early to prepare yourself 







































Appendix H: Estimated Marginal Means for Risk Frame × 
Demographic Similarity × Scene Similarity ANCOVA 
 



















Low 33.764 2.205 
High 35.061 2.206 
High 
Low 36.875 2.140 
High 34.753 2.349 
Environment 
Low 
Low 37.929 2.238 
High 41.622 1.966 
High 
Low 40.262 2.083 




Low 67.826 2.059 
High 70.466 2.061 
High 
Low 72.742 1.999 
High 65.765 2.195 
Environment 
Low 
Low 69.510 2.091 
High 71.423 1.837 
High 
Low 67.075 1.946 




Low 46.915 2.427 
High 56.349 2.429 
High 
Low 51.369 2.356 
High 52.157 2.586 
Environment 
Low 
Low 53.622 2.464 
High 51.690 2.165 
High 
Low 53.253 2.294 




Low 37.033 2.286 
High 42.313 2.287 
High 
Low 33.760 2.218 
High 37.909 2.436 
Environment 
Low 
Low 38.888 2.321 
High 33.462 2.038 
High 
Low 37.667 2.160 
High 36.366 2.324 


















High 34.133 2.217 
High 
Low 27.791 2.150 
High 37.931 2.361 
Environment 
Low 
Low 28.355 2.249 
High 29.320 1.976 
High 
Low 33.062 2.094 






Low 28.228 2.305 
High 26.945 2.307 
High 
Low 46.263 2.237 
High 63.199 2.457 
Environment 
Low 
Low 31.818 2.340 
High 27.782 2.056 
High 
Low 43.133 2.179 






Low 28.506 2.234 
High 53.357 2.236 
High 
Low 37.750 2.168 
High 60.126 2.381 
Environment 
Low 
Low 30.866 2.268 
High 43.289 1.993 
High 
Low 32.776 2.112 
High 57.504 2.272 
Note. Covariates appearing in the model are evaluated at the following values: Personal 


























Low 72.388 3.159 
High 60.035 3.161 
High 
Low 64.669 3.066 
High 58.735 3.366 
Environment 
Low 
Low 51.059 3.207 
High 53.878 2.834 
High 
Low 58.083 3.004 
High 53.418 3.213 
Behavioral Intention 




Low 38.258 3.195 
High 30.177 3.197 
High 
Low 28.868 3.100 
High 31.177 3.404 
Environment 
Low 
Low 28.447 3.243 
High 31.331 2.885 
High 
Low 29.668 3.039 
High 27.017 3.248 
Behavioral Intention 
(Seek information  
when there is time)c 
Health 
Low 
Low 38.731 3.212 
High 39.611 3.214 
High 
Low 37.098 3.117 
High 34.929 3.423 
Environment 
Low 
Low 37.248 3.261 
High 37.425 2.865 
High 
Low 34.989 3.035 






Low 60.652 3.497 
High 49.458 3.500 
High 
Low 52.840 3.394 
High 47.807 3.727 
Environment 
Low 
Low 44.303 3.551 
High 48.907 3.119 
High 
Low 47.383 3.327 




Low 31.939 3.337 


















(Seek information  
one week)e 
High 
Low 30.643 3.239 
High 26.504 3.556 
Environment 
Low 
Low 30.557 3.388 
High 33.879 2.976 
High 
Low 26.505 3.154 
High 30.776 3.394 
Behavioral 
Expectation 
(Seek information  
when there is time)f 
Health 
Low 
Low 31.939 3.337 
High 33.320 3.340 
High 
Low 30.643 3.239 




Low 30.557 3.388 
High 33.879 2.976 
High 
Low 
Low 26.505 3.154 





Low 67.419 3.439 
High 64.954 3.390 
High 
Low 63.170 3.287 
High 54.875 3.641 
Environment 
Low 
Low 63.677 3.439 
High 62.496 3.040 
High 
Low 61.984 3.202 
High 62.854 3.445 
Response Efficacy 




Low 45.794 3.544 
High 46.996 3.546 
High 
Low 44.996 3.439 
High 46.333 3.777 
Environment 
Low 
Low 32.168 3.598 
High 33.407 3.180 
High 
Low 23.848 3.350 
High 31.891 3.604 
Response Efficacy 
(Seek information  
when there is time)i 
Health 
Low 
Low 44.515 3.497 
High 47.271 3.499 
High 
Low 44.183 3.393 
High 46.367 3.726 
Environment Low 
Low 32.364 3.550 



















Low 24.758 3.305 
High 35.838 3.556 
 
 
Note. Covariates appearing in the model are evaluated at the following values:  
a. Personal relevance = 45.646, Optimistic Bias = 28.177, Climate Change = 57.530 
b. Personal relevance = 45.690, Optimistic Bias = 28.087, Climate Change = 57.428 
c. Personal relevance = 45.814, Optimistic Bias = 28.103, Climate Change = 57.649 
d. Personal relevance = 45.708, Optimistic Bias = 28.121, Climate Change= 57.502 
e. Personal relevance = 45.793, Optimistic Bias = 27.906, Climate Change= 57.654 
f. Personal relevance = 45.730, Optimistic Bias = 28.051, Climate Change= 57.543 
g. Personal relevance = 45.697, Optimistic Bias = 28.242, Climate Change= 57.476 
h. Personal relevance = 45.697, Optimistic Bias = 28.242, Climate Change= 57.522 




Appendix I: Estimated Marginal Means for Personal Relevance × 






















Low 22.477 3.749 
High 23.014 3.541 
High 
Low 24.450 3.406 
High 23.757 3.694 
Environment 
Low 
Low 31.814 3.641 
High 27.500 3.109 
High 
Low 29.287 3.694 




Low 44.779 3.641 
High 46.048 3.868 
High 
Low 49.228 3.694 
High 48.509 4.070 
Environment 
Low 
Low 49.581 3.694 
High 57.525 3.406 
High 
Low 55.268 3.364 





Low 59.098 3.334 
High 62.270 3.149 
High 
Low 67.500 3.028 
High 55.000 3.285 
Environment 
Low 
Low 65.086 3.238 
High 63.734 2.765 
High 
Low 60.154 3.285 




Low 77.629 3.238 
High 79.129 3.440 
High 
Low 79.287 3.285 
High 77.188 3.620 
Environment 
Low 
Low 78.904 3.285 
High 78.300 3.028 
High 
Low 75.165 2.991 




Low 42.860 3.643 
High 52.517 3.440 
High 
Low 42.044 3.309 
High 43.974 3.589 





















High 45.625 3.021 
High 
Low 46.217 3.589 




Low 53.254 3.537 
High 58.847 3.759 
High 
Low 61.735 3.589 
High 60.531 3.955 
Environment 
Low 
Low 61.989 3.589 
High 55.897 3.309 
High 
Low 61.134 3.268 





Low 31.080 3.475 
High 35.439 3.282 
High 
Low 21.341 3.157 
High 29.504 3.424 
Environment 
Low 
Low 31.764 3.374 
High 23.534 2.881 
High 
Low 29.438 3.424 




Low 44.707 3.374 
High 48.052 3.586 
High 
Low 49.092 3.424 
High 47.098 3.773 
Environment 
Low 
Low 49.592 3.424 
High 43.147 3.157 
High 
Low 47.463 3.118 





Low 24.212 3.482 
High 23.146 3.289 
High 
Low 16.070 3.163 
High 31.465 3.431 
Environment 
Low 
Low 18.846 3.382 
High 22.517 2.888 
High 
Low 23.671 3.431 




Low 40.886 3.382 
High 43.232 3.593 
High 
Low 42.288 3.431 
High 44.921 3.781 
Environment Low 
Low 39.994 3.431 






















Low 45.122 3.124 







Low 26.152 3.354 
High 23.294 3.168 
High 
Low 46.742 3.047 
High 63.144 3.304 
Environment 
Low 
Low 29.317 3.257 
High 19.940 2.781 
High 
Low 44.101 3.304 




Low 29.863 3.257 
High 29.953 3.461 
High 
Low 46.905 3.304 
High 60.079 3.641 
Environment 
Low 
Low 34.935 3.304 
High 37.478 3.047 
High 
Low 43.995 3.009 






Low 25.490 3.319 
High 49.722 3.134 
High 
Low 34.795 3.014 
High 57.759 3.269 
Environment 
Low 
Low 27.616 3.222 
High 42.045 2.752 
High 
Low 31.971 3.269 





Low 30.031 3.222 
High 55.091 3.424 
High 
Low 41.072 3.269 




Low 34.909 3.269 
High 45.711 3.014 
High 
Low 
Low 35.647 2.977 







Low 70.212 4.744 
High 49.649 4.481 
High 
Low 58.075 4.309 
High 47.471 4.674 
Environment 
Low 
Low 41.971 4.607 
High 41.188 3.934 

























Low 76.343 4.607 
High 72.516 4.895 
High 
Low 72.824 4.674 
High 70.714 5.151 
Environment 
Low 
Low 62.676 4.674 
High 66.923 4.364 
High 
Low 73.175 4.309 








Low 29.667 4.793 
High 13.622 4.526 
High 
Low 18.750 4.353 
High 19.206 4.722 
Environment 
Low 
Low 20.171 4.654 
High 20.170 4.016 
High 
Low 15.500 4.722 




Low 46.629 4.654 
High 46.161 4.945 
High 
Low 41.500 4.722 
High 43.929 5.203 
Environment 
Low 
Low 42.000 4.722 
High 43.846 4.409 
High 
Low 44.625 4.353 
High 38.765 4.722 
Behavioral 
Intention 
(Seek information  





Low 32.970 4.881 
High 22.000 4.610 
High 
Low 25.600 4.434 
High 25.441 4.809 
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1 Parasocial interaction refers to the imagined face-to-face relationship between the audience and the 
character(s) in narrative (Horton & Wohl, 1956; Moyer-Gusé, 2008). 
 
2 The Green and Brock (2000) version of the transportation scale contained 11 general items and 8 items 
specific to vivid imagery in the narrative. In the original 11-item version measured for the main study (4 
items were later dropped), nine of the items matched those in Green and Brock’s general 11- item version, 
but two items were replaced with questions about vivid imagery. Specifically, “The events of the narrative 
are relevant to my everyday life” and “The events in the narrative have changed my life” were replaced 
with “I have vivid images of the characters in the story” and “I have vivid images of the scenes in the 
story.” 
 
3 These three items were reverse-coded before doing all analyses involving the transportation scale. 
 
4 The article by Greenough et al. (2001) was part of an assessment about the health effects of climate 
variability and change that was sponsored by the United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 
 
5 The test for linearity suggested that attitude to climate change had a nonlinear relationship with perceived 
scene similarity and perceived demographic similarity, however those two variables (the latter two) were 
not part of the main dependent variables of interest. 
 
6 In the dissertation narratives, high scene similarity was represented by an urban scene, and low scene 
similarity was represented by a rural scene. The manipulation check showed that participants perceived the 
urban scene to be more similar to their locale than the rural scene. 
 
7 Sjöberg (2004) argued that the virtues of the psychometric paradigm are based on improper data analyses, 
specifically the use of means versus raw scores.  Sjöberg claimed that when means are used the dread and 
unknown dimensions account for as much as 80% of the variance in risk perception, but when raw scores 
are used, these dimensions account for only 20 - 25% of the variance. Furthermore, Sjöberg (2000; 2004) 
contended that even with additional dimensions, the psychometric paradigm is still left wanting as a means 
of explaining risk perception, as it rarely goes beyond explaining 30 – 40% of the variance when raw 
scores, rather than means are used in the factor analyses. 
